4th North Carolina at Seven Pines by Philip Hatfield [Archive]

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06-21-2007, 07:41 PM

The following is posted here with the permission of the author, Philip B. Hatfield. Please do not reproduce this article without out his expressed written consent.

4th North Carolina Infantry at the Battle of Seven Pines:
“A Victory, but Dearly Bought”
By: Philip B. Hatfield, Ph.D.
Member, Company of Military Historians

http://docs.google.com/File?id=dc4fv89z_7gjnz3jhf
Painting of Confederate attack at Seven Pines
In late May 1862, the Army of the Potomac was literally fighting it’s way up the Virginia
Peninsula toward Richmond. Intense battles at Yorktown and Williamsburg failed to stop
the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George B. McClellan. The
confederates under General Joseph Johnston were falling back toward Richmond. As the
two armies converged on Richmond, Tar Heels under General Daniel Harvey Hill were
preparing for what would be their first full engagement, and suffering intense discipline
as well as harsh environmental conditions. As Sgt Ashbel Fraley1 of company F, 4th
North Carolina Infantry and his comrades marched toward Richmond following battles at
Williamsburg and Yorktown, he daily made time to express his blithe yet humorous
views on superior officer, campaign and army life in general in his diary. Beginning on
May 5 1862, he wrote in his diary:
May 5 Attempt to leave camp and continue our march. Raining. The road is blocked with the trains of wagons OBS. A marching army is a mass of the grandest confusion I ever saw.
Battle of Williamsburg, 4th N.C. - After marching four miles through mud and rain were ordered back to the fight, were not actively engaged.
May 22 Brigade Drill. Regular humbug! Intolerable nuisance. It’s general uses.
(1) To keep the men from enjoying a little rest, which they so much need.
(2) To take out the sick men that the surgeon alway refuses to excuse from duty (tho’ they are scarcely able to walk) that our Cols & Gen’s may have the gratification of seeing them faint and fall in the boiling sun.
(3) To make the men careless in drill that the officers may have the pleasure of speaking to them as to Negroes.

(4) To exasperate the men beyond the endurance of patience, and they may curse and swear so the Devil will reap the greater harvest in eternity.
(5) That the Gen and his aides may show their uniform suits; and (tho’ they know it not) their ignorance,
“O wadsome powder the gift to gi’ us,
Tocorusel’ or sell as others see us;
It would from many a blunder free us,
And foolish notion.”

Another 4th N.C. soldier, Private Joseph F. Gibson2, wrote to his parents on May 23rd

after having been seriously ill, also complaining of the trials of the march to Richmond.
The letter elsewhere indicates that their knapsacks had been stored on wagons originally:
“…This is marching back and forwards I can’t tell how long this will last I hope
it may not last long I hope…This marching through the mud this is no fun in it
certain and sure. We haven’t any tents now our blankets is all the shelter
now…the roads was so muddy that they had to throw the knapsacks out…”

On May 29th Sgt. Fraley indicates he would not have missed his knapsack:
“…By some fool command we carry our knapsacks with us -- it is seldome that a sensible order comes round. Yet one did last night, - - That was to leave our knapsacks in Camp and go unencumbered. But the discovery was made (unfortunately) that it was sensible, and revoked this morning.”

On Friday night, May 30, a violent thunderstorm suddenly hit the area turning the river

and into wildly rushing water and roads into a muddy mess. McClellan’s army separated

as a result, although two Federal Corps, that of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman’s

III Corps and Major General Erasmus Darwin Keyes’ IV Corps managed to cross the

river and establish a line of earthworks and abatis near the village of Seven Pines. The
federal works extended northeast toward Fair Oaks about one mile north of Seven Pines

on the Richmond and York River Railroad.3 The stage was now set for the much awaited

fight for Richmond.
Johnston’s four Confederate infantry columns encountered Union pickets along the
Williamsburg Road early on May 31st, near the crossing of 9 Mile and Richmond Roads
at a small village known as Seven Pines. The complex and risky battle orders were given
verbally, and as a result quickly disintegrated according to Newton (1993). During the
morning of May 31st General James Longstreet, instead of using the Nine Mile Road as
ordered, moved his division down the Williamsburg road, which had been assigned to
support D. H. Hill’s and General Benjamin Huger’s divisions.
The 4th North Carolina Infantry were assigned to the brigade commanded by Brigadier

General Albert Featherston, who had been stricken with an illness a few days before, and

subsequently Colonel George B. Anderson was placed in command of the brigade under

D. H. Hill. Union picket lines extended approximately three-quarters of a mile along the

Williamsburg road toward Richmond from Seven Pines. General Joe Johnston wanted

attack the Federals while they were separated, and hence limited to Corps strength. He

placed D.H. Hill’s division at the spearhead of the attack in line of battle along the

Williamsburg road. However, D.H. Hill’s division stood on arms from approximately 8

a.m. until almost 1 p.m. without firing a shot, listening while the battle began to pitch.

The delay was related to a dispute occurring between James Longstreet and General

Huger over who had seniority.4 Concerned that further delays would impair the

Confederate attack, Hill decided to attack just after 1 p.m., and the confederates quickly

drove in federal skirmish lines along the Williamsburg Road. D.H. Hill’s division was

first in the line of battle. He struck Keyes’ positions, unsupported by Longstreet who

would not arrive until later. Sgt Ashbel Fraley described his experience in the May 31,

1862 in a rather fragmented entry in his diary, speaking of frantic conditions on the field

when the battle opened, and the results:
“Aroused before daylight and all are prepared to march. Move back and to the left one or two miles. Stack arms in the woods. But soon receive orders to prepare to go into battle. Made password “our homes” response “our firesides”
Leave our knapsacks in the woods March toward the picket lines Firing commences See the Stars and Stripes. Run through the advance attacking battalion. Charge the enemy’s battery. Terrific struggle. And hit with a ball but not much hurt Keep with the Company. Dreadful slaughter. Reg falls back. Rally again. Advance with 5th Ala. Battery taken. Continue to advance. Yankee’s shoot close. Captain Simonton killed.
Fall back. Night closes on. Only 54 men present with coulors. Night comes in. Go to carry up the wounded. Are engaged till near midnight. Try to find my way back to camp but fail. Made a fire and sleep by the roadside. A victory, but dearly bought.”

http://docs.google.com/File?id=dc4fv89z_8c7q2dcgr
Map of D.H. Hill’s Division’s 1 pm assault

Major Brian Grimes was in command of the 4th N.C. at Seven Pines.5 The regiment was

on the brigade’s right front and had moved far in front of the other regiments in Colonel

Anderson’s Brigade (49th VA, 28th GA, 27th GA) in the initial assault. Navigating the

terrain was difficult, if not impossible; the fields around Seven Pines village were now

mud bogs and covered with thick growths of trees. Recent rains had left large puddles, in

some places with waist-deep water.6

In spite of the delays and confusion over orders, the 4th N.C. regiment ‘saw the elephant’

in its first full advance as a “splendid picture of manhood” according to Captain E.A.

Osborne.6 However, shortly afterward moving forward, the 4th N.C. began to suffer

casualties from enfilading Federal artillery from a battery concealed behind strong works

just to the left of the Williamsburg road. Not far in front of this strong redoubt was a

tangled line of abatis where Casey’s Federal Division was dug in. Major Grimes noted

the terrain made it difficult to manage the alignment of the regiment.5 Soldiers in the 4th

N.C. could hear the battle pitching to their right, and Captain Osbourn described “heavy

musketry on the right indicated that the battle was raging there with terrible fury.”6

When the 4th N.C. advanced ahead of the supporting brigade on the right, Federal artillery

and musket fire began to exact heavy casualty tolls on the regiment. While waiting for

supporting brigades to move up, Grimes managed to briefly move the regiment inside a

small body of woods giving the 4th N.C. time to realign. However, the heavy Federal

artillery redoubt with supporting infantry regiments assisted them approximately one-half

mile on their right front. This earth work was the center of the Federal line, and flanked

on both wings by infantry concealed in extensive earthworks and protected by

abatis in front.

Footnote: Abatis were felled trees with branches shaved one to three feet or more and sharpened, then one end was stuck in the ground, with the other end protruding outward. The purpose was to delay advancing infantry as much as possible.

Private S.A. Hoover,7 of Company C, recalled the scene in his post-war recollections:
“…The next day was the battle of Seven Pines - there we met the Yankee’s behind their breastworks - we had to charge their batteries through a piece of cut down forest, which was cut and thrown in every direction. The limbs cut off from two to four feet from body of trees in order to keep us from advancing rapidly, so they would have a better chance to cut us down, but we got through that thicket and got their battery but lost lots of good men…lay on battlefield all that night. My brother John was mortally wounded the same day and died the next day. He and I were taken to the field hospital the next morning and then to the railroad station where they loaded us on the cars and took us up to Richmond hospital…My clothing was so thoroughly saturated with blood they asked me if I was a Yankee or a Southerner. I was taken to hospital at Richmond, lay there two months.”

As Major Grimes advanced the 4th N.C. toward the Federal position at the right

oblique under intense fire, they quickly stepped from the woods. Corporal B.B. Ross,8

Company I, 4th N.C. wrote about his experience during this part of the advance:
“When we were marching to Seven Pines we passed through a huckleberry pond. The woods was thick, and water was half a leg deep. While in the midst of this pond a shell exploded over us and cut the calf of one leg off, and tore the other ankle into pieces of Raleigh Rowe in our company. The piece went through the hat of Tom Crawford and tore the skin on top of his head. Another piece knocked the bugle off Lient. Creekmur’s hat. The Captain told me to pull Raleigh Rowe out of the water, and make him as comfortable as possible. By the time I had ministered to Rowe, the Company had left me and I had to go through the pond alone. In going through, the cannon balls were striking in water all around me, spattering mud in my face. I rushed forward, trying to catch up with the Company, but did not catch them until they had got in front of the breastworks.”

Foot note: Lt. Creekmur is a misspelling – Corporal Ross is likely referring to 1st Lt. Willam Coughenour.

Lt W.C. Coughenour, Company K (Rowan Rifles) mentioned by Corporal Ross, would

soon be sent home for convalesce following his wounds received at Seven Pines. The

Carolina Watchman9 back home in Rowan County North Carolina reported on September

8, 1862 the following humorous account of an accident he apparently suffered while on

medical leave following Seven Pines, suggesting things at home could be equally

dangerous as things on the front:
“Captain Coughenhour recovered after a fall from a second story window at Morganton.”

Foot Note: Nothing was cited as to why Lt. Coughenhour was perched in that window.

Corporal Ross’s participation in the action was not over yet. He further wrote:
“…In Seven Pines battle I was within twenty yards of the breastworks when I was struck in my left breast. I had on my overcoat with twentyrounds of cartridges in my left breast-pocket. The ball went through all of these, into my uniform coat - pocket, and made holes through about 20 letters in my coat, several holes in my handkerchief in that pocket and lodged in there. When I regained consciousness, I felt that death would claim me in a few minutes, for I was sure the ball had gone through me. Our company was ordered to fall back, but I remained where I was to die. But after seeing the havock played in our regiment when they did fall back - as many killed as when going forward, for the Yankees kept “pouring it into them,” and out of fifty-two men and officers and Company I, 30 were killed or wounded - I concluded to move if possible. I slipped over the fence out of the field, and got behind a stump. There was wounded Yankee behind the stump, so I got at his feet. While I was lying there, a cannon ball struck the stump in front of us, split it open, blew it up, and stuck the top end in the ground, one piece about six inches from me on one side, and about one foot off on the other side. The Yankee whose ankle was broken, crawled to another stump, but I, seeing the uselessness of the stump, remained where I was. While lying there, I summed up courage to examine my wound, and found that the ball, which I thought had gone through my side, had lodged in my pocket. My side was badly bruised but I felt relief to find the bullet, and although I was suffering dreadfully, I went into camp.”

During the initial advance of the 4th N.C., the original color bearer, 1st Cpl James

Bowers of Company K (Rowan Rifles) was killed while holding the flag in his hand.9

As he lay dying, he told a comrade to be sure and “…Tell Mr. Brunner that I died with

my face to the enemy.” Ironically, Bowers enlisted on May 30, 1861 and was killed a

year and one day later on May 31, 1862 at Seven Pines.10 The Carolina Watchmen

reported the following regarding James Bower’s death:

“James Bowers (CO K) printer’s devil for the Watchman, killed at battle of Richmond. He had responded to the call of Gov Ellis and went with the Rowan Rifles guard to Wilmington on April 21, 1861, when the CO was invited to vol for three years or the war, he was the first to step forth. He performed his duty faithfully with us and regularly wrote us letters from the front.”

Foot Note: Printers Devil was a nickname for apprentice. Bowers had worked for a
Mr.Brunner at the print shop.

With Bower’s death, another color bearer quickly picked up the flag. No available

sources consistently identify of this color bearer, although he too quickly fell only to be

followed by yet another new color bearer who also soon fell in only minutes.6

Once the regiment advanced out into the open field, Major Grimes discovered yet another

artillery section had opened on his left wing and they subsequently continued to suffer

heavy casualties due to being entangled by abatis, unable to consistently return fire.

Major Grimes described the battle field as a “muddy plowed field miring the men ankle

deep at nearly every step…”4 Finally, the Georgians and Virginia regiments had

managed to catch up, and Grimes ordered the Tar Heels forward. At this point, the 4th

N.C. had its first experience of returning mass (volley) fire to the Federals. Captain E.A.

Osbourn wrote:
“…Opened fire upon the enemy with such deadly effect as the cause a momentary lull in the storm of deadly missiles that were assailing us…but again the enemy renewed his fire with redoubled fury.” 6

Onward the 4th N.C. advanced until they encountered a small rail fence where they

briefly halted to await support on the right.5 Unfortunately, support never came up, and

their position was continually exposed. Captain Osbourn noted, “It was evident that the

regiment could not remain there without being utterly destroyed.” He saw Major Grimes

“sitting calmly on his iron-gray horse, with one leg thrown over the saddle bow, as

afterwards so often seen on the battlefield.” He later described Lt Col Grimes as

appearing as “an angel of war” sitting on his horse.6 Finally, Osbourn approached

Grimes and insisted that he order a charge; he shouted over the din of battle “Major, we

cant stand this. Let us charge the works!” Grimes responded, “Charge them! Charge

them!”

Newton (1993) has recently opined that when E.A. Osborn spied Lt Col Grimes sitting on

his horse, and described him as appearing to be “an angel of war” the reality may have

been that possibly, Grimes was simply wondering just what to do next. He would later

gain quite a reputation as a fighter and battlefield tactician, rising to become the last

Major General appointed in the Army of Northern Virginia in 1865.4 But Seven Pines

was his first real attack, and Grimes, a lawyer rather a soldier by training, was hardly a

seasoned officer. Sitting calmly on his horse may well have been as much as he could

think of to do.

The North Carolinians advanced to within roughly 100 yards of the Federal redoubt when

Major Grime’s horse was shot out from under him, sending him tumbling to the ground.

For a while, he was literally buried under the horse, whose head was torn off by a Federal

artillery projectile.5 Grimes described to his wife later that “The regiment seeing me fall,

supposed killed for wounded, and began to falter and waiver…I …waived my sword and

shouted “Forward! Forward!” and the regiment moved forward.”

Major Grimes further stated, “Some of the men came to my assistance and pulled the

horse off”(p. 14). Not far away, Second Lieutenant R.D. Funkhouser of the Virginia

regiment was watching Grimes, who after having his horse removed from him, quickly

jumped up and grabbed the regimental flag and began waving it to motivate the men.

Fearing that Grimes would be targeted while waving the flag, the lieutenant yelled “Let

me carry the flag!” only to hear Grimes retort “Lieutenant, your life is worth as much as

mine”10

Somewhat disoriented now, Grimes continued to observe the assault from behind the

regiment, which had now gotten between 30 or 40 yards of the redoubt. Federal fire

intensified until the regiment was unable to advance further. The regiment remained

unsupported on both flanks when Grimes realized “We were two hundred yards in

advance of any other regiment.”11

Major Grimes further reported in the official records that after fighting in the exposed

position for several minutes, he decided to order the men to fall back toward “a ditch

midway between the redoubt and entangled woods.” However, as the regiment began to

retire in reasonably good order, the color bearer apparently became confused by Grimes

orders and fell back all the way to the previous line of abatis. As men in the ditch (which

afforded some cover) began to follow the flag to the rear, Grimes ordered the regiment to

halt now approximately 250 yards from the Federal line.4 Grimes described the casualties:
“As in evidence of the severity of thefire of the enemy while in front of the battery 46 of my men were found killed within an area of one acre.”11

Although the Confederates did not yet realize it, many of the inexperienced Federal

regiments from New York and Pennsylvania as well as the artillerists were already

beginning to withdraw from the redoubt.3 The North Carolinians were generally

psychologically shaken and nearly physically exhausted by this point. However, while

taking cover in the ditch, 4th N.C. soldiers witnessed a Confederate battery open fire into

the Federal lines which bolstered their courage, and Grimes debated what to do next.

Captain E.A. Osborn described scene when Major Grimes suddenly ordered the 4th N.C.

to charge into the federal redoubt from the ditch:
“On we rushed with such impetuosity and determination that the enemy abandoned everything and retired.”6

Grimes described yet another dramatic event occurring in the charge:
“After allowing my men time to recover from their fatigue,…just then I saw my third color-bearer shot down. Captain Simonton (sic A.K. Simonton of Company A) and myself to raise the colors. Captain Simonton reaching them first, placed them in my hands, raising them aloft, calling upon my men to rally around their standard. It was done with alacrity, and together with several other regiments, we reached the redoubt, the enemy fleeing.”11

During this final assault on the enemy redoubt, Captain A.K. Simonton, who had held

the 4th N.C. colors in the ditch, was killed instantly, and Captain James H. Wood of

Company B was seriously wounded among many others. Major Grimes also described

the earlier counter attack as “a fearful storm of shot, shell, grape and canister…(which)

tore through the trees, plowing up the ground of every side and cutting down the branches

and saplings around us.”11

Private James H. Carter,12 Company C, wrote to his father regarding the fate of the 4th N.C. flag in the battle:
Preceeding camp 4 N.C.S Troops near Richmond,VA
My Dear Father,

Under very unfavorable surcustances I am trying to drop you a few lines. We the 4 N.C. attacted the Yankeys the last day of May and had a very hard faught battle. Our flag was shot down four time but was picked up and carried in the Yankey batery waving though the staf was broken by a bum shel and the flag shot to pieces.

During this second assault on the Federal redoubt, Captain Osborn observed the ground

was “literally covered” with the dead and wounded of the 4th N.C. Following the battle,

Major Grimes John Stikeleather,13 Company C, requested to become the new color bearer

of the 4th Regiment. John Stikeleather would carry the 4th N.C. colors for the duration of

the war without being seriously wounded, although he was struck in the right shoulder

with a spent Minnie ball at Chancellorsville a year later. He attributed his safe return to

his conversion to Christianity during the war. He surrendered at Appomattox in April,

1865 and took the oath of allegiance. Stikeleather wrote a through post war account of

his experiences, including his experience at Seven Pines:
“My own experience in that terrible fight, briefly stated, may not be out of place at this time. As we approached the field of carnage, and the bullets began to whistle around us, and the cannon balls commenced plowing through our ranks, and an occasional wounded soldier passed us going to the rear, our feelings can be better imagined than described. I confess I did not feel sure whether I could
stand the test or not, but, just at this juncture, and incident occurred that helped
me along wonderfully, and I have often felt thankful since that it did occur just
when it did. The incident was this; among the wounded wending this way to the
rear was a Georgia boy probably not more than 16 years old, slightly wounded in
the arm, boo-hooing right out. Someone near me called to him and asked how the
fight was going. His reply between his cries and sobs was “They are whipping us
like hell.” Evidently, he was badly whipped. There was something so ludicrous in
his manner that I immediately responded thus, that may do for woman or a child,
but not for a man, whereupon I gave my courage another twist, and kept moving
to the front. I received no hurt in the battle, but had my cap box shot off, and
passing a wounded Yankee soldier just after I discovered its loss asked him to give
me his. The poor fellow said “Take it, I am too badly wounded to give it to you.”
No one but those who have been there knows the gratitude that wells up in the heart
of a soldier at this escape unhurt form battle…”

Ironically, except for Stikeleather, the 4th N.C. color guard would once again be all

killed or wounded at Chancellorsville. Another 4th N.C. member, William R. Gorman,14

served as a stretcher bearer since he was a member of the 4th North Carolina Brass Band.

He left a chilling account of the battlefield after the firing had ceased, written a few weeks later in his diary:
June 28, 1862 About four o’clock on Saturday we found the hospital of D.H. Hills division. Though I had my feelings wrought up to a high pitch, looking on the mutilated dead, on those bloody fields; yet that feeling was nothing compared to what I saw and heard, when I saw the wounded, and heard the dying groans of those devoted braves. I shudder while I write about it. I am going to tell you a tale of horror which was true, and may God forbid that I ever have to witness the like again! …The dead, none being there to bury them, lay among the suffering and dying, form which arose the most sickening stench. Their lifeless bodies were almost in motion with the myriad maggots that infested them. Oh! It was horrible! Too awful to think about. Nor is this all. I myself did a task there that makes my flesh crawl to think of. A man from Company C, 4th Regiment, told me something hurt him under his arm. He was shot through the right breast, breaking his collor bone. When I looked, horror of horrors! One thousand maggots were working there. I borrowed a pair of scissors and went to work, and it took me half an hour to remove them. Such a grateful look did he give me that I could have done anything. Those three days were days of horror -- a “reign of terror” indeed. Our regiment only lost about 60 killed and wounded. One of the killed in that Company, a fine young man, Paul Barger, gave me his pocketbook before we started, stating that possibly he might be killed and he did not want a to have his money. That was the last I ever saw of him.

After the battle, Col George B. Anderson pulled his brigade back from the Federal

redoubt and began to reorganize in a small clearing located near the Williamsburg road.

The evening roll call reflected 54 men present, and the entire color guard had been killed

or wounded, including the entire color guard.11 That night the men of the 4th N.C. slept

on arms laying on the ground, “surrounded by dead and wounded , both men and

animals” while the air was filled with cries and groans of the wounded and dying.5 

The next day, June 1, 1862, fighting again commenced at nearby Fair Oaks Station,

approximately one mile from Seven Pines. General Joe Johnston was severely wounded

on the 31st and replaced by Robert E. Lee on June 1st. Major Grimes managed to get to

a telegraph station that day and informed his brother William that he was unhurt on the

31st, and mentioned the 4th N.C. battle flag was “shot 32 times” at Seven Pines.15 The 4th

N.C. were not actively engaged during the fighting at Fair Oaks on June 1, 1862. The

battle of Seven Pines literally “shattered” the 4th N.C., who entered the battle with 25

officers and 520 non-commissioned officers and men, only to end with every officer

except Grimes was killed or wounded, 462 killed and wounded, (77 were killed on the

field) and 99 men mortally wounded, with the last casualty passing away before the end

of July later that summer.4,11 This amounts to roughly 89 percent of those engaged with

six officially listed as missing.16 The 4th N.C. is believed by some researchers to have

suffered the highest percentage loss in a single battle of any regiment in the war on either

side.4 Whether the statistics are complete or not, these staggering losses at Seven Pines

earned the regiment the grim sobriquet “Bloody 4th.” 6 Truly “A Victory, but Dearly

bought.”1

Epilogue

After the battle, 46 dead solders from the 4th N.C. Regiment were removed from a

one-acre trench in front of the Federal artillery redoubt as reported by Lt Col Grimes in

the official records, to an unknown site along the Williamsburg Road. Perhaps the most

stirring and fitting conclusion to the story of the 4th North Carolina at the Battle of Seven

Pines is provided by Sgt Ashbel Fraley, who would later be promoted to Second

Lieutenant. On July 2, 1862 he made the following entry in his diary:

“After finishing our labours, we proceed toward Richmond and pass the
battlefield of Seven Pines. We were marching right in front. When opposite the
graves of those of our regiment who fell there the Col gave the command, “On the
right by file into line -- march!” I was inwardly cursing him for his awkwardness in placing the markers, when the evolution was completed, as the same time unable to conjecture what he was going to do. But my unpleasant feelings toward him were suddenly stopped and changed to the warmest and most solemn affection, by a very unexpected and solemn scene. We were then fronting to the grave of the killed from our regiment on the 31st of May, 74 all buried together. The Col commanded, “Present arms”. Then taking off his hat he said, “Fellow Soldiers! There is no more fitting place to render thanks to almighty God we have been spared to avenge their death’s, than by the graves of those who fell by our sides fighting so gallantly for their country’s rights. Let each one silently within his own heart return thanks to God that we have been permitted to live, to again see the last solemn resting place of our companions and friends.” A solemn
pause ensued. The Col like the remainder of the regiment was not a religious
man; but it made the scene more affecting. “Shoulder Arms” and “Left Face” was
commanded and we proceeded toward Richmond. Went into camp two miles
from the city.”

Finally, Sgt. Fraley demonstrates the deep impression that his unit’s losses at Seven Pines

(and his modus operandi of bemoaning daily solider life) had left on him, even after the

intense fighting they endured in the Seven Days Battles around Richmond a few weeks

later. Sgt Fraley wrote nearly three weeks later:

July 23, 1862 Do. Do. (Sic – his abbreviation for duty)

But when I say “regular duties” I don’t mean the same duties that once we pursued. Alas! Poor 4th N.Carolina! drilling! -- but what is drilling now! Without a commander; without confident subordinate officers, our movements are supremely ridiculous (sic by original author). Privates turns with a sneer at the unpardonable ignorance of their commanders, while they (some of the officers) become capteious and weakly tyrannical; miguidely thinking thus to assume the commander; and thus atone for what is not comprehended within the narrow
limits of his own military genius. But blame not the 4th N.C. Once the pride of the state. Once the praise of all. ‘Tis a sad story that tells what reduced it to this. It is written in blood, and may be read on the battlefield of Seven Pines,
and those of the 26th and 27th June -- a story that has made bleed harder hearts than mine. Then; --be kind to the sad relic of the 4th N.C.

Foot Note: Lt. Ashbel S. Fraley was severely wounded in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley
campaign. After remaining four days at Winchester he started in an ambulance for Staunton, VA with the intention of going to Richmond or home to North Carolina. His conditioned became worse on the way and when he arrived in Staunton, he was unable to proceed further. He entered the hospital and continued gradually sinking until the morning of October 14, 1862 when he expired. His remains now rest in Unity Church - Yard, Rowan County, North Carolina. When I informed of his death, Brian Grimes replied, “Then Company A has lost it best man.”4

END NOTE:
The author traveled to the small village of Seven Pines, Virginia, on May 31, 2002 the 140th anniversary of

the Battle of Seven Pines. While standing on route 60 facing the small state marker pointing out

McClellan’s early skirmish line, it was possible to speculate regarding the location of the mass grave

ostensibly containing fallen members of the 4th N.C. from their charge on the federal redoubt there. At the

time of the 140th anniversary, no evidence was found of any steps previously taken to recover and re-inter

these bodies. Modern day route 60 was the old Williamsburg road at the time of the battle, and the position

of the Federal redoubt was not far from the intersection of Nine Mile Road and the Williamsburg Road.

Perhaps further research and discussion with local residents will yield more information in the future as to

the location of this trench for the purpose of making proper identification and possibly re-interment.

References

1. Fraley, Ashbel S. Incidents of the War. A.S. Fraley Diary. Transcription of Fraley Collection held at Rowan County Library, Salisbury, N.C. Fraley was a resident of Rowan County, and served as Orderly Sergeant and later Lieutenant in the 4th N.C. Infantry.

2. Gibson, Joseph F. Private, Company F, 4th N.C. Infantry. Original Letter to his parents. 23 May 1862.
Transcribed by Mrs. Addie Cloninger. Catawba County (N.C.) Historical Association.

3. Newton, S. H. (1993). The Battle of Seven Pines: May 31-June 1, 1862. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard.

4. Allen, T.H. (1999). Lee’s Last Major General: Bryan Grimes of North Carolina. Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing Company.

5. Cowper, Pulaski (Ed). (1986) and Gallagher, Gary, (Ed.). Extracts of Letters of Major-General Bryan Grimes, To His Wife: Written while in Service in the Army of Northern Virginia. Together with some Personal Recollections of the War written by him after it’s close etc. Wilmington, N.C. Broadfoot Publishing Co.

6. Osborne, E.A., Major, 4th N.C. Infantry. 4th North Carolina Regimental History. In Walter Clarke (1901) Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War 1861-1865. Volume I. Goldsboro and Raleigh, N.C. pp. 238-239.

7. Hoover, S.A. (1861-1865). Reminiscences 1861-1865. Original memoir held in Southern Historical Society Collection, Chapel Hill, N.C. Hoover served in Company C, 4th N.C. Infantry.

8. Ross, B.B. Cpl, Co I, 4th N.C. Experiences of B.B. Ross during the war of 1861-1865. Southern Historical Society Collection. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

9. Carolina Watchman (Rowan County Newspaper), 2 June 1862. Rowan County Public Library. Salisbury, N.C. It also contains the following information:“List of killed and wounded, Captain Mc Neeley’s company, 4th N.C. at Richmond. Wounded. Lt Culinar, slightly in the head, and many, many more. Ten killed, including Pvt Bowers, 31 wounded including Paul Heiling and James W. Neely. Captain Craig’s company: three killed, seven wounded, two missing. Captain Wood’s company: nine killed, 13 wounded. Captain Kelly’s company: three killed, seven wounded. List of killed and wounded of Company K, 4th N.C. Regiment. Regimental officers: 12, privates 65 killed, 37 officers and 245 privates wounded.”

10. Funkhouser, R.D. (1876,). From Manassas to Frazier’s Farm. Southern Historical Society, pp. 368-369. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

11. Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XI, pp. 955-956.

12. Carter, James H. Letter. 4 June 1862. David Carter Collection. Southern Historical Society. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

13. Stikeleather, John. E. (1870). Recollections of the War Between The States. Southern Historical Society Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill NC, pp. 7-8.

14. Gorman, William R. 4th North Carolina Band. Our Living and Our Dead, Vol. 2. Southern Historical Society Collection, Chapel Hill, N.C. pp.21-22.

15. Grimes’ Family Papers. Letter from Bryan Grimes. 1 June 1862. Southern Historical Society. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

16. Mast, Greg. (1995). State Troops and Volunteers: A Photographic Record of North Carolina’s Civil War Soliders. University of N.C. Press. Chapel Hill, N.C. pp 289.

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APPENDIX A
4th Regiment North Carina State Troops
1861 Company Organization

Company A: Iredell County – Iredell Blues
Chartered in 1842 by the North Carolina Assembly, this militia unit was designated as the 52nd Regiment, N.C. Militia on April 18, 1861. The unit enlisted for the duration of the war May 29, 1861. During June 1861, the unit was re-assigned to the 14th N.C. Volunteers. The “Iredell Blues” were so nicknamed because of the bluish tint in their uniforms. A noted opponent of secession, A.K. Simonton, was elected Captain. He would be killed at the battle of Seven Pines in 1862.

Company B: Rowan County – Scotch Irish Grays
Known as the Scotch-Irish Grays, this pre-war militia unit was the second Rowan County unit to volunteer for state service in 1861. They wore U.S. pattern blue frock coats and were armed with Mississippi rifles. Formed in 1858, the Scotch-Iris Grays mustered into state service June 3, 1861 while encamped at Rowan Mills near Salisbury. The men elected James Wood as Captain, and a few days later were ordered to Camp Hill near Garysburg, N.C.

Company C: Iredell County – Saltillo Boys
Captain John Barr Andrews, who in 1858 co-founded the Statesville Military Academy, also formed the “Saltillo Boys.” Mustered into state service on June 7, 1861 for the duration of the war, the unit included a large number of recruits came from the Statesville Military Academy. A company flag still exists now held in a private collection in Catawba County, N.C.

Company D: Wayne County – Goldsboro Volunteers
The “Goldsboro Volunteers” were formed April 15, 1861 under Captain Junnius P. Whittaker. Initially mustered in for 12 months service as part of the 14th N.C. Volunteers, this unit was transferred to the 45th Regiment, N.C. state troops on June 28, 1861 for the duration of the war.

Company E: Beaufort County – Southern Guards
The “Southern Guards” were formed June 3, 1861 and mustered confederate service for the duration of the ward, Captain David Carter commanding.

Company F: Wilson County – Wilson Light Infantry
Mustered into state service April 18, 1861 for 12 months duty, the “Wilson Light Infantry” later mustered into confederate service for the duration of the war on June 28, 1861. This unit was commanded by Captain Jesse Barnes.

Company G: Davie County – Davie Sweepstakes
The “Davie Sweepstakes” mustered into confederate service June 4, 1861 for the duration of the war. William F. Kelly was elected captain, and would be killed at Sharpsburg September 17, 1862 along with his brother.

Company H: Iredell County – Iredell Independent Grays
The “Iredell Independent Grays” were composed largely of cadets from the Statesville Military Academy. Formed in 1858, this unit mustered into confederate service June 13, 1861 for the duration of the war. Captain E.A. Osborne, a former cadet under Captain John B. Andrews, was elected company commander. The academy was also known as the Statesville Military Institute and initially used space at the Buena Vista Male Academy. Captain Osborne would later become Colonel of the 4th Regiment N.C. State Troops. His second Lieutenant, Franklin Weaver, was also a cadet and would be the last officer to fall mortally wounded carrying the colors at the Bloody Lane in Sharpsburg.

Company I: Beaufort County – Pamlico Rifles
The “Pamlico Rifles” were mustered into state service June 25, 1861 for the duration of the war under Captain William T. Marsh, who would be mortally wounded at Sharpsburg.

Company K: Rowan County – Rowan Rifle Guards
Formed in 1858, this wasthefirst unit from Rowan County to volunteer for state service in 1861, and were known for their strong military bearing. Armed initially with smoothbore percussion weapons issued from the Fayetteville Arsenal, and a few stands of the much coveted .58 Mississippi rifles the unit was organized by Dr. Josephus Hall, a local surgeon who was voted First Captain of the new militia unit when the war broke out. Frances McNeely was later elected Captain, so Dr. Hall could serve as a doctor. The Rowan Rifles assisted in capture of the U.S. Army garrison at Ft Caswell on the N.C. coast “without a shot being fired” by a local militia unit known as the Cape Fear Minute Men on January 10, 1861.

Jimmayo

06-21-2007, 10:30 PM

It is very likely that these bodies were reinterred after the battle or after the war. There is an account of the Federal bodies being searched for at Frasers Farm and removed to the national cemetary. One can only hope that the citizens of the area did the same for the CS troops. This area around 7 pines has been under development since the 1950s.

pbhatfield

06-23-2007, 11:01 AM

Jim
I know some CS casualties were moved to a small cemetary off of 9 mile road further south, but was unable to locate records or oral history accounts of mass grave bodies being reinterred. Iagree it seems reasonable, but have not been able to track it down. I even called a couple developers in the area to ask if anyone had found unusual things that would suggest evidence, but to no avail. Let me know if you find out anything.
Phil

roundshot

06-23-2007, 02:01 PM

They were likely reinterred in Oakwood Cemetery on the Nine Mile Road near downtown Richmond: http://www.kimshockey.com/va/oakwood.html .Many, many casualties of the Peninsula and 7 days are there. See also: http://home.earthlink.net/~oakwood_cemetery/history.html

During WWII, most of the Seven Pines Battlefield south of the Williamsburg Rd. was engulfed by Richmond's Byrd airport and a military base and housing known as Beulah Road apartments. I lived in them as a preschooler in the early 1950s. These have long since been torn down and reclaimed by scrub trees and brush, although remnants of sidewalks are still evident in the woods. I used to relic hunt this area during the 70's, and in amongst all the apartment junk found many fine relics. Casey's Redoubt stood nearly exactly where the Sandston water tank now stands.

roundshot

06-23-2007, 02:49 PM

As an add-on to my previous post, here is how the Seven Pines area appeared on a 1964 Topo Map. Also marked are documented CS camps based upon Id'd relics, mostly buttons. Don't get excited fellas, this area has undergone massive change over the last 40 years but this may be of interest to some.

pbhatfield

06-24-2007, 01:13 AM

Thanks Bob - looking this map over, I would guess the area of Berry Street near the tower has interesting possibilities. As many confederates as were killed in the battles near Richmond in 1862 I am not sure we will ever know if the 4th NC soliders were re interred, since they were in a trench to begin with having no markings as to who was in it - some of the newspaper clips you posted as attachments would indicated to me that a great deal of the confederate dead were already unkowns and hence, put into mass graves at Oakwood. I am going to seek out more info/records (if any can still be had) from those committees formed to manage the re interment by the city council in the 1860's - there may be something useful there. Thanks for your interest.
Phil Hatfield

roundshot

06-24-2007, 10:14 AM

Check the known killed of the 4th NC vs. the interrments at Oakwood. Hollywood also has many dead from the 4th but the dates are generally later.The Hollywood Confederate death list is online.

The photo below shows one of the initial burial grounds from the Seven Pines battle, with the famous Twin Houses (Kuhn) in the background, and the Williamsburg Road beyond that. Casey's redoubt is just west (left) of the houses, although the position was considerably strengthened in the weeks following the battle. The photo is incorrectly ID'd as being at Fair Oaks

Karl F

10-09-2007, 06:17 PM

I'll be posting another version of the actual battle of seven Pines that took place on May 31. I am glad to see this battle get some well deserved attention instead of blowing right by it as most historians do. I have to disagree with the caption on the photo. Fair Oaks station is 3/4 of a mile to the north of Casey's redoubt at the twin houses. The redoubt was not even finished at the time of the battle and troops could step right over the walls and the trenches used as burial trenches were more than likely the rifle pits extending to the North and South from the redoubt.
I also feel IMHO that Heintzelman was the person responsible for the defeat at the twin houses.

7 Pines, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
A Reprieve for Wessell's Brigade and Casey's Division
A closer look at Casey's division and the first 3 1/2 hours of the battle.

For 145 years the division of General Silas Casey has been much maligned. This division has bore the sole blame for the failure to hold the Confederate advance at Seven Pines.
They were disgraced in the Official Records and newspapers, and suffered the shame of being broken up and removed from the Army of the Potomac as punishment. The finger of accusation was pointed squarely at the Brigade of Henry Wessells which was part of Casey's Division.

This burden could not have been more undeserved by any unit anywhere. This dishonor was heaped upon Casey's Division, and ultimately Wessells' Brigade, by one General in particular, Samuel P. Heintzelman, in a successful attempt to shift from himself the responsibility for not holding the advanced position at the twin houses known as Seven Pines on May 31, 1862. It was his orders that placed Casey's Division there and his failure to properly support Casey that lead to the initial outcome.

When the Army of the Potomac landed at Fortress Monroe Virginia in April of 1862 no troops in the Army were greener than those of Keyes' 4th Corps, Casey's Division and more especially those of Keim's -later Wessells' brigade. The Brigade was composed of the 85th, 101st & 103rd Pennsylvania and the 96th New York. This Brigade along with the rest of the Division were to become the manual labor force for the Army during the Campaign.

During the siege of Yorktown the Brigade was put to work building corduroy roads and bridges in all directions. when the Confederates evacuated Yorktown the Brigade was ordered to quick march to the front with blankets, overcoats and one days rations. On May 5th after sleeping on their arms in the rain all night they were once again ordered to the front at Williamsburg. The Brigade was held in an exposed position in an open field in front of ft. Magruder and was shelled by the fort for some time. On May 6th the Brigade was still in this position when they received their first rations in two days and were then pushed on in pursuit of the Confederates who had evacuated Williamsburg.

On May 18th General Keim who had commanded the brigade died from exposure and an order from McClellan placed Wessells in command of the Brigade.

General Samuel P. Heintzelman was in command of the left wing of the Army and Casey's Division was the vanguard of the left wing. When they reached the Chickahominy River on May 22nd Casey's Division was immediately put to work digging rifle pits. The Division crossed the River on the 23rd at Bottoms Bridge and they were again immediately put to work making the bridges and approaches passable for the Artillery and Supply trains. Wessells' Brigade was again put to work building corduroy roads in all directions for the rest of the Army and were also slashing timber and digging rifle pits and breast works all while also maintaining a picket line several miles long.

When the Army again moved, Casey's Division relinquished control of the works they had just constructed to General couch's division. when the Army stopped, construction began on new works again and so it continued for the next week.

The men of Wessells' Brigade and most of Casey's Division were without shelters up to and until they made camp at the twin houses in front of Seven Pines. The frequent rains kept them soaked to the skin and the ground covered with water. Fresh water wells were not accessible during this time so the men were forced to use surface water for drinking and cooking. As a result of these conditions, dysentery and other illnesses ran rampant in Casey's Division.

On May 28th the effects of exposure, fatigue and the sickness associated with the drinking of surface water had so affected the Brigade that scarcely one-half of the men and officers were fit for duty. Also on the 28th General Casey was ordered to move forward of Seven Pines and to occupy and fortify a position near the twin houses.

The following is taken from General Wessells testimony before a joint congressional committee May 28, 1863. Part I pp. 597-614:

"I (General Wessells) expressed my objection several times and received this note from Gen. Heintzelman":

Head-Quars. Left Wing etc., May 29, 1862

General: The Brigadier general instructs me to say that he moves forward a brigade of General Kearny's Division this morning to a position not over two miles from Seven Pines. In case of an attack Gen. Kearny's Division could reinforce you in half an hour. The position occupied by your corps was selected by Gen. Barnard and Lieut. Comstock, of the engineers and instructions to occupy it came from Maj.-Gen. McClellan. The Maj.-Gen. has also directed that the third corps shall not be moved forward, unless to prevent yours from being driven back.

Chauncy McKeever, Chief of Staff

(It is important to remember Heintzelmans words
He, as over all commander of the left wing of the Army takes the responsibility for the placement and support of all troops in that wing and to make changes in the disposition of these troops to meet situational changes.)

About daylight on May 29th, the pickets south of the Williamsburg Road in front of Seven Pines were attacked. The fatigue details were called in and the Division stood in line of battle for nearly two hours anticipating a general attack. The 100th NY was advanced to support the pickets but after a short time the Confederates withdrew back toward Richmond.

Also on the 29th, in compliance with Heintzelman's orders, after constructing new works and slashing timber for abates at Seven Pines, Casey's division advanced and nearly 3/4 of a mile to the twin houses where they began constructing works again. A division camp was established and fatigue details were again sent out to slash timber and dig rifle pits. The construction was under the direction of Lt. M.D. McAllister of the Engineer Corps. The new works would consist of a line of rifle pits running North and South across the Williamsburg Road with a pentangular redoubt in the center which would place it some 50 yards South of the road. While this was going on Casey also had to maintain a picket line 3 miles long 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile in front of his new line of works.

On May 30th, Casey's advanced picket line South of the Williamsburg Road was again attacked in the same place and driven in. Casey's work details were called in, and the Division once again formed into line of battle in advance of the rifle pits near the twin houses. The pickets were driven in to the edge of the slashings where the advance was held but the push enabled the Confederates to view the works being constructed. This attack was conducted by 300 men of the 23rd NC.

Just after the attack concluded a thunderstorm broke over the field with such ferocity that it was mentioned in the reports of both sides. The storm lasted from 5PM until midnight and completely flooded the surrounding countryside. All who witnessed it agreed that it was the worst storm that had ever seen. At daylight on the 31st the newly dug rifle pits were completely flooded. Once again large details of men were sent out to continue slashing timber and to work on the redoubt.

The redoubt, which would become the focal point for the Confederate attack on the 31st was unfinished when the attack came and was only a few feet high in many places. In some places the men could merely step over the walls. The rifle pits remained flooded and were unusable as a defensive work.

"The actual strength of the Brigade (Wessells') as appears in the morning reports was 2,061. Of these, 200 comprised the working party on the fortifications , a like number was detailed on picket. which, with the usual details and extra duty men made our actual strength in action less than 1,500 men."
(Gen. H.W. Wessells Comdg. 2nd Brigade Casey's Division, O.R. Ser. I, Vol. XI, part I, pp. 926-927.)

" My command, (Palmer's) consisting of the 81st, 92nd, 85th and 98th New York Vols., numbered in the aggregate about 1,200. Of this number 400 of the effective officer and men were at the commencement of the engagement on picket duty or on duty with working parties. A great portion of these did not rejoin their regiments as they should have done, but were permitted by the officer of them to ramble about, and of course doing but little service. The sick, or those reputed sick, in the brigade numbered some hundreds and in some companies there were no commissioned officers, in most of them not more than one and I estimate the whole fighting force on the ground at less than 1,000 officers and men." (Gen. Palmer Comdg. 3rd Brigade Casey's Division, O.R. Ser. I Vol. XI. pp. 929-930.)

At this time it has been difficult to ascertain an accurate effective strength for General Naglee's Brigade as his reports are missing, being one of the three brigades in Casey's Division and exposed to the same conditions as the other two Brigades it would have also been significantly affected by sickness and the detachment of fatigue details to a point where their effective was between 1,200 and 1,500. By using the larger number of 1,500 effective in the first brigade and combining it with the 2,100 from the other two brigades, General Casey had only 3, 600 men in line at his position on the Williamsburg road and these were divided into two lines of battle.

On Casey's right flank to the North was Fair Oaks Station. It was a full 3/4 of a mile from Casey's right flank regiment at the twin houses and there were only three regiments holding Fair Oaks Station and one of these was supporting the picket line. On Casey's left flank 3/4 of mile to the South lay the White Oak Swamp.
To Casey's rear 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile was the division of general Couch. To Casey's front lay the assembling division of General D.H. Hill with a force of 9,000 seasoned troops.

So now the stage is set. We find General Silas Casey with the greenest division in the army, much reduced and numbering approximately 3,600 men, stuck out by themselves within 9 miles of the Confederate Capitol with no support on either flank and opposed by a force outnumbering his own at better than two to one odds and with little or no reinforcements other than a promise of support from Gen. Heintzelman.

The attack on the 31st came just as the men of Casey's division were preparing to cook the first rations they had received in two days. At about 12:30 two guns from Capt. Thomas Carters Va. Battery fired in rapid succession sending their shells over and beyond Casey's camps. This was followed closely by the advance of the enemy on the pickets and firing was heard South of the Williamsburg road in the same two previous attacks. The firing quickly spread to the North side of the road. The details were called in and once again the Division fell into line of battle.

Gen. Wessells immediately ordered the 103rd PA out to reinforce the pickets. The regiment as marched out consisted of 430 men in 5 companies. The remaining 5 companies were on fatigue details and picket duty.

At approximately 12:30 general Garland advanced his confederate brigade consisting of the 2nd Fla., 38th Va., 23rd NC., 24th Va. toward the federal lines with the 2nd Miss as skirmishers North of the Williamsburg road. He was followed by the brigade of G.B. Anderson consisting of the 4th NC., 49th Va., 27th Ga., and the 28th Ga. on the South side of the Williamsburg road. 15 minutes behind Garland was the brigade of General Rodes consisting of the 5th Ala., 12th Ala., 12th Miss., 4th Va. Bn., and the 6th Ala. as skirmishers. Behind rodes was the brigade of general Rains consisting of the 6th Ga., 26th Ala., 23rd Ga., and the 13th Ala. The Va. Artillery of Capt. Thomas Carter and the Ala. Battery of Capt. J.W. Bondurant were in the center on the Williamsburg road.

In the mean time, General Casey ordered Capt. Sprat (with only a four gun battery) forward of the line of works approximately 400 yards. To support these guns General Casey ordered the following regiments forward to form the first line of defense. The 11th Maine, consisting of only three companies was to form 30 yards to the right of the battery near a fence. Immediately to the right of the 11th Maine the 104th Pa consisting of seven companies was to form after moving from their camp along nine mile road. Immediately to the left of the battery and South of the Williamsburg road the 100th NY was to form. To their left was the 92nd NY and on the far left and some distance away the 81st NY was protecting that flank.

Immediately to the right of the 81st NY was the 98th NY. They were protecting the gap between the 92nd and 81st NY. A little to the rear of the 98th NY was the 96th NY and two companies of the 103rd PA. Casey posted his remaining three regiments to the right and left of the redoubt which formed his second and last line of defense. On the left of the redoubt was the 85th NY and in the redoubt was the six gun battery of Capt. Bates. On the right of the redoubt and extending across the Williamsburg road was the 85th PA. On the right of the 85th and extending into the woods was the 101st PA which numbered only 387 officers and men.

To the right rear of the redoubt Casey placed the six gun battery of Capt. Fitch who placed one section South and two North of the Williamsburg road. Capt. Regan's battery was posted to the rear of the 101st but was masked by the 101st and was unable to fire for most of the battle.

Casey's picket line and it's supports at the Williamsburg rd. consisting of 5 companies of the 103rd PA were initially able to stall the advance of the skirmish line of the 2nd Miss. Garlands supporting regiments quickly flanked the five companies of the 103rd PA driving them and the pickets back through the woods toward Casey's first line.

During the time the pickets were being driven in, the 104th PA, 11th Me, 100th NY, and the 92nd NY moved up to the edge of the abatis slightly in advance of Sprats Battery. During this move the 104th had to cross a worm fence which split it's line diagonally. Upon exiting the woods and the abatis remnants of the 103rd PA, (approx. 100 men) formed on the left of the 11th Me.

As the skirmishers of the 2nd Miss. came out of the woods Casey's advance regiments opened a deadly fire on them stalling their advance. The 2nd Fla. and part of the 23rd NC continued to push forward almost reaching the fence in front of Sprat's battery. At the same time, approx. 1:30PM South of the Williamsburg rd. the skirmishers of Rodes Brigade were also reaching the edge of the woods.

South of the road a charge by the 100th NY stalled the advance of Rodes skirmishers of the 6th Ala. Rodes' supporting regiments were quickly moved up into line outflanking the 100th and 92nd NY. Gen. Rains' brigade was ordered to sweep wide and attempt to get on the flank and rear of Casey's line at the twin houses. To assist Gen Rains, Gen. Hill ordered Capt. Carter's battery to follow this flanking movement. Back North of the road G.B Anderson's brigade of 1,865 men had quickly moved up and passed through Garland's men and smashed into Casey's 10 companies of the 104th PA and 11th Me. both together totaling 493 men who had charged into the woods.

Seeing that they were about to be flanked the 104th PA started to fall back as did the rest of the advanced regiments stopping only long enough to fire another volley into the rapidly advancing confederates. It was now approximately 2 PM and General Keyes (4th Corps Commander) sent a dispatch to Couch asking for support and another dispatch to Heintzelman. Both dispatches would apparently be ignored because as Heintzelman would later state "I was not alarmed because we had it before."

Shortly after Anderson's men hit Casey's line, Gen. Hill ordered them to shift left thereby extending the line and outflanking Casey's line to the North. Some of the regiments did move left and some did not. While Anderson was reforming North of the Road, Rodes was also reforming his brigade to the South of the road in the edge of the woods. Rodes recalled the 12th Miss. who had advanced with the 6th Ala. through the abitis ahead of the rest of the brigade in pursuit of the 100th NY. He then placed the 12th Miss. on the right of his newly formed line. Rodes then resumed his advance with the entire brigade of six regiments in a single line.

The artillery battery of Capt, Bondurant was posted on the Williamsburg rd on Rodes' left to engage Fitch's advanced battery and the guns in the redoubt. General Rains' brigade now on line poured a withering volley into the 81st and 98th NY from the edge of the woods and then advanced into the open toward the NY regiments. The 23rd Ga who was still advancing in the woods saw that they had now flanked the 81st NY wheeled to the left and poured another volley into the flank of the 81st. Captain Carter's battery moving with Rains was almost ready to move his guns into battery on the flank of Casey's main line at the twin houses.

Two companies of the 103rd PA which were in the rear of a gap between the 98th and 92nd NY, advanced a few yards to meet the confederate push but the 96th NY who was standing with them did not advance. Now being reformed, Anderson's men resumed the drive and were out flanking Casey's line to the North by several hundred yards. Sprat's battery was playing havoc with the confederates advancing on the Williamsburg rd. but seeing that his advancing line was being pushed back and that the guns were in danger of being overrun, Gen. Casey ordered the battery to fall back. Due to heavy loss of both horses and men Sprat was forced to abandon one gun.

The 104th PA and the 11th Me. were contesting every yard of ground but were steadily being pushed back by ever increasing numbers in their front and on both flanks. Bondurant's artillery was now at the edge of the woods on the road and on the left of Rodes' line and was firing on the guns in the redoubt. The time was now approximately 2:45PM and Jenkins with several SC regiments had come up and was moving ****her to the North and to the rear of Anderson's brigade. They had orders to sweep the area South of the railroad at Fair Oaks station which ran East and West and was located just North of Casey's position and then drive down Nine Mile rd. toward the union position at Seven Pines.

Just as the 104th PA and the 11th Me were being pushed back across a worm fence on of Anderson's regiments, the 4th NC thought there was an opportunity and made a right oblique movement and charged toward the redoubt several hundred yards away and to their right front. After sustaining heavy losses in men and officers and seeing that they were alone and 200 yards infront of everyone else in their brigade, they were forced to fall back beyond the point they had charged from. Jenkins' regiments now formed with two of Anderson's, the 27th and 28th Ga and pushed toward Nine Mile rd. driving one of Casey's picket supports, the 56th NY before them.

The time was now approximately 3:15 PM and Casey's first line was badly flanked and, collapsing and falling back through Casey's camps. Some of the first line regiments reformed on the other side of Casey's camps and others did not stop until they reached Gen. Couch's position 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile to the rear. The battle had now been raging for almost 3 hours, no support had been sent despite Heintzelman's assurances that Key's corps / Casey's Division would be quickly supported.

The 101st Pa,85 NY and 85th PA standing in line behind the flooded rifle pits were now coming under heavy fire from the confederate artillery and rapidly advancing infantry. The 104th Pa fell back to Nine Mile rd and then moved toward Couch's position. The 11th Me hooked up with the 56th NY and held their position in a ravine South of the railroad and East of Nine Mile rd. The 81st NY fell back beyond Casey's camps and then reformed near the woods South and East of Casey's camps. The 98th NY reformed a little further to the rear and to the right of the 81st NY and the 96th reformed in line with the 98th NY but along the Williamsburg rd. The rest of the first line regiments fell back through the second line of abatis to Couch's position at Seven Pines.

By 3:45 PM D.H Hill's lines were closing on and around Casey's second line at the twin houses and the three regiments that were still holding this line. The 85th NY South of the redoubt was the first to feel the weight of this onslaught. By this time the 85th NY and the rest of Casey's main line had already been raked for almost an hour by the guns of Thomas Carter on their flank. Rains' right regiments were on the left flank and the rear of the 85th NY causing that regiment to fall back to it's right. The commander of the 85th stopped his men near the twin houses, reformed and pushed back toward the position they had just left. They had only stayed 15 minutes when the pressure on their front and flanks and rear forced them to fall back through the camps beyond the trees and they reformed on the left of the 81st NY.

Col Bailey had just ordered the guns in the redoubt to be spiked when he was killed. The battery in the redoubt was unable to withdraw their guns because they had lost most of their men and officers and all of their horses. Fitch's battery was falling back and Regan's battery was already in position at the second line of abatis on the road to the rear of Casey's camps. Shortly after taking this position Maj. Van Valkenburgh, Casey's chief of artillery was shot dead. At about the same time Anderson's men had closed the distance on Casey's remaining two regiments the 85th PA and the 101st PA.

The commanding officer of the 4th NC, Maj Bryan Grimes, advancing in front of the 85th and 101st PA said "We were advancing on the redoubt when I saw two enemy regiments in line on our left partially protected by and extending into the woods. I faced my men to the left and double quicked them to reach the cover of these same woods when I saw another regiment attack these troops." What he saw was likely the 27th Ga. attacking the 101st PA on their front while the 28th Ga attacked their flank. The 101st Pa suffered heavy casualties losing 129 men or 1/3 of their total strength holding this position.

Lt. Col Morris commanding the 101st was severely wounded after directing Lt. Sheaffer of Co. A to drop the right two companies back and refuse the flank. Regardless of this effort the 85th and 101st PA were overwhelmed and fled to the rear. Most of them reformed near the second line of abatis but again some did not stop until they reached Couch's line.

Only the 55th NY and some time later the 10th Mass of Couch's division were sent forward. They did not arrive until the situation was hopeless and most of Casey's line had been broken by D.H. Hill's Division. The 55th NY and the 10th Mass were both shot up and almost surrounded and captured before they too were forced to retreat from the field.

Fox's history of Regimental Losses states that the 4th NC and the 6th Ala. had the greatest numerical loss of any confederate regiments in any single battle of the war at Seven Pines in front of Casey's Division, save one the 26th NC at Gettysburg. How is this possible if as Heintzelman's report states "Casey's Division broke unaccountably and was of little use"?

The returns of the casualties for Casey's Division for this battle are as follows: 177 killed, 927 wounded and 325 captured or missing. a total of 1,429 casualties and fully 1/3 of the men Casey had to fight with. General Casey in his after action report lists his casualties as 73 officers, 1,360 enlisted men for a total of 1, 433. Gen Heintzelman went out of his way to disgrace even the dead of Casey's division in his official reports by implying that they were cowards. (O.R., Ser. I Vol. XI, Part I)

This review of the initial actions at Seven Pines is not as complete as some would argue it should be. But it contains much more information than most any other writer has related in their reviews of the battle by parroting Heintzelman's statement that "Casey's Division broke and was of no use." I do not claim to be an expert on this battle but I have tried to give a better understanding of why this Division could not hold. I would hope that this reexamination has shed more light on this battle for the average historian/reenactor, for both sides. I would also hope that readers see as I do that Casey's Division was the scapegoat to cover for the negligence of Samuel P. Heintzelman who used every opportunity after casey's fight to cover his own butt by slamming Casey's Division in his never ending dispatches to McClellan.

(Do these sound like someone who is stating fact or someone who is trying to shift blame?)

May 31, 1862 6PM
Gen. McClellan: Our troops on the road have given way*********
S. P. Heintzelman

May 31, 1862 6:20 PM
Col. Colburn: General Casey's division is being rallied by ****** of the General's staff. Gen. Casey is dead. ************************
C. McKeever, chief of Staff

May 31, 1862 8:45 PM
Gen. Marcy, chief of staff: *********** when I got to the front the most of Casey's division had dispersed. ********* The rout of Gen. Casey's men had a most dispiriting effect on the troops. *****************************
S.P. Heintzelman

May 31, 1862 9:15 PM
Gen. McClellan: ************** I got the information of the attack about 2 PM and sent reinforcements at once. ******** I soon met the fugitives of Casey's Division and I learned that most of them had given way. ****************** the stragglers of Casey's Division had a most dispiriting effect **************
S.P. Heintzelman

May 31st, 1862 10PM
Gen: McClellan: ***************** Gen. Casey's Division cannot, however be relied upon for any purpose what ever. *************************
S. P. Heintzelman

June 1, 1862 9AM
Gen. McClellan: ************* I need reinforcements as Casey's Division is not of any use. ***************************
S.P. Heintzelman

Why would the commanding general of a wing of the army and the one ultimately responsible for the placement and support of a part of that wing find it necessary to vilify a Division of that command that he did not even witness in action nor was he on the field during the action? why would a commanding officer report rumor or second and third hand information as fact without first checking the validity of the information?
You can only conclude that this commanding officer making the accusations was trying to shift the blame for an adverse action he was responsible for onto someone else.

While I do agree that discipline in the division was not the best and there were some who did behave badly how could you possibly conclude reading the previous three parts that the men of Casey's division were cowards? But if the actions of this under strength green division, who held the enemy for 3 1/2 hours, was flanked on both flanks, out numbered by better than two to one odds, and suffered almost 35 per cent casualties before they withdrew are to be defined as the actions of cowards, then you must also conclude the every soldier who fell back to cemetery hill on the first day at Gettysburg is also a coward.

By Karl Feldmeyer
______________________________________________
-Official records of the war of the rebellion Ser. I Vol. I, Part I

-Official records of the war of the rebellion ser. I Vol. LI. Part I

-Official records of the war of the rebellion ser. I Vol. XI, part I

-Histories of the several regiments and battalions from north Carolina in the great war 1861-1865. Vol I, and II State of NC

-Report of the joint congressional committee on the conduct of the war, May 1863, part I Testimony of Generals - McClellan, Heintzelman, Keyes, Casey, Hooker.

-Regimental losses in the American civil war, 1861-1865, Wm. F. Fox 1889.

-History of the 101st PA Regt. Pa Vet. Vol. Inf. John A. Reed Chicago 1910

-Southern historical papers, Vol 14

-fifty years observation of men and events, Erasmus D. Keys, New York 1885

-New York tribune articles by Samuel wilkeson, June 2,5,10 1862

-History of the southern rebellion, Orville J. wilkeson

-Battles and leaders of the civil war, vol. II

-To the gates of Richmond, Stephen w. sears new york 1992

-the battle of seven pines, g. w. smith new york 1891

-the peninsula campaign, Joseph p. cullen, Harrisburg pa. 1973

-History of the 85th regiment of Pa vol Inf. Luther s. dickey 1915

-Forward to Richmond, time life books inc. 1983

-letters of qm. sgt Edward n. boots 101st pa. vol. inf.

-letters of wm. hall co. f 101st regt pa vol inf.

-History of the 56th NY 10th legion Joel Fisk and William H.D. Blake, published 1906

-History of the 103rd Pa vol inf. luther dickey 1910

- History of the 85th NY vol Inf, Wayne Mahood 1991