AoT Tactics, applied on the Battlefield

[LWhite64]

Thought this might be of interest for thoughts on how to act before 1864 and possibly after.

From the Atlanta Southern Confederacy, April 6, 1864.

Firing in Battle

A Captain of a Mississippi Company in the army of Tennessee, writing to the Atlanta Register, throws out some excellent suggestions on this important matter, which we hope will go the rounds of the press.

I have tried to write an article and have failed, now I ask you to write it and insert it in your valuable paper and sign it as coming from a company commander of the above brigade, asking the cooperation of all the company commanders of the army of Tennessee on the following points: Teaching the men in battle to aim their pieces with more accuracy, and the great importance of being cool and collected, and wait until the enemy are within easy range; exhort them all to act together in the next battle, and go into it with that idea prominent in the minds, and try for once to impress it upon the minds of each man to deliver his piece as if he was firing at a target. I feel the greatest necessity of this, and I am confident that if we can get even one volley fired in this way, we can whip any number the enemy can bring against us. If you were never in a battle, you would not guess that there were half the random shots fired that there are. Why, sir, I have seen whole regiments and brigades deliver their fire when I am sure that they did not even wound a single man. Such firing, besides wasting ammunition, does not intimidate the enemy at all; on the other hand, it makes them feel that there is little danger, consequently, he is more bold, and delivers his fire more accurately; besides, if men are allowed to make those random shots, it becomes a habit, and they become so excited at it that they would oftener miss a man at ten paces than they would hit him. Just in that way battles are often lost and won, while the company commander, if he would only stop it and show them that they were doing no good, they would soon become collected, and after they once saw their folly, would soon, of their own accord, fire deliberately and probably save the day after it had been comparatively lost.
Why, sir, in battle you often see company commanders charging around, with their swords flourishing around their heads, crying out give it to them, boys, give it to them, manifesting in themselves and creating in others all the excitement possible; now a second thought would show to their better judgement that they were doing more harm than good, for men become so exited under such circumstances, that they wouldmiss an elephant at ten steps. You often see the above blustering around then the enemy are at least off at the distance of the one thousand yards, and to hear the roar of musketry and the excited commanders, you would think they would soon come to a hand to hand contest. What is it that excites a man in battle? Why, it is the danger. If you shoot at a man once, he is very much excited; shoot at im a hundred times and miss him every time, and all his fear and excitement is gone; but reserve your fire until you can do some execution, and when they come, fire into them; cut his clothes, would his neighbor, kill the second man from him, and let him see it, and I tell you seventy five Yankees out of every hundred will break and run, and then a charge, with our infernal yell, and the day is ours.
Another very imporant point, after we have whipped and routed the enemy; Let us all resolve to keep each and every man in his place, ready to follow up our advantage and secure the fruits of the victory; not such things as we can get from the dead and wounded; but first of all prisoners, and then his artillery, wagon trains, etc.
Oh! let us do it by all means; we can do it; and let us all determine to act together, and the result will be (not as it was at Chickamauga, half the army scattered over the battlefield, pillaging the dead and wounded) but a victory as never was known to our arms, and may give us back Tennessee, (the glorious old State) in place of a few greenbacks, haversacks, old pocket knives, and just such trash as was the fruits of Chickamauga, where the bones of many of our noble and brave boys lie bleaching on the plains. I wish I could command every company separately in the next fight, or I wish I could write so as to stir them up.

[sumter_guard]

What an incredible moment frozen in time! You can feel the officer's frustration. Excellent article Lee, thanks for bringing it out. It staggers me that the guy wrote a letter to the editor to implore his fellow officers to command their men more effectively, not to mention the details of the wild firing going on. Just a great article.

Andrew

[LWhite64]

I have more that ties in with it as well. About a month ago Patrick Lewis calculated that here at Chickamauga there were 114 rounds fired for every man hit in the battle, and here visibility limited firing til 150 yards or closer for the most part. Add to this what Mark Jager found about the firing at Murfreesboro and there is a serious problem in the army.

[sumter_guard]

Of course terrain and visibility is going to be an issue on any battlefield, I can understand that. Its a fascinating thought when I would assume that a lot of the boys in the AoT were no strangers to rifles and muskets. Then when you think about the amount of time and the engagements that transpire from Murfreesboro to the opening of the Atlanta Campaign you'd think they'd be getting better?

Andrew

[pipthelimey]

I highly reccomend David Grossman's book, "On Killing." It deals with a lot of the psychological aspects of battle and helps explain some of the phenomena that the captain mentioned. It's not just in the ACW, it's been observed since the invention of the firearm.

Andrew Jerram

[brown]

Nice article, great Chickamauga reference! Goes well w/ the one you showed me last month about the men of the 14th Corps blindly firing over there works on the 20th of September (1863).

[PvtHull48thovi]

GREAT ARTICLE, I understand how he must feel, its just stupid to waste ammo and in re enacting sometime a fight can last forever and not one man has taken a hit and that just makes me angry as hell, Especially when there is a crowd. This on the other hand was real and the safety of the entire company or etc is on the line when men are just randomanly shooting!



Pvt. Shelby Hull
3rd LA and 48th OVI

[Mike Ventura]

So maybe the re-enactorism of not taking hits is more accurate (pun intended) than we have heretofore thought?:wink_smil

[DougCooper]

This officer would appear to be an inexperienced, ego-centric buffoon. Why else would you use the newspaper to simultaneously slam the entire leadership of the AoT down to the company level and at the same time try to convince the public that the Yanks are cattle that will run back north if we just shoot a little staighter? What nonsense, even if somewhat accurate on the histrionics of some company commanders.

"I have seen entire regiments and brigades..." leads me to believe he may be a staff officer vice a combat officer. A combat officer would have a bit more respect for his opposite number...and respect his troops and his commanders a bit more.

[CYoungJSU]

Without the officer's name, this article seems to be more of a "speak out" type letter to the editor than anything else. I have worked for several years with newspaper articles dealing with local Confederate units (the Jacksonville Republican and Mobile Daily Register specifically) and what company and regimental commanders wrote in those papers. You would be surprised at the "frankness," as in this article, that were written about the command structures and the handling of those commands in varying engagements. Yes, from experienced junior officers as well. Unfortunately, I don't believe that just because this individual has a very vocal opinion, it means he is a novice in his position as a company commander; quite the opposite could be true. This may be the best way he feels he can get his point across. Newspapers were a very opinionated media outlet, as they are today, and anonymity could be kept while enlightening superior officers. Also, the number of rounds fired vs. the number of casualties at Chickamauga and Stones River can attest to this company commander's frustrations.
CY

[LWhite64]

Special Order No.93
Headquarters Bate's Division
Dalton, GA, May 6, 1864.

The division commander suggests to the officers and troops of his command that too much apprehension has been felt among our troopsin reference to being flanked in an engagement by the enemy, which movement can esaily be met by "change of front" of a brigade or regiment, as the case may require, with a prompt notification of the fact to the brigade or division commander. All ground taken from the enemy must be held at all hazards, unless otherwise ordered by proper authority, as relinquishing it deceives our friends and encourages the enemy. Brigade commanders cannot be too prompt in notifying the division commander of all important movements made by themselves or by the enemy in their front and flank.
Especially would he call attention to firing at long range. The enemy being our equals in long range firing, the fire should be reserved until the enemy is close enough for each man to mark his man; demoralization to the enemy has always followed a well directed fire at short range. If practicable, such fire should be followed by a determined charge to break the enemy's line, thereby producing further demoralization and confusion. Especial attention is called to accuracy of aim, collectedness, and coolness in firing at all times; firing too high must be guarded against, as wounded men give more trouble to the adversary than his dead. Fire at the lower extemities; avoid overshooting.
In the beginning of a battle, except by troops deployed as skirmishers, the fire by file must be avoided; firing by wing or company will be observed and, as far as practicable, alternately by front and rear rank. During the battle the officers and non-commissioned officers must keep the men in ranks, enforce obedience, encourage and stimulate them.
Before and after battle the roll of each company will be called, and absentees must be strictly accounted for. No soldier will be permitted to quit the ranks to strip or rob the dead, or even to assist in removing our dead or wounded, unless by special permission from brigade or division commander. The surest way to protect our wounded is to drive the enemy from the field. Any one persisting in quitting his standard under the pretense of removing or aiding the woulded without proper authority will be regarded and proclaimed a coward and dealt with accordingly. This order will be published to the troops of this division, and each field officer will make it his dury to impress these suggestions upon the officers and men of his command.
By command of Major General Bate:
C.J. Mason
Assistant Adjutant General.

[DougCooper]

Special Order No.93
Headquarters Bate's Division
Dalton, GA, May 6, 1864.

The division commander suggests to the officers and troops of his command that too much apprehension has been felt among our troopsin reference to being flanked in an engagement by the enemy, which movement can esaily be met by "change of front" of a brigade or regiment, as the case may require, with a prompt notification of the fact to the brigade or division commander. All ground taken from the enemy must be held at all hazards, unless otherwise ordered by proper authority, as relinquishing it deceives our friends and encourages the enemy. Brigade commanders cannot be too prompt in notifying the division commander of all important movements made by themselves or by the enemy in their front and flank.
Especially would he call attention to firing at long range. The enemy being our equals in long range firing, the fire should be reserved until the enemy is close enough for each man to mark his man; demoralization to the enemy has always followed a well directed fire at short range. If practicable, such fire should be followed by a determined charge to break the enemy's line, thereby producing further demoralization and confusion. Especial attention is called to accuracy of aim, collectedness, and coolness in firing at all times; firing too high must be guarded against, as wounded men give more trouble to the adversary than his dead. Fire at the lower extemities; avoid overshooting.
In the beginning of a battle, except by troops deployed as skirmishers, the fire by file must be avoided; firing by wing or company will be observed and, as far as practicable, alternately by front and rear rank. During the battle the officers and non-commissioned officers must keep the men in ranks, enforce obedience, encourage and stimulate them.
Before and after battle the roll of each company will be called, and absentees must be strictly accounted for. No soldier will be permitted to quit the ranks to strip or rob the dead, or even to assist in removing our dead or wounded, unless by special permission from brigade or division commander. The surest way to protect our wounded is to drive the enemy from the field. Any one persisting in quitting his standard under the pretense of removing or aiding the woulded without proper authority will be regarded and proclaimed a coward and dealt with accordingly. This order will be published to the troops of this division, and each field officer will make it his dury to impress these suggestions upon the officers and men of his command.
By command of Major General Bate:
C.J. Mason
Assistant Adjutant General.

Now that is how you do it!

Still a staff officer though :D

[LWhite64]

This is from an article in the Mobile Register and Advertiser, October 25, 1863 titled Clayton's Brigade at Chickamauga.

"...It was about four o'clock[Sept 19,ED.] when,-the brigade moving by the left flank, at 'double quick'-the left wing of the 38th Alabama, in front, ran into an ambuscade of the enemy, of whose presence they were first made aware, by a fatal volley which instantly killed Major Jewett and Captain Welch, and brought down about a score of the companies of Welch and Bussy. The regiment then fronted itself by impulse without 'undoubling' and stood in many places in four ranks, which soon increased to five, six, or seven, as there was a scramble for the rear rank. This was natural, unavoidable, under the circumstances. The men of the regiment fire. They were ambuscaded and fighting a still unseen enemy. The truth is, that no regiment stands firmly, fights cooly, and without disorder in its first encounter. I know that there are such representations; but I tell you, I know them to be false. But to proceed-the left wing of the 38th was swung back a considerable distance. All of Captain Welch's company, except Lieut. Welch and four men, were cut of, and were not seen again during that day or the next, However, they reported to the Colonel of an Arkansas regiment, in while ranks they fought, and as he certified, fought well. Part of Capt. Bussy's company was also cut off; (he being wounded) and one of them, at least, captured by the enemy. He afterwards killed the Yankee guarding him, and got back. The right wing of the regiment, being subject to a less severe fire, stood firmer. But the entire line was under fire, and soon a scene of dire confusion ensued-The men kept up a wild fusilade, thought they did not see the enemy. Those who did not fear the enemy's bullets, and would firmly face them, could not stand teh fire from the rear of their own comrades who blazed away, to the imminent danger of the front rank. Now there was a gradual moving back, which finally became, a disorderly retreat.-This has yet to be explained.
Some say they heard an order to retreat. I did not, and believing a retreat unnecessary. I instantly halted my company, and faced it to the front. The regiment was then reformed in a semi-circle. The firing was renewed and continued for some time, but I did not allow my men to fire, and I checked it in the companies next to mine. It was a useless waste of ammunition. After this we were faced to the rear by order and marched back a quarter of a mile to get more. My company had not fired five rounds. We went back and Bate's brigade went forward to take our position...Ammunition being redistributed, the brigade was reformed and ordered to advance. General Clayton galloped along the front, waving his hat, and shouting 'Forward.'...Confidence was restored. Enthusiasm replaced the recent dejection. Forward we went, with now firm step, more and more rapid, until it became first a 'double- quick', then a run. We reached the line where Bate's brigade was posted. We plunged on over Bate's brigade, sweeping some of them along with us. We raised a loud yell and on we went, driving the fugitive enemy before us..."

[BrettKIllinois]

It's interesting that he mentions that they pick the wounded and dead of war trophies like money and pocket knives and not shoes, trousers, and other reenactornisms. Further proof that in many case the men were well uniformed.

[RJSamp]

Who's saying it's a reenactorism Brett? Just read last night where a 21st Wisconsin Sergeant pulled the shoes of a dead confederate.....and a few months later he pulled the boots off of an officer. I don't see too many reenactors running around barefoot......except of course yourself a few years ago or Roy Brown from Hersey High School/1st MI Engineers.

[RJSamp]

So maybe the re-enactorism of not taking hits is more accurate (pun intended) than we have heretofore thought?:wink_smil

And maybe the 'reenactorism' of powder burning is more authentic than we have heretofore thought....

[LWhite64]

From Lot D. Young, Reminiscences of a Soldier of the Orphan Brigade, refering to fighting at Chickamauga, "...The Citizens of today will doubtless wonder how any man could escape such a rain of shot and shell, but by the old soldier it is readily understood. While ninty per cent of these shots were being fired the men were lying flat on their faces and were overshooting each other when suddenly one of the other would spring to his feet and with a bound and yell rush at a double-quick upon their foe, giving him time to fire one or at most two rounds when his ranks would be broken and compelled to retire...."

[BrettKIllinois]

It's senario related and battle specific to do it.

The Reenactornism is that its acceptable to have some sort of generic galvanizable kit for for all time frames, theatres and sides.

US Soldiers were wearing bonets during the march to the sea... it doesn't mean it's appropriete for chickamaugua.

Who's saying it's a reenactorism Brett? Just read last night where a 21st Wisconsin Sergeant pulled the shoes of a dead confederate.....and a few months later he pulled the boots off of an officer. I don't see too many reenactors running around barefoot......except of course yourself a few years ago or Roy Brown from Hersey High School/1st MI Engineers.

[LWhite64]

The following from a gunner in Battery I, 4th US Artillery describing the attack of Ector's Brigade on the morning of September 19th, "We once more double shotted with canister and poured into them a murderous musketry fire, yet with their characteristic battle yell on they came receiving our combined artillery and musket fire, until staggering, wavering under the awful slaughter in their ranks, they halted, and, delivering a deadly volley into our ranks, they threw themselves at full length on the ground, and, lying on their backs so as to expose themselves as little as possible they loaded their muskets, then turning over and resting on one knee they delivered their fire, then threw themselves on their backs to load as before. Our Infantry followed their example and for the next half hour an almost muzzle to muzzle (we were about fifty yards apart) musketry fire was maintained. Meanwhile our battery was pouring canisters into the enemy's ranks and with deadly effect, for our gunners, training their guns low, and taking deliberate aim at the always visible foe tore a gap in their line with every discharge literally lifting the prostrate foes at the point of impact high in the air and hurling them back mangled remains of human valor. Human endurance has its limits, and at length the Rebels sullenly fell back and disappeared in the forest in our front.

[Pat.Lewis]

Wow Lee,

The last one you just posted from the artilleryman takes the cake. It hits all the points one could want to emphasize about fighting in the West. It even plays into one of my sneaking suspicions that the 114 shots-per-hit (note not per killed) rate at Chickamauga is much, much too low compared to what it should be when you calculate the effect of cannister. 150? 200? You start to wonder if any infantryman ever his an enemy soldier when you think of firing 4 or 5 cartridge boxes to get a hit. Time and again Confederate attacks can push back infantry but are halted and melt in the face of artillery. In many cases it's the cannister that's dealing out the ton of casualties that it takes to break an attack.

Another point if we want to talk about reenactorisms. Look at the ranges mentioned.
...and for the next half hour an almost muzzle to muzzle (we were about fifty yards apart) musketry fire was maintained.
How many times have you seen a stand up fight at 50 yards at a big event? Compare that to this man calling the same range "muzzle to muzzle" (read suicidal) even when lying down.

I know you've got more of these, Lee. Keep 'em coming.

[sumter_guard]

Whoah Lee! Not to hike the thread but is that the same fight that Sam Sprott of the 40th Ala. talks about when they charge the battery just prior to Cleburne's Division coming in and making their night attack? I'm guessing it is as Stone's Battalion was in Ector's Brigade. This thread is awesome.

Andrew

[LWhite64]

From Val C. Giles, 4th Texas Infantry, Sept.19, "Passing across this little glade we found that the woods became more open, the timber larger and the brush and vines not so thick. We were now under a heavy fire, and our men were falling everywhere. There was not breeze enough to lift the black smoke and it hung low above the ground, so dense that it was almost stifling. Reaching an old road skirting an open field, we were ordered to halt. My old Brigade was well drilled in skirmish tactics and every man took advantage of his knowledge of the skirmish drill and 'took obstacle.' When the officer in command of a skirmish line ffives the order 'take obstacle' he simply means for every man to seek shelter wherever he can find it. The old road was more of a gully than road, and afforded protection for many of the men, but not for all. Every tree, sapling and stump was occupied that was big enough to afford any protection. The Federal batteries beyond the old field were making our position a veritable hell on earth. Shells, grapeshot, canister, shrapnel and Minie balls were tearing through the air, while dirt, leaves, limbs, and bark were falling and flying all over and around us."

[LWhite64]

From Captain Samuel T. Foster, 17th-18th Texas Consolidated Infantry, describing the fighting on Sept. 19th, "Old Pat Cleburn orders us in to stay and we stay; but we are too close to the Yanks...we are so flat on the ground that we dont make much show. They shoot at us, but we do not return it. Now if a soldier ever reasoned about any thing he was ordered to do-we would very naturally enquire what good we were doing here, being shot at and not return the fire-The fireing is very heavy on our right and left, and the Yanks are blazing away at us like fury. Some heavy pine timber here-While lying down here today one man is shot in the head and killed so dead that the man next to him did not know it until we had to move, and moving here was an awful bad piece of business; Bullets fly like the wind you can hear them zip zip- zip but you cant see them. You know they are passing very thick and is all. The fireing gradually slackens up as dark comes on; for here when it gets dark, it is very dark. In the night we are moved to the right lots of others troop going to the right."

One of Cleburne's Command, The Civil War Reminiscences and Diary of Capt. Samuel T. Foster, Granbury's Texas Brigade, CSA. p. 52-53.

[LWhite64]

From Thomas J. Walker, 9th Tennessee Infantry, "Crossing the Creek, the line of battle formed and immediately in our front across a small clearing on the opposite side of a clearing on an elivated ridge, the enemy was posted being works of rails. The order, 'Charge the breastworks!' was given. The line swung forward and from some cause a halt was made in the center of the file. Orders were given to lie down and fire. Right in front of our file was a large pine tree three or four feet in diameter. We at once placed ourselves behind that tree and began to fire, thinking we were fortunate in having such a protection. As we soon found out to our sorrow, the enemy had direct fire on our line and that tree became the target. Before the line advanced to take the fortified line which they did, every soul behind that tree was either killed or wounded."

Confederate Chronicles of Tennessee, Vol.I. "Reminiscences of the Civil War", p. 54.

[LWhite64]

Unknown Soldier of the 2nd Tennessee Infantry descrbing fighting on September 20th, "As Polk's Brigade reached this plateau, a terrible burst of artillery and musketry greeted its appearance. The hissing of the missles was more noticeable than the explosions of the guns, and sounded like the clashings of a multitude of sword-blades in the air overhead. Not a shot of the first volley struck the line, all flying high. Colonel Robison...gave the order to charge, which was only partially heard, and the yell with which we were wont to join battle was feeble, and roused little animation. Unfortunately, parts of the line began to fire, which occasioned a halt, and soon the firing became general. No further attempt was made to go forward, as all commands were drowned in the noise of conflict, and the men constrained by circumstances to endure the pelting of the terrible tempest as best they could. The Second Tennessee occupied a conspicuous position on the plateau, and on this account got an undue share of the enemy's attention; but its fire was so closely delivered and so accurate that few heads were shown above the breastworks; in fact, very few of the enemy fired from the shoulder, the guns generally being held above their heads and fired at random; otherwise, few of the attacking party would have escaped, as it remained under fire fully an hour. The intervening trees were scarred by bullets from bottom to top. The smoke, which shrouded our position somewhat, was another elements of safety, while a few scattered pines and oaks gave some shelter. The writer was one of a party of nine streched out behind one pine. The tree was regarded as a monster in size at this time, but, on inspection after the battle, it proved to be of quite ordinary proportions.
This was, without doubt, the most cheerless and monotonous combat in which the regiment ever engaged. There was nothing to do but load and fire at a dim vista, whence proceeded quick flashes and a constant hiss of bullets. The voice of command was suppressed, and officers lay among the men, awaiting the end of the agony, hardly hoping to escape with life."

The Annals of the Army of Tennessee, Vol. I. 1878. p. 56-57.

[Dignann]

Lee,

These are all great accounts and quotes, but could you provide source citations for them?

Thanks.

Eric

[LWhite64]

Diary entry of Van Buren Oldham, 9th TN,

Saturday, September 19
Crossed the mountains without opposition. After double quickening some distance we entered the fight in a charge. Some halted and lay down when after firing. When after firing several rounds I was wounded in the face. I thought at first I was killed. I am now on my way to the hospital.

9th Tennessee Unit file, CHCH.

[LWhite64]

So, now what can we learn from these accounts? One thing is for sure, lying down and firing was very common. Im trying to locate an account from the Battle of Hoover's Gap that refers to the Confederates advancing and then throwing themselves down, then jumping up again and advancing, the so called Indian Rush, etc. There are also a lot of references to men advancing while firing. Any thoughts?

Lee

[sumter_guard]

While re-reading Sam Sprott's memoirs I came across this recollection that fits just perfect. This is Sprott's recollection of charging the 4th U.S. Artillery Battery "I" with Ector's Texas Brigade at Chickamaugua. Sprott was Captain of Co. A 40th Alabama Infantry:

" . . . Forward we went, guns on the right shoulder, keeping step with the shells bursting, bullets whistling around us and men falling at every step. When we had gone about half way, high above the roar of battle, we heard the commands, 'Battalion halt. Lie down.' This was done in order to give us a breathing spell before making the final rush for the battery. While lying here I saw something that was very amusing notwithstanding the serious surroundings. An old Irish man named Jimmie Barr who had joined Co. D of our battalion as a substitute was lying near me and was loading and shooting as fast as he could. I don't supposed he had ever fired a gun before. He would load, put his gun to his shoulder and when he would go to shoot, he would shut his eyes and turn his head away and in doing so he would elevate his gun to an angle of about forty five degrees, and then pull the trigger and bang away, And this he continued to do so as long as we lay there ."

- From "Cush: A Civil War Memoir" by Samuel H. Sprott. Edited by me and
Louis Smith Jr.

[Pat.Lewis]

I can't get enough of these quotes. As Lee said sometime back in the thread this is stuff that we can't get out of a drill manual anywhere. If I could add one thing I would emphasize the title of the thread. Army of Tennessee tactics as applied on the field. I recall (though away from my books presently) a number of Longstreet's men remarking that Chickamauga was unlike anything they had seen in the East. Quotes to the effect of we were not used to the stand-up-and-fight or rather lie-down-and-shoot battles of the West, and the Union soldiers in the West were not used to the wild rushes and bayonet charges seen in Virginia. I can fill those in later if anyone's interested.

Its great to think of that contrast not only in uniform and appearance between ANV and AoT at Chickamauga but also in fighting style. Perhaps something to ponder for the upcoming LH?

[sumter_guard]

It is totally fascinating, and until now I didn't think about the difference between the fighting styles of the two armies. Now there is a dissertation! I have found another quote about a drill competition between two brigades and I want to say the Missouri Brigade was one of them. The competition was OVER as soon as the brigade, on the advance, halted and lay down in perfect order then rose to retake the advance. So this was a practiced maneuver. I will find the quote and post it when I find it. For now, take the specifics (save the actual maneuver) lightly.

Andrew

[CYoungJSU]

Larry J. Daniel discusses this in his book "Soldiering in the Army of Tennessee." Daniel writes that a contest between three regiments in Breckinridge's division occured on March 23, 1863. The three regiments, one from each brigade participating were the Eighteenth Tennessee, Thirteenth and Twentieth Louisiana (consolidated) , and First Florida. The final phase of the competition was a bayonet drill. One soldier stated that the 18th Tennessee had a special surprise in store. The soldier wrote that as they got half way across the field yelling as loud as they could when all at once the Drum rapped and they all dropped [as if to avoid a volley] like they were dead [;] Even the Col. and his horse went down. The horse lay as close [to] the ground as he could and the Col. right behind him. They all lay for several minutes before they got up. It beat everything I ever saw in my life...(24).

Upon further observation of the endnotes, it seems the quote may have been located in a letter from William D. Rogers to his parents on April 17, 1863, located at Stones River NBP.

CY

[sumter_guard]

That was the quote I was looking for. I was reading through Daniel's book this weekend. Thanks for throwing that in. While the Colonel's horse surely added a dash of elan, I would think that this was more than just show. This thread has done a good job, so far, showing the regularity of laying down under fire and firing prone. I'm sure it was used quite a bit in those situations when the minies were flying so thick you could, "catch your hat full."

Andrew

[Daryl Black]

From Diary of William Sylvester Dillon, Company E, Harris Guard 4th Tennessee; typescript in Mississippi State Archives

September 19, 1863 --"The right wing of this brigade [Strahl's] suffered heavily but we being on the left and it not coming into action our loss was very slight considering the length of time the fight continued. Our Brigade being held in reserve all day and none except the two regiments on the right got a fire of a single round at the enemy. Lt. Weber of Co. A was killed and Prvt Games of Co. G. I believe this was all of the killed of the regiment. The wounded will number about 35. Co. D had one man, Prvt. Mason Shelton wounded. Co. E had Corp. A. O. Turner slightly wounded by a cannon ball... This loss was very slight considering the heavy shelling we lay under all day. Our men fought under a great disadvantage all day -- some old dry fences had taken fire and the wind ble the smoke in the faces of our men completely blinding them and giving the enemy a greate advantage.; giving them a chance to take accurate aim whilst our boys were unable to get a view of their enemies. About one hour after dark fighting ceased and we rested on our arms on the field of battle.

Sunday Sept. 20 1863..... O. F. Strahl's Brigade were again held in reserve all day -- consequently not being in front our loss is again light -- ony a few wounded by shells as we were all day under a heavy range of cannon shot and shell. Today our loss is not so heavy as it was yesterday as all the dry wood and fences burned up during the night and this is a clear fine day, consequently our brave boys do not fight under so great a disadvantage as they did on yesterday..... the loss in the brigade will be about 250 men in the two days fight. This is about the average loss of the brigades of the division, notwithstanding the fact that they were engaged in front and us held in reserve -- this will give some idea of the heavy shelling that we lay under whilst acting in reserve."

If I remember correctly, based on an analysis of Cheatham's expenditure of ammuntion I did many years ago, Strahl's Brigade averaged 5 shots per man during the course of the battle.

Lee, isn't there an account of Walthall's men on Winfrey field advancing, lying down and then receiving the order to rise up to resume the advance in the CCNMP archives?

[Pat.Lewis]

As promised re the East vs. West debate

"As a rule the Western men of Rosecrans' army were as plucky as the Southerners in the 'stand-up-and-fire' or the 'lie-down-and-shoot' fights that were so much in vogue in both Rosecrans' and Bragg's armies. Unaccustomed, though, to have their antagonists rush against their lines in the wild charges so common in Virginia, the Western men were...easily forced out of the way of the Texas Brigade."

Joseph B. Polley Co. F, 4th TX
Hood's Texas Brigade, 1910

I remember one similar line from one of Benning's boys in a history of that brigade who said that by lying and fighting at close range the Western Confederates were playing the to the Federals' strengths. That would speak to the soldiers being bad shots point a while back along with the fact that there are still a good number of smoothebores still in CS hands at Chickamagua.

[LWhite64]

Captain J.H. Steinmeyer, Marion Rifles, 24th South Carolina Infantry, September 20th, "Our Brigade, under Col. Colquit, was rushed forward, without the opportun ity to reconnoiter, to the storm the strong position of the enemy-and struck a concealed angle of the works, that had been thrown up, hidden by the timbered locality. This we passed, until exposed to an enfilade fire-as well as from the front- of four batteries of artillery. The position behind their works was immediately held by King's regulars, supported by most of Baird's Division. The location as near as can be stated was about the Kelly House. There was necessarily some confusion resulting, first in the attempt to change front to storm the works that were discovered, to our left, and from which murderous fire was enfilading and evn reaching us from the rear, and then in consequence of the loss of nearly every field and staff officer. Colonels Colquit, Stevens, Capers, Maj. Jones, and Adjt. Palmer, had fallen in the charge through the thick woods. It was some time before the entire command could be withdrawn, the men, with indiscriminate company commanders holding their ground, lying down concealed best they could and keeping up an irregular fire. Reinforcements that came to us were forced to retire along with our remaining scattered command.

24th SC File CHCH.

Lee

[LWhite64]

"Walthall's Brigade at Chickamauga" By Capt. J.D. Smith, Co.D, 24th Mississippi Infantry, CONFEDERATE VETERAN, Oct, 1904.

"Walthall assembled his regimental commanders and told them to withhold their fire until they reached the works, saying that the other two brigades had lost their advantage by stopping to fire. He ordered us to go at a double quick to a slight depression of ground between the enemies' line and ours, and there drop down and rest until he gave orders to charge. At his command we were to rise and rush, without firing, with all speed to the works. The scheme worked like a charm..."


Smith also wrote a report of the battle and said of the above, "Here we met the enemy's fire at a distance of not more than 50 yards, and were ordered to lie down, and did not suffer much from the fire. In a few minutes the order came down the line, 'Ride up, forward,' and immediately afterward we received the order to 'charge'. This we did, driving the enemy before us..."

24th Mississippi File, CHCH

Lee

[DougCooper]

"Walthall's Brigade at Chickamauga" By Capt. J.D. Smith, Co.D, 24th Mississippi Infantry, CONFEDERATE VETERAN, Oct, 1904.

"Walthall assembled his regimental commanders and told them to withhold their fire until they reached the works, saying that the other two brigades had lost their advantage by stopping to fire. He ordered us to go at a double quick to a slight depression of ground between the enemies' line and ours, and there drop down and rest until he gave orders to charge. At his command we were to rise and rush, without firing, with all speed to the works. The scheme worked like a charm..."


Smith also wrote a report of the battle and said of the above, "Here we met the enemy's fire at a distance of not more than 50 yards, and were ordered to lie down, and did not suffer much from the fire. In a few minutes the order came down the line, 'Ride up, forward,' and immediately afterward we received the order to 'charge'. This we did, driving the enemy before us..."

24th Mississippi File, CHCH

Lee

Charging with loaded but uncapped weapons and not stopping to fire was the norm later in the war. The entire 2nd Corps did that at Spotsylvania - worked like a charm.

[sumter_guard]

Mods please delete . . . duplicate post

[sumter_guard]

"We were then ordered to the foot of a long ridge, heavily wooded. After remaining there lying down for some twenty minutes, the yankees charged our brigade, just as Barksdale's brigade of the Virginia Army charged on our right. I do not know the name of this old field we charged through in the morning, nor the name of the ridge where the yankees charged us at about 2 p.m. I hope this may be of some service to the history."

- A.M. Chandler 45th Miss. Inf. Talking about Chickamauga

[LWhite64]

Found this while preparing for a tour today.

"General Bushrod Johnson's Division came up at the double quick; we were ordered to lie down, and they passed over us. We then formed on their right and fought there a while. When General Adams' Division came up and took our places, we moved rapdily and formed just to the right of Jay's Mill, and fought very hard until Longstreet's Virginians-they had bright looking uniforms- began to arrive and formed one hundred yards to our rear. General Pat Cleburne's Division came up at double quick and formed between us, just at night. We were exhausted and were ordered to lie down, when Cleburne's men passed over us with some terrific fighting for an hour or two..." Sgt. Newton Cannon, 11th TN Cav.

[LWhite64]

Afternoon of September 20th, "About the middle of the afternoon we advanced again, but not so far as in the forenoon, and lay down under an infantry and artillery fire, while Semples Battery was pushed by hand helped by a detail from the 33rd Ala. who afterward also carried ammunition to the guns which played on the Federal breastworks at close range and infilading their line from the right." Preston Memoir, 33rd Alabama, Alabama Dept of Archives and History.

[Pat.Lewis]

they had bright looking uniforms

Well, well. That is an interesting way to describe blue gray kersey. I would not have ever thought of the term "bright." I guess you look "brighter" when you've come to the battle wearing a new uniform and riding on a train versus when you've marched there from Middle Tennessee on dirt roads in the middle of a drought. There's that same East-West contrast that we see over and over again.

This is also something we need to think about for the Chickamauga LH next weekend. Our easterners should not only be wearing "new" or different clothes but should be a good deal cleaner in contrast the ragged, dirty, worn out jeans of the western fellows. Get dirty AoT'ers!