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Charles Heath
01-17-2008, 11:33 AM
Folks,

These report snippets and other communications come from the ORs on CD, as part of O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/2 [S# 13], and will begin to provide some perspective on the days before, during, and after the battles of Glendale and Malvern Hill. For those who want the full reports and those not cited here, the report numbers are provided. Having a map in hand will be helpful, to say the least.

Since the forum truncates posts that would make Tolstoy proud, this will be in a series....

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN--SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES

#200
June 23, 1862

“You will observe that my command embraces twenty-three Virginia regiments, one battalion, and seventeen batteries. According to the provisions of the law of conscription these various organizations should contain something like 32,000 men, yet they number on their rolls, as appears from the list I inclose, less than 20,000, and of this number over 7,000 are at times absent from their posts. That is to say, while I ought to command 32,000 Virginians, I do not really command 13,000.”

JAMES LONGSTREET, Major-General, Commanding.


O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/2 [S# 13]
June 29, 1862

“The enemy seem to be in large force in front of my right, and are or have moved a little to their right. I do not think it prudent for me to attack him with my small force unless there be a simultaneous attack all along our lines. I will keep a good lookout on my left. I had hoped that Jackson would have co-operated with me on my left, but he sends me word that he cannot, as he has other important duty to perform.”

D. R. JONES Brigadier-General.

#201

“Early on the 29th Longstreet and A. P. Hill were ordered to recross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and move by the Darbytown to the Long Bridge road. Maj. R. K. Meade and Lieut. S. R. Johnston, the Engineers, attached to General Longstreet's division, who had been sent to reconnoiter, found, about sunrise, the work on the upper extremity of the enemy's line of intrenchments abandoned.

Generals Huger and Magruder were immediately ordered in pursuit, the former by the Charles City road, so as to take the Federal Army in flank, and the latter by the Williamsburg road, to attack its rear. Jackson was directed to cross at Grapevine Bridge and move down the south side of the Chickahominy. Magruder and Huger found the whole line of works deserted and large quantities of military stores of every description abandoned or destroyed.

The former reached the vicinity of Savage Station about noon, where he came upon the rear guard of the retreating army. Being informed that the enemy was advancing, he halted and sent for re-enforcements. Two brigades of Huger's division were ordered to his support, but subsequently withdrawn, it being apparent that the force in Magruder's front was covering the retreat of the main body. Jackson's route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, but he was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine Bridge.

Late in the afternoon Magruder attacked the enemy with one of his divisions and two regiments of another. A severe action ensued and continued about two hours, when it was terminated by night.

The troops displayed great, gallantry and inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy; but, owing to the lateness of the hour and the small force employed, the result was not decisive, and the enemy continued his retreat under cover of darkness, leaving several hundred prisoners, with his dead and wounded, in our hands.

At Savage Station were found about 2,500 men in hospital and a large amount of property. Stores of much value had been destroyed, including the necessary medical supplies for the sick and wounded. But the time gained enabled the retreating column to cross White Oak Swamp without interruption and destroy the bridge.

BATTLE OF FRAZIER'S FARM [Glendale]

Jackson reached Savage Station early on the 30th. He was directed to pursue the enemy on the road he had taken and Magruder to follow Longstreet by the Darbytown road. As Jackson advanced he captured such numbers of prisoners and collected so many arms that two regiments had to be detached for their security. His progress was arrested at White Oak Swamp. The enemy occupied the opposite side and obstinately resisted the reconstruction of the bridge.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill, continuing their advance on the 30th, soon came upon the enemy strongly posted across the Long Bridge road, about 1 mile from its intersection with the Charles City road. Huger's route led to the right of this position, Jackson's to the rear, and the arrival of their commands was awaited to begin the attack.

On the 29th General Holmes had crossed from the south side of James River with part of his division.

On the 30th, re-enforced by General Wise with a detachment of his brigade, he moved down the river road and came upon the line of the retreating army near Malvern Hill. Perceiving indications of confusion, General Holmes was ordered to open upon the column with artillery. He soon discovered that a number of batteries, advantageously posted, supported by an infantry force superior to his own and assisted by the fire of the gunboats in the James River, guarded this part of the line.

Magruder, who had reached the Darbytown road, was ordered to re-enforce Holmes, but being at a greater distance than had been supposed, he did not reach the position of the latter in time for an attack.

Huger reported that his progress was obstructed, but about 4 p.m. firing was heard in the direction of the Charles City road, which was supposed to indicate his approach. Longstreet immediately opened with one of his batteries to give notice of his presence. This brought on the engagement, but Huger not coming up, and Jackson having been unable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, Longstreet and Hill were without the expected support. The superiority of numbers and advantage of position were on the side of the enemy.
The battle raged furiously until 9 p.m. By that time the enemy had been driven with great slaughter from every position but one, which he maintained until he was enabled to withdraw under cover of darkness.

At the close of the struggle nearly the entire field remained in our possession, covered with the enemy's dead and wounded. Many prisoners, including a general of division, were captured, and several batteries, with some thousands of small-arms, taken. Could the other commands have co-operated in the action the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy.

After the engagement Magruder was recalled to relieve the troops of Longstreet and Hill. His men, much fatigued by their long, hot march, arrived during the night.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL

Early on July 1 Jackson reached the battle-field of the previous day, having succeeded in crossing White Oak Swamp, where he captured a part of the enemy's artillery and a number of prisoners. He was directed to continue the pursuit down the Willis Church road, and soon found the enemy occupying a high range, extending obliquely across the road, in front of Malvern Hill. On this position of great natural strength he had concentrated his powerful artillery, supported by masses of infantry, partially protected by earthworks. His left rested near Crew's house and his right near Binford's. Immediately in his front the ground was open, varying in width from a quarter to half a mile, and, sloping gradually from the crest, was completely swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery. To reach this open ground our troops had to advance through a broken and thickly-wooded country, traversed nearly throughout its whole extent by a swamp passable at but few places and difficult at those. The whole was within range of the batteries on the heights and the gunboats in the river, under whose incessant fire our movements had to be executed.

Jackson formed his line with Whiting's division on his left and D. H. Hill's on his right, one of Ewell's brigades occupying the interval. The rest of Ewell's and Jackson's own divisions were held in reserve. Magruder was directed to take position on Jackson's right, but before his arrival two of Huger's brigades came up and were placed next to Hill. Magruder subsequently formed on the right of these brigades, which, with a third of Huger's, were placed under his command. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve and took no part in the engagement. Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding necessary communication, and the extreme difficulty of the ground, the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the afternoon. The obstacles presented by the woods and swamp made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for its use and none for its proper concentration. Orders were issued for a general advance at a given signal, but the causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the troops. D.H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries of the enemy. Jackson sent to his support his own division and that part of Ewell's which was in reserve, but owing to the increasing darkness and intricacy of the forest and swamp they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance. Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of the ground he had gained after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy. On the right the attack was gallantly made by Huger's and Magruder's commands. Two brigades of the former commenced the action; the other two were subsequently sent to the support of Magruder and Hill. Several determined efforts were made to storm the hill at Crew's house. The brigades advanced bravely across the open field, raked by the fire of a hundred cannon and the musketry of large bodies of infantry. Some were broken and gave way, others approached close to the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the advanced batteries to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those of the enemy. For want of concert among the attacking columns their assaults were too weak to break the Federal line, and after struggling gallantly, sustaining and inflicting great loss, they were compelled successively to retire. Night was approaching when the attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish friend from foe. The firing continued until after 9 p.m., but no decided result was gained. Part of the troops were withdrawn to their original positions, others remained on the open field, and some rested within a hundred yards of the batteries that had been so bravely but vainly assailed. The general conduct of the troops was excellent.— in some instances heroic. The lateness of the hour at which the attack necessarily began gave the enemy the full advantage of his superior position and augmented the natural difficulties of our own.

After seizing the York River Railroad on June 28 and driving the enemy across the Chickahominy, as already narrated, the cavalry under General Stuart proceeded down the railroad to ascertain if there was any movement of the enemy in that direction.

He encountered but little opposition, and reached the vicinity of the White House on the 29th. At his approach the enemy destroyed the greater part of the immense stores accumulated at that depot and retreated toward Fort Monroe. With one gun and some dismounted men General Stuart drove off a gunboat which lay near the White House and rescued a large amount of property, including more than 10,000 stands of small-arms partially burned. Leaving one squadron at the White House, in compliance with his orders, he returned to guard the lower bridges of the Chickahominy.

On the 30th he was directed to recross and co-operate with General Jackson. After a long march he reached the rear of the enemy at Mal-vern Hill on the night of July 1 at the close of the engagement.

On July 2 it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, leaving the ground covered with his dead and wounded, and his route exhibiting abundant evidence of precipitate retreat. The pursuit was commenced, General Stuart with his cavalry in the advance, but a violent storm, which prevailed throughout the day, greatly retarded our progress. The enemy, harassed and closely followed by the cavalry, succeeded in gaining Westover, on James River, and the protection of his gunboats. He immediately began to fortify his position, which was one of great natural strength, flanked on each side by a creek, and the approach to his front commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping, in addition to those mounted in his intrenchments. It was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view of the condition of our troops, who had been marching and fighting almost incessantly for seven days under the most trying circumstances, it was determined to withdraw, in order to afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need.

Several days were spent in collecting arms and other property abandoned by the enemy, and in the mean time some artillery and cavalry were sent below Westover to annoy his transports.

Under ordinary circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its escape was due to the causes already stated. Prominent among these is the want of correct and timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled General McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to add much to the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns; but regret that more was not accomplished gives way to gratitude to the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe for the results achieved. The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign, which had been prosecuted after months of preparation at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, and upward of 35,000 stands of small-arms were captured. The stores and supplies of every description which fell into our hands were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field, while his subsequent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled.”

R.E. Lee, General

#229

July —, 1862.

On Saturday morning the division marched back across the ravine to renew its supply of ammunition and get something to eat. We shortly received orders to march and to follow the command of Major-General Hill. After marching half a mile we halted, the troops in front being at a halt, and so remained under arms all day, being ordered into bivouac where we were at night. This was at McGehee's house and farm, a position which had been the enemy's extreme right, and whence their causeway over the Chickahominy leads. The enemy had destroyed the bridge.
All day Sunday we remained in the same position, marching early Monday morning and crossing the Chickahominy by the enemy's causeway. Passed through their encampments, crossed the York River Railroad, and, marching by the Williamsburg road, we turned off at the White Oak Bridge fork and reached the bridge about noon, finding it destroyed and the enemy drawn up beyond in line of battle. Batteries were brought up and a heavy fire opened upon him, silencing his battery completely. Our fire was directed by Major Whiting, of the staff. Sundry ineffectual attempts were made during the day to repair the bridge, but the enemy keeping up a distant and random fire of shell about the crossing, the men would not work. During the afternoon the furious battle of Frazier's farm was raging between the enemy and the troops of General Longstreet. It could be distinctly heard, and indeed was scarcely 2 miles from us. Our delay at White Oak was unfortunate.

Next morning, the enemy having retired, the bridge was repaired and the troops passed, my division in the advance. Marching by the road to Turkey Bridge on the Turkey road, we presently fell in with the line of skirmishers of Major-General Magruder's troops, moving in line of battle by the Charles City road. They halted for us to pass. The troops were marching by a flank. The commanding general of the corps, Major-General Jackson, would not allow the dispositions to be made to advance with skirmishers deployed and in line, but caused the troops to press on until the head of column closed on the advance guard, a regiment of cavalry, in a thick wood near Crew's farm, about 11 a.m. On the farm the enemy were found very strongly posted. They immediately opened with shell on the woods, every portion of which was under their fire. The result was, the cavalry came to the right-about and broke through the long column of troops which filled the road, now enfiladed by the fire. Though suffering loss, they formed to the right and left with precision and promptness.

To our left was a very large wheat field, on the farm of Mr. Poindexter, which afforded a good view of the enemy's position and fair opportunities for artillery. Batteries were ordered up. The enemy's position, naturally commanding, was materially strengthened by the judicious distribution of his artillery. The first battery ordered into Mr. Poindexter's field found itself exposed to a vastly superior cross-fire, and was soon compelled to retire with loss. Balthis' battery, better posted and better covered by the ground, fought well and continued the action until their ammunition was exhausted. Other batteries were ordered up. The position to be taken by the artillery rendered infantry support necessary, and I was directed by General Jackson to form my line with my right on the road in the wood, advancing to the edge in front and holding that. This was done by the Third (Law's) Brigade. The line continued by Hood extended across Poindexter's field, the men lying concealed by the wheat and the roll of the ground. I had been strengthened by the Third Brigade, of Jackson's division proper, under the command of Brigadier-General Hampton. This was held in reserve. Trimble's brigade, of Ewell's division, supported my extreme left. This disposition I was directed to maintain, the general attack of our forces being understood to be made as soon as practicable on the extreme right, the enemy's left. In the mean time it became apparent from our position that the enemy had divined the movement; their artillery fire, which had been very severe upon my batteries and troops; Ceased, and heavy columns were discovered in movement for disposition on their left. After some time the movement of baggage and troops in retreat by the Turkey Bridge road could be plainly observed.

After the attack commenced on the right my division, with the exception of two regiments on the right of my line, which was near our center, and some of the Texas skirmishers, had nothing to do with the battle except to suffer a murderous artillery fire, which they did un-flinchingly. Personally assisted by my staff, I was called upon to direct the artillery fire, which I continued to do during the afternoon. From my point of view the enemy appeared to fight with great stubbornness, and our attack to have made but little impression upon him. He deployed at one time six batteries in front of our center, when, opening in this deployment with artillery, they, together with the stationary batteries already in position, and which we had been engaging at times during the day, all opened a terrific fire upon Poindexter's field. Our gunners replied with spirit, but from want of ammunition' the contest was too unequal, and I caused them successively to withdraw. This cross-fire was excessively severe upon the supporting troops. Toward night, learning that the center was pressed hard, I received orders to direct General Trimble to move over from the left to that point, and commenced to close my own troops into the right, when night fell, and with it the battle, which had raged with great fury, ceased. For an hour after night-fall the enemy shelled the woods and Poindexter's field with rapid and heavy fire. This indicated another withdrawal. My troops remained in position all night, the advanced scouts confirming the withdrawal of the enemy during the night, leaving their dead and wounded.

Wednesday morning, the 2d, a very heavy rain set in; the troops remained in bivouac, cooking. Thursday Major-General Jackson's corps marched to take the road to Westover, but missed it, and bivouacked near Willis' Church.

W. H. C. WHITING, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

#231
July 9, 1862.

On the 29th it was ordered to take the advance and move to the Chickahominy River, which it did. The bridge being incomplete, shortly before sunset it was ordered to its former bivouac.

On the morning of the 30th it took up the march at 2.30 o'clock, following the troops in advance of it. At night it bivouacked near White Oak Swamp.

Took up the march at 5 a.m. on July 1, following troops in front. Hearing from General Whiting artillery was needed in front, I ordered captains Carpenter and Poague to report to Brigadier-General Whiting with their batteries. For an account of their operations I respectfully refer to their reports. The brigade was halted near a church in the wood and held in reserve. Being within range of the enemy's shell, it was twice removed to the rear; but, unfortunately, the first shot indicating the necessity of a move killed that promising and gallant officer Captain Fletcher, Fifth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, and the next, causing a second move, killed 1 man and wounded 3 of same regiment. Between 6 and 7 p.m. I was ordered to the front with my command. On reporting to General Jackson, I was ordered to file to the right through the woods and report to Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill. I obeyed the first part of the order. I had not gone far when I found the brigade under the fire of a battery. It moved steadily on under a heavy fire. I dispatched a staff' officer to a house near by to see if I could hear of General Hill's locality. I could learn nothing, and hearing a heavy fire to my left, I moved directly for it. To gain that point the command was exposed to a terrific fire, and in consequence of the darkness of the hour and much wood and swamp the brigade became greatly separated. Finding myself with a portion of the Thirty, third Regiment, Colonel Neff, and a portion of the Fourth Regiment-I moved to the assistance of our troops through the swamp sending Captain O'Brien to find the other regiments and bring them up. On emerging from the swamp I found a handful of gallant men of the First and Third North Carolina Regiments receiving a most terrific fire. I immediately placed the Thirty-third and Fourth Regiments in position, and with about 100 men held this hill against the enemy, who gave us the most terrific fire I have ever seen. There was a continuous stream of shot, shell, and balls for some two hours, when the enemy's fire slackened, and ceased about 10 p.m.

During this time the officers and men behaved with true courage. Our loss was heavy.
Colonel Neff and Maj. F. W. M. Holliday, Thirty-third Regiment, and Lieutenants Howard and Garnett, of my staff, particularly attracted my admiration by their coolness and untiring efforts to keep the men in their position. Their escape from injury is truly providential.

About 9 p.m., while trying to find remnants of my brigade— — for some few men had found out my position and joined— I met a portion of the Thirteenth Georgia Regiment and ordered it to this position. In a short time parts of my regiments came up, all having been subjected to a heavy fire while moving up, but in consequence of the thick wood and darkness could not find their proper positions. For details of their operations I refer to their several reports.

Here the fearless and gallant Col. A. J. Grigsby, Twenty-seventh Regiment Virginia Volunteers, was wounded— slightly, I am glad to say— but obliged to leave the field. Captain O'Brien, of my staff, was injured by a fall from his horse, and not with me after reaching the field.

Hearing of troops near by not engaged I immediately sent for them, and was soon re-enforced by a portion of General Lawton's brigade, General J. R. Jones' brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, and a part of the Louisiana Brigade, and that gallant band of Marylanders under the brave Col. B. T. Johnson. Colonel Johnson, hearing I needed assistance, came forward to tender his regiment, which I gladly accepted, and gave him the advance, directing him to extend our line some half a mile to the right, placing my picket on and near the flank of the enemy. This duty he executed rapidly and with good judgment, holding this position until after the enemy had retired the following day. Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham's brigade I placed on Johnson's left and the balance of Lawton's brigade between Cunningham's and my original position, securing my entire front and flank, sleeping on the field so hotly contested against heavy odds.

After these dispositions General Lawton arrived, and I rode in to report to Generals Hill and Jackson my position. This effected, I returned to the field before dawn and made the requisite dispositions to repulse any attack; but at daylight we found the enemy had evacuated his position during the night, taking off his guns, but leaving his dead, small-arms, and other indications of a defeat and hasty retreat, which was an agreeable surprise, for I had learned, through prisoners captured about daylight, his force the day previous had been vastly superior to ours.

CHAS. S. WINDER, Brigadier-General, Commanding.


#234
July 13, 1862.

On Saturday the regiment remained near McGehee's.

On Sunday we were marched as far as Grapevine Bridge, and returned about night-fall to our camp.

Monday we crossed the Chickahominy and the York River Railroad, and bivouacked near White Oak Swamp, and moved Tuesday, July 1, on the Shirley road, halting occasionally for some time. Heavy artillery fire all the while heard in front.

Passing a church, we were placed in a wood about 5 p.m. to the right of the road, and remained there over an hour.

Some of the regiments of the brigade being within reach of the shells of the enemy, about 6.30 o'clock the brigade was ordered from the woods to the road. The thick undergrowth delayed the movements of the Second and Fifth Regiments so much, that when the left of the Second reached the road neither the Twenty-seventh, Fourth, nor Thirty-third were in sight. The road was crowded with artillery and regiments hastening from the battle-field. The regiment was pushed forward as rapidly as possible on the road, and Sergeant-Major Burwell sent in advance to ascertain the routes taken by General Winder, and by his exertions we followed in his track.

Night was rapidly closing in. The regiment was in the woods to the right of the road, marching upon the left flank of the enemy and exposed to the fire of their artillery.

Leaving the woods we entered a field, which was swept by the enemy's fire. Here we met officers and men hastening to the rear, who reported that all our troops were in retreat. Still the regiment was pushed forward to join, if possible, the brigade. The Fifth was in our rear. The darkness, the rapid march, and the woods had separated the men very much, and the command was exceedingly small. Concealing them by a deep ravine in a wood, within 150 yards of the road, I rode out until I struck the road. Here I could not see any of our troops, and the fire from the enemy was incessant.
.
LAWSON BOTTS, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

#235
July 11, 1862

On Saturday morning, the 28th, I threw out some men to relieve the picket I had put out the night before. They brought in several prisoners. It was some three or four of these fresh men who arrested Brigadier-General Reynolds and Captain Kingsbury, his assistant adjutant-general.

The regiment remained here until Sunday morning, when it, with the brigade, marched to the bridge across the Chickahominy, where it remained inactive until nearly night, and then returned to the ground occupied in the morning.

On Monday, the 30th, the regiment took up the line of march and proceeded to a point at or near White Oak Swamp, where it remained for the night.

On Tuesday, July 1, marched down road; halted near a church. While here the enemy, who occupied a strong position on Malvern Hill, opened fire upon the advance of our army, whereupon an artillery duel ensued between ours and the enemy's batteries. The brigade was here forced to seek cover in the woods, where it remained until quite late in the evening. My regiment did not suffer from the shells thrown by the enemy, though some casualties occurred in the brigade.

Late in the evening the infantry became engaged, and my regiment, with the brigade, marched to the scene of action. I received no orders, but followed the Twenty-seventh Regiment, which was my position in the march. The Twenty-seventh double-quicked through the woods. I followed, passing out of the woods into an open field. We were exposed to a tremendous and furious fire from the enemy's batteries. I continued to move the regiment at a double-quick in order to secure the wood, some 200 yards in advance, where I intended to close the regiment up, as coming so rapidly through the first woods the files became widely separated, but all entered the field and were striving to close up, though the shells were bursting all around and in great rapidity; but when the first company reached the woods, Colonel Grigsby, I believe— or it may have been some one else-commanded "Left into line." I commanded "Halt," and did all I could to stop the regiment, in order to close it up. But it was getting late, and the cheering of the men made it impossible for me to arrest the movement, Lieut. Col. R. D. Gardner and Maj. William Terry doing all in their power to bring the regiment together, but, unfortunately, it was not accomplished.

It was here that Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner's horse was shot dead, falling upon him, and he was unable to get from under his horse until assisted. Up to this moment he was doing all a man could do to get the men together. Major Terry acted well his part, but exposing himself all the time in his effort to get the regiment in order. I left him in the field, and rode in with that portion of the regiment which had entered the woods; but in the mean time it had grown quite dark, and it was difficult in a wood so dense to keep even the advanced portion of the regiment together. Passing through this wood, I reached the road with only a part of the regiment— in a word, the regiment, unfortunately, became separated, and owing altogether to the fact that the command above referred to was given by some one. But for this I would have secured a new formation of the regiment and taken it altogether into action. But as it was, some were on the left and others on the right of other troops. Men and officers, so far as I could discover, acted very well in the engagement.

CH. A. RONALD, Colonel Fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers.

#236

On Tuesday, July 1, by order of General Winder, I had placed my regiment in the woods in rear of the battle-field. I had scarcely gotten into position before a Parrott shell mortally wounded Captain Fletcher. This gallant young officer had on many occasions proved himself so brave as to be the idol of his company and of the entire regiment. His last words on the field were words of encouragement to his men.

General Winder ordered me to move back some distance and out of the range of the guns. I had hardly executed the order before another shell exploded in the line, killing 1 and wounding 4 privates. The brigade was then moved still farther back. I obtained permission of General Winder to go to the rear to look after my wounded, and while there was informed that the brigade was moving to the front. With difficulty I reached the head of my regiment just as it filed to the right into the woods. The blocked-up condition of the road compelled the regiment to move in single file, which scattered it very much. Having received no orders, I followed the Second Regiment across a corn field until I arrived at a woods and found it posted in a ravine, which seemed to be providentially placed in our way as a breastwork against the terrific shower of shell and grape. I soon after met with Colonel who informed me that he had lost the balance of the brigade. After remaining in this perilous situation, in which our men were unable to do any good and were in very great danger and finding it impossible to join the rest of the brigade, Colonel Botts and I, on consultation, determined to fall back to the road, which we succeeded in doing with but a few wounded. I gathered the scattered men of the brigade, assisted by Colonel Botts, and moved along the road until I received orders to halt and rest.

WM. S. H. BAYLOR, Colonel Fifth Virginia Infantry

#237
July 7, 1862

At the battle of the 1st instant the Twenty-seventh regiment was marched up the road in column with the brigade until it came within about half a mile of the battle-field, when the whole brigade filed to the right into a piece of woods. Then my regiment, in a line with the brigade, supported on the right by the Thirty-third Virginia and on the left by the Fourth Virginia Regiments, advanced by the right flank through the woods, then into an open field, and then again through a very dense forest of brush and timber, across the main road to the position assigned on the field.

The shot and shell fell fast and thick on us as we marched on, and just before reaching our position on the field Col. A. J. Grigsby, while leading the regiment in his dauntless and fearless style was struck by a Minie ball, inflicting under his left arm a painful but not dangerous wound.

The regiment was ordered to fire, which it did, and continued firing for some length of time, when it was ordered to charge on a battery. This was attempted, but the regiment, being much scattered and unsupported by sufficient force, was compelled to desist. The regiment then resumed its original position on the field and continued firing until the fight closed.

G. C. SMITH. Captain, Comdg. Twenty-seventh Regiment Virginia Vols.

#238

Saturday, the 28th, remained in our position all day, men being employed a portion of the day in gathering arms and burying the dead of friend and foe.

Sunday, the 29th, marched down to Grapevine Bridge, where we remained for several hours, and then returned to our former position.

Monday, the 30th, were aroused at 2.30 a.m. Got under arms and took up the line of march in the direction of Grapevine Bridge, crossed Chickahominy, and marched to the York River Railroad. Marched down the road some distance, and then down what I was told was the Williamsburg road. Heard heavy firing in front of us, but did not get under fire all day. Bivouacked at dark near White Oak Swamp.

Tuesday, July 1, marched at daylight, crossed the swamp, and moved on in the direction of James River. Do not remember what troops were immediately in our front. The Thirty-third Regiment marched in rear of the brigade. About 11 o'clock we filed into a wood on the right of the road and formed line of battle, Thirty-third on the extreme left. Remained in this position a considerable time, and then fell back a short distance to get out of range of shells. Here we remained until near sundown, when we were ordered to "Attention," faced to the left, and moved down the road in the direction of the firing, Thirty-third leading. As we approached the scene of action found the firing very warm, shot and shell flying over and around us. We again filed to the right into the woods, through which we soon made our way; entered a corn field and inclined to the left, marching on until we again reached the main road. In the road we halted for a moment, the men lying down behind a fence in the mean time which afforded a partial protection. Soon moved off again, crossed the fence to our left, and marched in an oblique direction through a thick undergrowth across a swamp clambered up a steep acclivity on the opposite side; crossed the fence, and found ourselves on the field of battle.

It was now quite dark, and it was difficult to tell where were our friends or foes. The regiment was put in line as well as circumstances would permit, the men sheltering themselves behind the hill as much as possible while they delivered a pretty warm fire upon the enemy. We were for some time unsupported, and our small force must certainly have been crushed by the superior weight of the enemy had they known our numbers. We were subsequently joined by some Louisiana regiments and General Lawton's brigade.

Considerable confusion was created necessarily in the swamp and bushes, officers and men becoming separated and regiments more or less intermingled; yet, so far as my observation extended, both officers and men behaved well. Major Holliday, Adjutant Walton, Captain Holliday and Sergeant-Major Baldwin were particularly brought under my notice. Captain Holliday was the only captain in the regiment on the occasion.

The firing did not cease until about 9 p.m., when it gradually died away, the enemy finally withdrawing.

JNO. F. NEFF, Colonel Thirty-third Virginia Infantry.

#243

On Tuesday, July 1, the brigade crossed the White Oak Swamp and proceeded toward the Malvern Hills. In the latter part of the day a heavy cannonade to the front announced to us the conflict which was then in progress. A little after 5 o'clock we were drawn up in line of battle about 100 paces in rear of the First Brigade, in a body of woods beyond a church, of which I have been unable to ascertain the name. While we were in these woods a number of the enemy's shell exploded near us, and we shifted our position several times to get out of their exact range. About sunset we were ordered forward. We marched slowly down the road under a terrific fire from a battery which perfectly commanded it and which threw its shells with great accuracy. Some confusion occurred amongst the troops in front of us, and we were kept marching and counter-marching along the road in question for several hours, Finally we proceeded across a small stream to the crest of a hill, and remained there, in the midst of the dead and wounded, until the following morning. Brigadier-General Jones was disabled early in the night by a contusion on the knee from a piece of shell, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham commanded the brigade during the remainder of the night. Notwithstanding the terrible fire to which we were so long exposed no one in the battalion was injured on this occasion.

On Wednesday, July 2, we encamped near the church I have mentioned.

Capt. B. W. Leigh, Commanding [1st Va.] Battalion

#254

I submit the following report of the operations of this brigade at or near Malvern Hill on the 1st ultimo:

On that morning I was ordered by General Lee to report to Major-General Jackson for temporary duty with one of the brigades of his command, and was by him assigned to the command of the brigade lately commanded by Brigadier-General Elzey, in the division of Maj or General Ewell. Of this brigade I assumed command about midday on the road leading from White Oak Swamp to Willis' Church.

In the afternoon of the same day the brigade, consisting of fragments of the Thirteenth, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-first, Forty-fourth, Fifty-second, and Fifty-eighth Virginia Regiments, and the Twelfth Georgia Regiment, numbering in all about 1,050 men present, was formed, by order of General Ewell, in line of battle in the woods on the left of the road leading from Willis' Church to Malvern Hill, where it remained until very late in the afternoon during a heavy cannonading between the enemy's artillery and our own, an occasional shell falling near the brigade, doing no damage, however, except the killing by the same shot of a private in the Forty-fourth Virginia Regiment and a young gentleman named Field, who was a volunteer on the staff of Colonel Walker, of the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment.

About sunset an order was received by General Ewell, in my presence, from General Jackson, through a staff officer, to send my brigade to the right to the support of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, and the brigade was immediately put in motion and marched, under the guidance of an officer sent for the purpose, across the road and through the woods, passing along the side of a ravine covered with trees and thick undergrowth, until the head of it reached a small road leading across an open bottom on a creek. Here the brigade was halted for a few minutes until the guide could ascertain the route to be pursued, when it was again put in motion, and as the head of it arrived in the open bottom; by the guide's direction the brigade was started across the bottom, and General Ewell and myself, with my staff officers, were directed to cross by a detour to the right over an old dam, as the only practicable way for horses. On arriving at the point where it was expected to meet the head of the brigade nothing could be seen of it, a thick brushwood excluding it from view.

In the mean time a large number of men, retreating from the battlefield, began to pass along the road into which we had then got, and filled the brushwood mentioned, producing great confusion and rendering it impossible for me to ascertain whether the brigade was passing through this brush-wood. After many fruitless efforts to ascertain this fact I rode toward the route over which the brigade was started as far as I could, and found a very deep ditch filled with skulkers from the battle-field, over which it was impossible for me to pass with my horse. I then rode around to a point where I could get a view of the place at which I separated from the brigade, and seeing none of it passing, I rode forward on the road leading to the battle-field with the hope of finding the brigade emerging from the woods farther on. It was then getting dark, and I found the road filled with a large number of men retreating in confusion, being mostly from General Toombs' Georgia Brigade. These troops, aided by my assistant adjutant-general, Captain Gardner, I endeavored to rally, but found it very difficult to do so.

During my exertions to rally these men the Twelfth Georgia Regiment, of my own brigade, came up, under the command of Capt. James G. Rodgers, and I marched it off, accompanied by Colonel Benning, with a few men from his regiment, of Toombs' brigade. These men were formed in line by direction of General Ewell, who had preceded me with some men rallied by him in a field over which a considerable body of our troops had charged in the early part of the engagement and in rear of some regiments then engaged with the enemy. Here I was soon joined by the Thirty-first and Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiments, which were brought up by my aide, Capt. S. H. Early, who had gone to the rear to look for the brigade. With these regiments I remained on the field during the night in the position designated by General Ewell, Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill being present at the time they were posted and for some time thereafter.

During the march the brigade was exposed to a terrific cannonading and shells were constantly bursting over and around it. For some time the regiments with me on the field, which were ordered to lie down, were exposed to the fiercest artillery fire that I have ever witnessed. About the close of this fire Brigadier-General Ransom, with a portion of his command, retired to the rear past my position, leaving none of our troops in front of me. A short time after the cessation of the fire we heard very distinctly the rumbling of wheels, indicating a movement of the enemy's artillery, and a large number of lights were seen moving about over the field in immediate proximity to the enemy's position, which were doubtless borne by persons from the enemy's lines in search of their wounded.

As soon as it was light enough next morning an appalling spectacle was presented to our view in front. The field for some distance from the enemy's position was literally strewn with the dead and wounded, and arms were lying in every direction. It was apparent that the enemy's main body with his artillery had retired, but a body of his cavalry, supported by infantry, was soon discovered on the field. To the right, near the top of a steep hill leading up toward the enemy's position, we saw a body of our own troops, some distance off, lying down, which proved to be a small body under Brigadier-Generals Ma-hone and Wright.

In the mean time parties of our men were going to the front in search of the wounded, and after a demonstration by the enemy's cavalry, which was abandoned on the firing of a few shots by the Maryland regiment posted in the woods some distance to my left, the parties from both armies in search of the dead and wounded gradually approached each other and continued their mournful work without molestation on either side, being apparently appalled for the moment into a cessation from all hostile purposes by the terrible spectacle presented to their view.

J. A. EARLY, Brigadier-General,Commanding Brigade.

More to come....

Charles Heath
01-17-2008, 12:19 PM
As threatened....

#255

On Sunday, 29th, orders were received to march down the Chickahominy. During the delay of starting I halted about 9 o'clock at a dwelling on the battle-field and sent an officer up a tree which had been prepared by the enemy as an observatory. This officer could with a glass plainly see the Yankee forces moving southward from Reynoldsville (General McClellan's headquarters). The smoke of burning stores could also be distinctly seen. I wrote a note addressed to General Lee or General Jackson stating these facts and that the Federal Army was certainly retreating. General Lee answered the note, and stated that the enemy were in heavy force on the right, and that he had tried to reach them with artillery, but without effect.

Meantime four large conflagrations had become plainly visible, and infantry, artillery, and wagons were seen moving amid clouds of dust in a southerly direction. I again wrote to General Lee, then 2 miles distant, communicating these facts, and- expressing the opinion that the enemy were certainly retreating with great precipitation, as burning stores were a sure indication, and ought to be vigorously pursued.

It was afterward known that General McClellan did break up the camps on Sunday morning at the place referred to and commenced a rapid retreat.

Under previous orders we continued our march about 10 o'clock, and after several halts reached the York River Railroad near Bottom's Bridge about 2 o'clock with the Third Division. After marching and countermarching several times a halt of several hours was made 2 miles north of the railroad. Several times in the afternoon I had called attention to the dense clouds of dust observed on the north side of the Chickahominy; that it plainly indicated a rapid retreat of the enemy, and that our forces should be thrown across that stream to intercept their flight or increase their disorder. A practicable ford was discovered near the point where we halted, and General Ewell had decided, under the discretion allowed him, to cross and attack them about 4 o'clock; but orders from General Jackson, conflicting with this, prevented so important a movement. About 6 p.m. the division was marched back up the Chickahominy, crossed the stream in the night at the new bridges, and bivouacked at Reynoldsville twelve hours after the enemy and General McClellan had abandoned that place.

It is deeply to be regretted that, from the sure indications of rapid retreat given by the Federal forces, some portion of our army was not thrown across the Chickahominy that day to fall on the flank of the enemy's retreating columns. This could have been safely and suddenly done at the ford before alluded to.

On Monday, 30th, by orders, we marched at an early hour over the same road taken by the enemy twenty-four hours before, and 3 miles distant passed the battle-field where General Longstreet had engaged the enemy the afternoon previous. At about 4 p.m. we reached the White Oak Swamp, where, after an hour's engagement with artillery, General Jackson's army bivouacked for the night, including General Whiting's division.

On Tuesday, July 1, we marched, by orders, at sunrise; crossed White Oak Swamp, the bridge destroyed by the enemy causing some hours' delay; continued by slow marches to ------- Church, and formed line of battle on Poindexter's farm, opposite the Malvern Hills, about 2 p.m., the Seventh Brigade on the extreme left. We remained in position about three hours, during the greater part of which time artillery and musketry firing was heard on our right a mile or two distant. At 5 p.m. Courtney's battery was put in position, opened a brisk fire, answered by heavy discharges from four or five batteries or the enemy posted on Malvern Hills. After half an hour's engagement, doing good service, the battery was withdrawn reluctantly by an order of General Whiting, through a courier, which turned out to have been intended for another battery.

At 3 p.m. that day, after the enemy's position and the disposition of his forces had been well reconnoitered through a glass and plainly visible, I asked permission to move through the continuous woods to the left and attack the enemy by a surprise on his right. This proposal, forwarded to General Jackson, was declined by him.

About sundown orders were received to march the Seventh Brigade to the extreme right, where the battle had raged fiercely for some two hours and our troops repulsed. I moved quickly, guided by an officer of General D. H. Hill's staff, through a dense woods, in the dark, exposed for 1½ miles to a continuous and rapid fire of the enemy's artillery, and took up a position on that part of the field where General Magruder had made his disastrous charges across an open field, every yard of which could be swept by the adverse artillery. This field was about half a mile broad, skirted by woods on the left and a high and abrupt declivity descending to Turkey Creek on the right. I reported to General Ewell, and a few moments after to D. H. Hill, who ordered the brigade to remain in its position near the woods on the edge of the field. I proposed soon after to General Hill to ride forward under cover of the heavy darkness and reconnoiter the enemy's position. It was then about 9 o'clock. We rode forward and approached within 100 steps of the batteries, and could hear plainly the ordinary tone of conversation. The guns were then firing on the woods to our left, where the last attack had been made, at right angles to that part of the field we were in. I suggested to General Hill the advantage of making an attack on this battery, and that it must be successful, and the enemy would not expect one from our position, and under cover of the darkness we could approach them undiscovered. General Hill did not seem inclined to make the movement. We rode back to the brigade, conversed some time, when I again urged the propriety of an attack, as we could approach so near undiscovered as to insure success, the enemy having no skirmishers in our front. But he declined as before to order the attack, and directed me to make no further movement. I occupied this position until about 12 o'clock, when all firing had ceased for more than two hours, and as General Ewell and General Hill had both been absent during this time I retired the brigade into the woods to bivouac for the night, as the men were completely worn-out and no further action expected.

I. R. TRIMBLE, Brigadier-General.

#257

That night we slept on the battle-field, and next morning, 28th, were ordered in front by Major-General Ewell, and gained the York River Railroad. Pushing beyond to a hill which commanded Bottom's Bridge, I placed a picket on the Williamsburg road and held the hill by order until the 30th, when I was ordered off.

On July 1, finding myself in the rear without orders, I pushed forward until I got within a quarter of a mile of Littleton's house, on the Malvern Hills. Here I halted and went forward with my adjutant and adjutant general of the Maryland Line. A short distance from my position I met Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson coming back, wounded, with the fragments of his command, which had been repulsed, losing heavily. I rode on, and just in front of Littleton's house came suddenly on a small body of the enemy within 100 yards of me. Returning, I reported the fact to Major-General Jackson, and asked should I go forward• He said, "No." 1 remained in position until dusk under the most terrific fire of shell and shrapnel I can conceive of. At that time, finding troops coming pouring back from the front, and no one to get orders from, I concluded to move forward toward the firing. As I was going up Major-General Ewell rode up and approved of my action.

I then went on and found Brigadier-General Winder, and by his order took possession of the woods beyond the Littleton house, which I held until we marched. This gave us complete command of the battlefield•

BRADLEY T. JOHNSON, Colonel, Commanding Maryland Line

#258

Jackson's command, my division leading, passed Savage Station early in the morning of the 30th instant, and followed the line of the Yankee retreat toward White Oak Creek. We picked up about 1,000 prisoners and so many arms, that I detached the Fourth and Fifth North Carolina Regiments to take charge of both.

At White Oak Creek we found the bridge destroyed and the Yankee forces drawn up on the other side. Twenty-six guns from my division and five from Whiting's division opened a sudden and unexpected fire upon the Yankee batteries and infantry. A feeble response was attempted, but silenced in a few minutes. Munford's cavalry and my skirmishers crossed over, but the Yankees got some guns under cover of a wood which commanded the bridge, and the cavalry was compelled to turn back. The skirmishers staid over all day and night. We attempted no further crossing that day. The hospitals and a large number of sick and wounded at White Oak Creek fell into our hands. Major-Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill attacked the Yankees in flank at Frazier's farm, some 2 miles in advance of us that day, and a corresponding vigorous attack by Major-General Huger on their rear must have resulted most disastrously to them. The obstacles he met, which prevented his advance, may have been of a character not to be overcome. I do not know and cannot judge of them. The bridge being repaired, Jackson's command crossed over, Brigadier-General Whiting's division leading, and effected a junction with General Lee near a church a few miles from Malvern Hill. Whiting's division was turned off the road to the left at the foot of this hill and mine to the right. We had to advance across an open field and ford a creek before getting under cover of the woods. We were in full view while effecting these objects, and suffered heavily from the Yankee artillery. Brigadier-General Anderson, on the extreme left, had become engaged, his brigade roughly handled, and himself wounded and carried off the field before the other brigades had crossed the creek. By the order of Major-General Jackson the division was halted in the woods and an examination made of the ground. The Yankees were found to be strongly posted on a commanding hill, all the approaches to which could be swept by his artillery, and were guarded by swarms of infantry securely sheltered by fences, ditches, and ravines. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible on the plateau, rising in the form of an amphitheater. One flank was protected by Turkey Creek and the other by gunboats. We could only reach the first line of batteries by traversing an open space of from 300 to 400 yards, exposed to a murderous fire of grape and canister from the artillery and musketry from the infantry. If that first line were carried, another and another still more difficult remained in the rear. I had expressed my disapprobation of a farther pursuit of the Yankees to the commanding general and to Major-Generals Jackson and Longstreet even before I knew of the strength of their position. An examination now satisfied me that an attack could not but be hazardous to our arms.

About 2 o'clock, I think, I received a note from General Jackson, inclosing one from Col. R. H. Chilton: chief of General Lee's staff, saying that positions were selected from which our artillery could silence the Yankee artillery, and as soon as that was done Brigadier-General Armistead would advance with a shout and carry the battery immediately in his front. This shout was to be the signal for a general advance, and all the troops were then to rush forward with fixed bayonets. I sent for all my brigade commanders and showed them the note. Brigadier-General Rodes being absent sick, the gallant Gordon was put in command of his brigade. That accomplished gentleman and soldier Col. C. C. Tew, Second North Carolina Regiment, took command of Anderson's brigade. Garland, Ripley, and Colquitt, and these two colonels were present at the interview. Instead of ordering up 100 or 200 pieces of artillery to play on the Yankees, a single battery (Moorman's) was ordered up and knocked to pieces in a few minutes. One or two others shared the same fate of being beat in detail. Not knowing how to act under these circumstances, I wrote to General Jackson that the firing from our batteries was of the most farcical character. He repeated the order for a general advance at the signal of the shouting from General Armistead. As well as I could learn the position of our troops the division of Brigadier-General Whiting was on my left: Major-Generals Magruder and Huger on my right, and Major-General Holmes some miles in our rear.

While conversing with my brigade commanders shouting was heard on our right, followed by the roar of musketry. We all agreed that this was the signal agreed upon, and I ordered my division to advance. This, as near as I could judge, was about an hour and a half before sundown. We advanced alone; neither Whiting, on the left, nor Magruder and Huger, on the right, moved forward an inch. The division fought heroically and well, but fought in vain. Garland, in my immediate front, showed all his wonted courage and enthusiasm, but he needed and asked for re-enforcements. I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Newton, Sixth Georgia, to his support, and observing a brigade by a fence in our rear, I galloped back to it and found it to be that of Brigadier-General Toombs. I ordered it forward to support Garland and accompanied it. The brigade advanced handsomely to the brow of the hill, but soon retreated in disorder. Gordon, commanding Rodes' brigade, pushed gallantly forward and gained considerable ground, but was forced back. The gallant and accomplished Meares, Third North Carolina Regiment, Ripley's brigade, had fallen at the head of his regiment, and that brigade was streaming to the rear. Colquitt's and Anderson's brigades had also fallen back. Ransom's brigade had come up to my support from Major-General Huger. A portion of it came, but without its Brigadier- It moved too far to the left and became mixed up with the mass of troops near the parsonage on the Quaker road, suffering heavily and effecting little. Brigadier-General Winder was sent up by Major-General Jackson, but he came too late, and also went to the same belt of woods near the parsonage, already over-crowded with troops. Finally Major-General Ewell came up, but it was after dark and nothing could be accomplished. I advised him to hold the ground he had gained and not to attempt a forward movement.

The battle of Malvern Hill might have been a complete and glorious success had not our artillery and infantry been fought in detail. My division batteries, having been three times engaged, had exhausted all their ammunition and had been sent back for a fresh supply. If I had had them with me with a good supply of ammunition I feel confident that we could have beaten the force immediately in front of us. Again, the want of concert with the infantry divisions was most painful. Whiting's division did not engage at all, neither did Holmes'. My division fought an hour or more the whole Yankee force without assistance from a single Confederate soldier. The front line of the Yankees was twice broken and in full retreat, when fresh troops came to its support. At such critical junctures the general advance of the divisions on my right and left must have been decisive. Some half an hour after my division had ceased to struggle against odds of more than 10 to 1 and had fallen back McLaws' division advanced, but to share a similar fate.

So far as I can learn none of our troops drew trigger, except Me-Laws' division, mine, and a portion of Huger's. Notwithstanding the tremendous odds against us and the blundering management of the battle we inflicted heavy loss upon the Yankees.

They retreated in the night, leaving their dead unburied, their wounded on the ground, three pieces of artillery abandoned, and thousands of superior rifles thrown away. None of their previous retreats exhibited such unmistakable signs of rout and demoralization. The wheat fields about Shirley were all trampled down by the frightened herd, too impatient to follow the road. Arms, accouterments, knapsacks, overcoats, and clothing of every description were wildly strewn on the road-side, in the woods, and in the field. Numerous wagons and ambulances were found stuck in the mud, typical of Yankee progress in war.

D. H. HILL, Major-General.

#264

Crossing next morning, we followed up the retreat of the enemy toward James River into the Long Bridge road and then into the Quaker road toward Turkey Bridge. At Malvern Hill the enemy made their last stand, with several batteries and two lines of infantry in a commanding position. Our own infantry were put under cover near the road, waiting to observe the effect of the fire of our artillery, this brigade lying behind that of General Ripley, in reserve, with Colquitt's still in our rear. The concentrated fire of two of the enemy's batteries from the hill was too heavy for the single battery (Moorman's) which we opposed to them. Late in the afternoon orders were communicated that the commander-in-chief had selected a position from which our artillery could enfilade the enemy's batteries; that the effect of our fire could be seen, and that when the enemy's guns were crippled or silenced a general advance of the infantry would be ordered. The enfilading fire soon commenced, and the commander of this division, accompanied by several of the brigade commanders, including the writer, went to a point from which the effect could be observed. So far from producing marked effect, the firing was so wild that we were returning to our posts under the impression that no movement of infantry would be ordered, when suddenly one or two brigades, belonging to a division on our right (either Magruder's or Huger's), charged out of the woods toward the right with a shout. Major-General Hill at once exclaimed, "That must be the general advance! Bring up your brigades as soon as possible and join in it." Hurrying back to my own brigade, I moved it down the road by the flank to the edge of the field over which the enemy's batteries were playing and filing out to my right formed line of battle. I was then ordered to advance and charge the batteries, which were some 800 or 900 yards off on a commanding hill, straight to the front, supported by two lines of infantry. There was no cover, and the ground nearest the enemy was plowed. Anderson's, Ripley's, and Rodes' brigades, Gordon commanding, had proceeded farther down the road, thus keeping under partial cover, and approaching somewhat nearer and on the right of the enemy's position. When ordered forward I saw no troops of our own in front of me.

The brigade moved forward with alacrity about half way to the battery or nearer, when the terrible fire of artillery and the opening fire of the infantry induced it to halt, lie down, and commence firing without my orders and contrary to them. The fire of the enemy was very severe, and being satisfied that the exhibition of force presented by a single brigade on that front was not sufficient to intimidate the foe nor to carry the position, I sent my acting aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Haywood, to inform Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill that unless I was re-en-forced quickly I could effect nothing, and could not hold the position I then occupied. After some delay a brigade appeared from the woods in my rear and seemed coming up to my support. But their movements seemed slow, and before they reached me my men began to give way, and very many ceased to respond to my efforts to hold them in line and maintain the position. Remaining on the spot until, in spite of every effort, the men could no longer be held there, the brigade fell back to the edge of the woods from which we had started.

It is not my desire to indulge in criticism or crimination. It is enough to say that there was somehow a want of concert and co-operation in the whole affair that made a successful attack impracticable and the consequent disorder and straggling of troops most lamentable. My own brigade went up as far as any troops I saw upon the field and behaved as well. If they retired, so did all the rest who were ordered to charge the battery. The whole division became scattered.

S. GARLAND, JR., Brig. Gen., Comdg. Third Brigade, Third Division.

#266

On Monday, July 1, it moved with the division early across the repaired bridge, and followed the route of the enemy's retreat until he was found in position on the farther side of White Oak Swamp Creek. Here it was brought to within supporting distance of the artillery of the division, which engaged the enemy until night-fall, driving him from his position and enabling the pioneers to repair the bridge, over which we crossed on Tuesday morning, and followed the retreat of the enemy until our army came up with him in position at Malvern Hill.

Taking different positions during the morning, in the afternoon the brigade advanced, under orders from the major-general commanding division, through a heavy fire of artillery, to a dense wood in close proximity of the enemy's position, where it lay for a time in reserve.

At about 5 o'clock it was ordered to take position in a jungle near the hill upon which the enemy was established and to the left of General Anderson's brigade, which it did in the following order: The Forty-eighth Georgia was on the right, the Third North Carolina, the Forty-fourth Georgia (about 170 men of which had rallied and been brought by Captain Beck and other officers), and the First North Carolina on the left, under Lieutenant-Colonel [William P.] Bynum, of the Second, who had been detached from the command of the First Regiment.

In obedience to the orders of General Hill I made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and found him immediately in our front in strong force, with a battery well advanced toward us and supported by strong lines of infantry. The number of his guns could only be judged of by the rapidity of his fire, owing to the nature of the country.

At about 6.30 or 7 o'clock an attack was made by the troops on our right, and we were, with the other brigades in advance, ordered by General Hill to move forward at once and attack the enemy. Gordon's and Anderson's brigades were on my right, and the troops of the three mounted the hill in a gallant manner. At its brow our troops were met with a furious fire of shot, shell, and musketry; officers and men fell fast, but they maintained their ground, opening and keeping up a severe fire upon the enemy in return, before which his advanced battery fell back and his troops wavered. He pressed hard upon our left, however, and while moving his regiment to its support the gallant and accomplished Col. Gaston Meares, of the Third North Carolina Regiment, fell. Meanwhile Garland's and Colquitt's brigades had been advanced and made good the action on the right.
Darkness, however, was rapidly approaching, and, not knowing the extent of the enemy's suffering, the troops fell back to the road near the brow of the hill; other portions withdrew to the cover of the rising ground, and the night coming on, there was much confusion from the loss of officers and the nature of the country. Dense, dark, and in many places marshy, observation could reach but a short distance, quick movement was impossible, and in the din of battle the voice could be heard but a few yards.

R. S. RIPLEY, Brigadier-General, Commanding.


#272

Sunday, June 29, obedient to orders from General Magruder, I advanced across the Labor-in-Vain Swamp, through the camps lately occupied by the enemy, to the neighborhood of Fair Oaks Station. Discovering there that the enemy's pickets were a short distance in front, I directed Colonel Anderson to advance the First Georgia Regulars deployed as skirmishers, putting the remainder of his command in line of battle, instructing General Toombs to form his line on the left rear of Colonel Anderson, and so placing the two brigades en échelon. Meanwhile the First Georgia Regulars, having advanced about 400 yards, came upon the enemy's picket line and drove it back to the main body of his rear guard, which was in position, with several pieces of artillery, in a field beyond. Finding my command in advance of General Magruder's division, which was to move on my right, and without support on my left, General Jackson not having crossed the Chickahominy, I halted my command, and directed Harris battery, attached to Anderson's brigade, and Moody's battery, attached to Toombs' brigade, to reply to the fire of the enemy, my skirmishers meanwhile keeping up a brisk exchange of fire. This was continued until he withdrew. On notification from General Magruder I advanced until my left had passed Mickey's farm and my right had come in view of the enemy at Savage Station, when Colonel Anderson, by my order, opened with his artillery, to wit, two pieces of Hart's battery, compelling the retreat out of view of the enemy's infantry. The engagement beginning on the right about this time, I caused Colonel Anderson to change front to the right, so as to take the enemy in flank and rear, should he advance on General Cobb's position. Scarcely had this disposition been made when orders were received from General Magruder, through Lieutenant Bryan, a member of his staff, to fall back to the railroad bridge with my whole command to support the right of his line. Two guides were sent at the same time to conduct me to the position designated. This order I obeyed; but failing to find General Magruder, my men were bivouacked near the railroad in a drenching rain about 10 p.m.

I cannot close my report of this day's operations without expressing my very great satisfaction with the admirable manner with which the First Georgia Regulars acquitted itself of the arduous duties assigned it. Deployed in full as skirmishers nearly the whole day in advance of the entire division, it preserved its alignment through woods and over every obstacle, and when in immediate conflict with the enemy behaved with a steadiness and coolness which exhibited the excellence of its discipline, the efficiency of its officers, and the courage of the men composing it.

Monday, June 30, at 8 a.m., according to orders, I marched with my command to General Longstreet's position beyond New Market, on the Darbytown road, a march of over eighteen hours' duration, reaching and occupying the field of Monday's battle with my exhausted troops between 2 and 3 a.m. of Tuesday, July 1.

About 7 a.m., by direction of General Magruder, my command, in conjunction with other troops, advanced as far as the Willis Church road, where many prisoners were captured. In obedience to orders, about 10 a.m. my troops were withdrawn from this position, marched back on the Darbytown road some 3 or 4 miles, counter-marched, and finally halted some 2 miles in rear of the position occupied in the morning.

Between 2 and 3 p.m., under orders from Major-General Longstreet, Colonel Anderson's brigade was placed in position on the right of the leading to Crew's farm, and immediately in rear of the position occupied by General Cobb. General Toombs was stationed to the right and rear of Colonel Anderson. In an hour or two, under orders from General Magruder, sent through Captain Coward, of my staff, Colonel Anderson was advanced to the position of General Cobb, who had just gone to the support of General Armistead, General Toombs occupying Colonel Anderson's position. Hardly was this change made when Anderson was ordered by General Magruder to the support of General Cobb. Having no instructions to the contrary, Colonel Anderson advanced upon the front, occupied by General Cobb, over broken ground and into a dense swamp. Under orders from General Magruder and the direction of Captain Coward the brigade changed front to the left and advanced in line of battle through the swamp, followed closely by that of General Toombs, who took position upon his (Anderson's) left, and under repeated orders from General Magruder both brigades were hurried through the swamp, the difficulties of which, or the fearful fire of the enemy, cannot be exaggerated. Owing to less distance General Toombs reached the plateau first, and advanced directly toward the enemy's batteries, in open view, some 600 or 700 yards ahead and slightly to the left. To that point everything tended, my own command as well as others already on the field, soon bringing the different troops in contact and under the terrific fire of the enemy, causing partial confusion, to avoid which, and erroneously thinking I had so ordered it, Toombs' brigade obliqued to the left, crossed the road, getting out of my control. These movements had been made under a murderous fire, which these brave troops endured without the opportunity of returning a shot. For the further movements of this brigade I have to refer you to the report of General Toombs, herewith inclosed. Colonel Anderson, coming up in line with and to the right of General Toombs, struck the ridge at a point where it fell rapidly away from his front toward the right, causing the two regiments on his left to mount the ridge, while the balance of his brigade was in the bottom. To remedy this and to advance with his whole command in line he halted, and retired the two regiments in advance, so as to bring his brigade parallel with the edge of the plateau. Before this change of front was completed three of his regiments, mistaking some order for that to advance, rushed forward, coming under a deadly crossfire of artillery and suffering severe loss.

Night had now closed in, and convinced that further attempts would be unavailing, this command was kept under the crest, in order to repel any advance of the enemy. Remaining in this position until about 11 o'clock, and there being no water convenient to the men, in the absence of other instructions I withdrew the command to the position occupied previous to the commencement of the action.

D. R. JONES, Brigadier-General, Commanding

#275

On July 1, at Malvern Hill, we were placed in line with the other regiments of your brigade. We were to be, I learned, the supporting brigade to Generals Cobb's and Anderson's commands, which occupied positions in front of our line. After marching by the flanks and forward quite a number of times we were brought immediately in front of the battery that we were to charge. The Second Georgia's position was directly in front of the battery, which I thought must be fully three-quarters of a mile distant from the woods we emerged from. Being under the direct fire of the enemy's guns the whole of that distance our brigade moved forward steadily for some distance and in good order, when, owing to some command, the Fifteenth Georgia, being next to our right, got in front of us, masking the whole of the right wing of the Second.

The Seventeenth Georgia at the same time crowded upon the Fifteenth Georgia. This crowding caused much confusion. At the time I was 15 or 20 steps in front of our regiment, looking back to see if our regiment was moving on in order. I found myself in front of another regiment, which I was told was the Fifteenth Georgia. I soon saw the mixed condition of troops, that the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, which occupied the line to our right, had by some command been moved to the left, which placed them upon the line we occupied. While in that huddled condition the order was given to march by the left flank, which our regiment performed in good order under a most destructive fire of grape and canister, being under full range of the enemy's guns.

After crossing a fence our regiment was ordered to lie down and wait for support to come up. Soon one of the regiments of Kershaw's brigade came up and moved forward and we ordered as a support; we followed close after them. They moved in order and made a most gallant charge, but were completely checked by the deadly fire from the enemy's battery. Their ranks being torn asunder, they had to fall back, which left our regiment in front without any support. Colonel Butt being wounded at that time, I had to assume command. I ordered our regiment to lie down until we could get a supporting regiment. We were under a most terrific fire of grape, but the men acted with the utmost coolness, not one exhibiting, that I could see, the least fear. We lay under that fire for fully half an hour waiting for some regiment to come up that we might continue our charge to the battery, which was not more than 150 yards in front of us. Word being brought that the enemy was flanking us on our right (immediately afterward there occurred a very heavy fire, which came in upon the rear of our right wing), I ordered the regiment up and gave the command about face, and marched in order to the rear across a small drain and gave the command halt, but owing to great noise was not heard. I intended to halt and change front, that I might receive the enemy that (I was told) had flanked us. I was in front of the regiment at the time I ordered them to about-face, which placed me in the rear in falling back. My order to halt went unheeded. The regiment continued to move off to the rear, which I think was fortunate, as when [we were] alone and could effect nothing in the position we occupied. Had the regiment remained in the position I intended to make a stand for the enemy (that was said to have flanked us) I do not think I would have brought off 50 men, as the enemy had directed an increased fire upon that point.

WM. R. HOLMES, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Second Georgia.

#287

This action being closed by the approach of a stormy night, my command, re-enforced by the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment, Colonel Griffin, lay upon their arms on the field of battle until daylight, when it was ascertained that the enemy had disappeared. Removing our wounded and burying our dead, we marched, under the command of Major-General McLaws, by the Enroughty [Darby] town road to New Market, and prepared to bivouac for the night, but were almost immediately ordered forward to the support of General Longstreet, then engaged with the enemy at Frazier's farm. On the way we were halted and permitted to rest until 11 p.m., when we continued the march to Frazier's farm, arriving just in time to take our position by daylight on the morning of July I. About 8 a.m. we advanced in line of battle as far as the Willis Church road, where the forces of General Jackson passed to our right, and we were ordered back along the Long Bridge road several miles to the rear, where we remained in line of battle until 4 p.m., when we were ordered forward to the open field on the farm adjoining Crew's farm. Here we remained under the fire of the enemy's artillery until about 6 p.m., when I was directed by an officer of Major-General Magruder's staff to advance and attack the enemy's battery. Having no specific instructions and no knowledge of the ground or position of the enemy: I led the brigade in line of battle through a wood for half a mile toward the right of the enemy's line of fire, exposed all the while to a front and flank fire of artillery, which could not be avoided. During this march I passed three lines of troops who had preceded me in the attack. Arriving immediately in front of that portion of the enemy where I determined to assail him, I was indebted to your assistance, Captain, for finding my way to a ravine which led immediately up to the plateau upon which the enemy was formed. Availing myself of this shelter, I led my command up to the Willis Church road. Here the enemy occupied the open field in two lines in force in my front, forming an obtuse angle, facing toward the road in such a manner as to flank any force which might ascend the brow of the hill in my front. Between these two lines of the enemy at the point of intersection a battery of artillery was placed, pouring over our heads a crushing shower of grape and canister, while the infantry lines blazed with a constant stream of fire. Still farther to my right the artillery on the hill near the orchard enfiladed my line, and their infantry, in Crew's farm to my right rear, were engaged with some of our forces whose line of battle was parallel to my own.

The Second Regiment, which extended to near the parsonage, having open ground in front, engaged the left line of the enemy with some effect; but the rest of the command were powerless to accomplish anything in their then position, and I was satisfied that any farther advance at that point would insure the destruction of my command unless some change was made in the enemy's position. The nature of the ground affording considerable protection to the men, I determined to hold them there, in the hope that some diversion by an attack either on the right or left might be created in our favor.

After some time a galling fire was opened from our rear, killing and wounding the men and producing a general feeling of uneasiness in the whole command. Captain Holmes, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Dwight, acting assistant inspector-general, of my staff, went back in person to arrest the fire. Major Rutherford, of the Third Regiment, attempted to do the same, and Corpl. T. Whither Blakely is especially commended by Colonel Nance for having volunteered for the same dangerous duty. Finding that the fire still continued for some time, doing us more damage than that of the enemy, I ordered the command to retire by the route we came to the next road in our rear.

At this point I found Major Galliard, commanding, reforming the second Regiment. With this regiment I retired to the next road in our rear, where I again halted, supposing that the other regiments would be found there, but owing to the intricacies of the wood and the approaching darkness the commanding officers conducted their regiments severally to the field whence we entered the fight.

While collecting on the flag of the Second Regiment all the men of the brigade who came by, General Ewell rode up and desired me to advance my command to support a brigade he was about to lead into action in Crew's field. Calling attention to the small number of men with me and my desire to collect the remainder of the brigade, II indicated my unwillingness to do so on account of the inefficiency of any support I could render, but as he became very urgent I yielded, and led the Second Regiment, under command of Major Galliard, to the point indicated. Soon General Ewell's forces appeared, and he led two regiments in beautiful order to the attack under a terrible fire of artillery and infantry. While we were at this point, Sergeant Harley, color-bearer of the Second Regiment, exposed himself with gallantry worthy of especial mention in his efforts to encourage and animate the men around him, and was wounded by a shell while thus engaged.

J. B. KERSHAW, Brigadier-General, Commanding

#289

July 12, 1862

Being in command of skirmishers of the brigade, I was not with the regiment in the battle of Sunday, the 29th. I am not, therefore, prepared to furnish a minute account of it in that affair. From accounts furnished me by captains of companies I learn that the Second, in conjunction with the other regiments of the brigade, charged impetuously through the woods that separated the opposing forces, and broke and put to flight a line of the enemy formed just on the edge of the field beyond the woods. This body of the enemy was armed with most superior weapons, which were scattered along upon the ground some distance in the rear of their line and in numbers greatly exceeding their dead left upon the field, showing plainly that it was routed. At this moment of victory an order was given--no one knows whence it originated and extended down the line of the brigade-to cease firing and to fall back. The regiment fell back in accordance with this order, was rallied and reformed, and was ready for another charge had the order been given. Night, however, came over the scene and the contest ceased all along the line.

In this action 383 men were carried, 8 were left dead upon the battlefield, and 53 were wounded. Of the latter the regiment met with a severe loss in Captain Bartlett, one of the most gallant and conscientious officers belonging to it. He was borne mortally wounded from the field and, I regret to report, has since died. Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwyn was also severely wounded in the foot while gallantly discharging his duties. Second Lieutenant Perry, of Company H, was also very severely wounded.

The regiment slept that night on the battle-field in a heavy rain, and so near the enemy's line that fires could not prudently be allowed.

Next morning we marched from Savage Station toward Richmond and then down toward the scene of Menday's battle.

With a few hours' rest along our line of march we were kept moving until the dawn of Tuesday morning, when we reached Frazier's farm. The consequence of this fatigue was the exhaustion of many men of the regiment. Colonel Kennedy, who had been suffering for days from a slowly but steadily developing fever, was obliged to yield and devolve the command upon me.

In the afternoon the regiment, by order, was moved to the left of the dwelling-house in the rear of the battle-field. At this point we remained exposed to the desultory fire of the enemy's artillery. One member of Company G was killed instantaneously at this point.

About 6 o'clock I received orders to advance my command in line with the brigade. Our advance carried us for half a mile over an exceedingly rough and thickly wooded piece of ground. This was being vigorously shelled by the enemy, inflicting, however, but few casualties upon the command. As soon as we rose the brow of the hill, where the brigade was temporarily halted to rectify the alignment, grape, canister, and musket balls began to greet us, the artillery of the enemy enfilading us from the right. At the command forward our line advanced with as much firmness and steadiness as it was possible for troops to maintain. Across the ravine it progressed until the brow of the next hill was attained. Here I halted in obedience to orders. Upon observation I discovered about 300 yards in front of my left a formidable line of the enemy, and about 200 yards in front of my right another line forming an obtuse re-entering angle. Upon these lines I ordered my command to fire. The response from the enemy was very heavy. The men, both officers and privates, adhered to their position manfully and without an exception, that I could see, until the remainder of the brigade, under the fire which opened upon [it] from rear as well as front, had fallen back in obedience to orders. This order my command, being on the extreme left, was the last to execute. At the point we temporarily halted when going into action I rallied around the colors a large portion of the regiment, and kept them upon the field, under orders from General Kershaw, until the battle ceased.

I carried into action 208 men. Of these 8 were killed instantly upon the field, and 33 were wounded, several mortally. Of the wounded were First Lieutenant Perry, commanding Company H, and First Lieutenant Brownfield, commanding Company I, the former severely in the neck and the latter seriously in the head. Lieutenant Brownfield was carried from the field the day after the battle by an ambulance from some other brigade. This much of him is certainly known. Since then, I regret to say, his fate is a mystery. The ambulances of the regiment were pressed into service by unauthorized parties, so that my ambulance was unable to give relief to but few of the wounded of the regiment. Lieutenant Lorick, of Company C, was also injured.
F. GAILLARD, Major, Comdg. Second Regiment South Carolina Volunteers.

#300

Early on the following day (Saturday) parties were sent forward to find the enemy. It was soon ascertained that he was not in force in my front and had destroyed the bridges across the Chickahominy immediately in front of me. It was supposed, however, that we would be able to draw him from his intrenchments by cutting his base. While other portions of the army were occupied at this work, my artillery was opened with such long-range guns as I could use against the enemy on the other side of the river. The range was so great, however, that we could do but little more than annoy him. The fire of one of the batteries in front of General D. R. Jones, however, made him feel exceedingly uncomfortable.

The effort to draw the enemy out by cutting his base was entirely unsuccessful, and on Sunday morning it was ascertained that he had abandoned his fortifications and was in full retreat toward his gun-boats on the James River. I was ordered, with my own division and that of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, to march via New Bridge and the Darbytown road to intercept his retreat. After a forced march our troops reached a point that night within easy striking distance of the enemy.

The march was resumed on Monday morning. Soon after taking up the line of march I was joined by the commanding general. Our forces came upon the enemy at Frazier's farm about noon, when the enemy's skirmishers were reported as advancing. Colonel Jenkins, commanding the Second Brigade, was directed to ascertain the condition of the enemy. Afar driving in his pickets it was found that he was in force and position, ready for battle. My own division was put in position for attack or defense at once, and one of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's brigades (Branch's) ordered forward to support my right flank, the rest of Hill's division being left for the time on the road to secure the right or to move up to support the front.

About this time information was received that Major-General Magruder was in rear in easy supporting distance ; but as information was also received that the enemy was in force in front of Major-General Holmes, it was deemed advisable to order Magruder's forces to join Holmes, about 3 miles off to our right.

After getting into position artillery fire was opened about 3 p.m. upon the enemy, apparently from the Charles City road. Taking this for Huger's attack, and thinking that his troops (rather fresh)would expect early co-operation, I ordered several batteries forward hurriedly in order to assure those troops that we were in position. The enemy's batteries returned the fire immediately and with great rapidity. One battery was found to be so near our front line that I ordered Colonel Jenkins to silence it. The enemy was found to be in such force there, however, that the engagement was brought on at once (4 o'clock). Troops were thrown forward as rapidly as possible to the support of the attacking columns. Owing to the nature of the ground that concert of action so essential to complete success could not obtain, particularly attacking such odds against us and in position. The enemy, however, was driven back slowly and steadily, contesting the ground inch by inch. He succeeded in getting some of his batteries off the field, and, by holding his last position until dark, in withdrawing his forces under cover of night.

JAMES LONGSTREET, Major-General, Commanding.

#302

The division being marched left in front during the late operations on the north side of the Chickahominy, the First Brigade brought up the rear of its line, and was not ordered into any of the actions which occurred prior to Monday, the 30th ultimo. It was held in reserve, however, in immediate proximity to the battle-fields of the 26th and 27th ultimo as well as that of the 1st instant, in readiness to be thrown into action at a moment's notice.
Upon the 30th ultimo the division was halted in the vicinity of the enemy on the road leading through Frazier's farm, and under the orders of Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson, commanding the division, I formed my command in line of battle on the right and nearly perpendicular to the road, one regiment of the Second Brigade being posted in line between my left and the road. My command constituted the extreme right of our general line of battle and was posted upon the rear edge of a dense body of timber, the Seventeenth Virginia Regiment (Col. M.D. Corse) occupying the right; the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel [Peter] Hairston commanding) the left; the First Virginia (Capt. G. F. Norton commanding) the center; the Eleventh Virginia (Capt. K. Otey commanding) the right center, and the Seventh Virginia (Col. W. T. Patton) the left center.

Soon after getting into position I received orders from Major-General Longstreet to use the utmost care in guarding against any movement of the enemy upon my right, and I at once caused Colonel Corse, of the right regiment, to change front to rear on his left company, so that his regiment formed an obtuse angle with the line of the brigade and fronted obliquely to the right. I also caused two companies of this regiment to move forward from Corse's new front as skirmishers, under command of Captain Simpson. After advancing several hundred yards these skirmishers were halted upon the rear edge of an open field, a good view of which was commanded from their position. I also posted Rogers' battery of four pieces upon an open eminence near the right of my line and in supporting distance of Corse's regiment, the position being such as to command an extensive field upon my right.

About 5 p.m. an order being received from Major-General Longstreet to advance my line, I immediately in person ordered Colonel Corse to change his front forward, so as to bring the right of his regiment up to the brigade line, and sent my staff along the line toward the left, so as to insure the simultaneous advance of the entire line. The brigade advanced in line of battle steadily and in good order, notwithstanding the unevenness of the ground (which in places was almost precipitous), the entangled undergrowth which filled the woods, and the firing of one of the enemy's batteries located directly in front, which rapidly threw shell and round shot over and almost in the midst of my command.

The advance continued to be conducted in good order until, very soon coming upon the pickets of the enemy and driving them in, the men seemed to be possessed of the idea that they were upon the enemy's main line, and in an instant the whole brigade charged forward in doublequick time and with loud cheers. Nothing could have been more chivalrously done and nothing could have been more unfortunate, as the cheering of the men only served to direct the fire of the enemy's batteries, and the movement in double-quick time through dense woods, over rough ground, encumbered with matted under-growth and crossed by a swamp, had the effect of producing more or less confusion and breaking the continuity of the line, which, however, was preserved as well as it possibly could have been under the circumstances. But a single idea seemed to control the minds of the men, which was to reach the enemy's line by the directed route and in the shortest time; and no earthly power could have availed to arrest or restrain the impetuosity with which they rushed toward the foe, for my orders, previously given with great care and emphasis to the assembled field officers of the brigade, forbade any movement in double-quick time over such ground when the enemy were not in view. The obstructions were such as to make it impossible for any officer to more than a few files of his men at one view, and it was apparent that any effort to halt and reform the entire brigade would be futile, and would only serve to produce increased confusion. But whatever the error of the men in advancing two rapidly in disregard of previous orders to the contrary, it was an error upon the side of bravery.

After advancing in this way probably 1,000 or 1,200 yards, crossing two bodies of woods and a small intermediate field, the lines suddenly emerged into another field, facing a battery of the enemy, consisting of not less than eight pieces, distant but a few hundred yards, while the enemy's infantry were found protected by an imperfect and hastily constructed breastwork and a house near by. At the same time it became apparent that another battery of the enemy was posted a considerable distance to our left. These two batteries and the enemy's infantry poured an incessant fire of shell, grape, canister, and lead upon my line, and did much execution; still there was no perceptible faltering in the advance of these brave men who rushed across the open field, pouring a well-directed fire' into the enemy, driving him from his breastworks and the battery in our front. The guns of the battery were abandoned to us for the time being, and my command was in virtual possession of the chosen position of the enemy. A more impetuous and desperate charge was never made than that of my small command against the sheltered and greatly superior forces of the enemy. The ground which they gained from the enemy is marked by the graves of some of my veterans, who were buried where they fell; and those graves marked with the names of the occupants, situated at and near the position of the enemy, show the points at which they dashed against the strongholds of the retreating foe.

It is proper to be stated here that the left of my line was entirely unsupported, and greatly to my surprise and disappointment, for I had supposed that the movement of my brigade was part of a general advance of our entire lines. Up to this time no firing was heard upon my left except the firing of the enemy, which was directed upon my line with telling effect.

Afterward, at a late hour, I found the right regiment of the Second Brigade (on the right of which I had originally formed) standing fast at or near the position it occupied in the beginning, and near the line from which my advance was begun. I was informed that this regiment had remained from the first in that position, having received no subsequent orders to move forward. I trust that I shall not be understood as alleging or intimating any delinquency upon the part of the Second Brigade, and I certainly do not undertake to say at what time that brigade, commanded by Colonel Jenkins, advanced; but if its advance was simultaneous with my own, it must have happened that the lines of advance of the two brigades were so divergent as to leave a wide interval between the right of the one and the left of the other. Whatever were the operations of the Second Brigade, they were doubtless in keeping with its proud character in the past and that of its gallant commander.

All that I undertake to state positively in this connection is that the right regiment of the Second Brigade did not advance for a long time after nay brigade had been moved forward, and that at the time when my command had obtained virtual possession of the enemy's position no Confederate troops were anywhere visible except my own.

It now became evident that the position sought to be held by my command was wholly untenable by them unless largely and immediately re-enforced. The inferior numbers which had alarmed the enemy and driven him from his breastworks and batteries soon became apparent to him, and he at once proceeded to make use of his advantage. While greatly superior numbers hung upon our front considerable bodies of the enemy were thrown upon both flanks of my command, which was now in imminent danger of being wholly captured or destroyed. Already they were capturing officers and men at different points of my line, principally upon the right. No re-enforcements appeared, and the dire alternative of withdrawing from the position, although of obvious and inevitable necessity, was reluctantly submitted to.

Owing to the difficulties offered by the wilderness through which the brigade had advanced the task of reassembling and reforming the regiments was attended with much trouble. I sent out details as speedily as possible to direct officers and men where to reform, and as soon as this task was accomplished— imperfectly, it is true, but as effectually as was possible at so late an hour of the day— I repaired to General Longstreet's headquarters as soon as I could find them, and under instructions there received— it now being night— I proceeded to select a suitable position on the road in the rear at which stragglers could be arrested and such of my men as had not then come in could be re-collected.

I should have mentioned before that soon after my command was overpowered and before all of it had fallen back General Branch's brigade was found coming up, and General Branch was shown by me into the position which my gallant men had vainly sought to hold against overwhelming odds, and immediately afterward the Third Brigade of this division, Colonel Hunton commanding, took position on Branch? right. If it had been possible for these brigades to have advanced simultaneously with my own the victory of the day would have been achieved on the right of our line with comparatively little difficulty and at an early hour.

When my line emerged into the open field in front of the enemy's batteries the Seventh Virginia, commanded by Col. W. T. Patton, gallantly assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel [C. C.] Flowerree and Major [A. A.] Swindler, was in good order, considering the difficulties of the ground over which it had passed, and this regiment and the First Virginia, nobly sustained by such portions of the other regiments as had come up, made the first daring charge, which drove the enemy from his position. Seven companies of the Seventeenth Virginia were unavoidably delayed for sometime by the almost impassable nature of the swamp at the point at which they crossed.

Praise is due to Colonel' Corse, Seventeenth Virginia, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston, Twenty-fourth Virginia, as well as to Col. W. T. Patton, Seventh Virginia (who acted with eminent gallantry), for discharging their duties with the utmost fidelity and bravery. The same praise is accorded to Capt. K. Otey, commanding the Eleventh Virginia, and Captain Norton, commanding First Virginia. Lieut. Col. R. H. Marye and Capt. R. H. Simpson, of the Seventeenth, fell into the hands of the enemy while discharging their duties with conspicuous gallantry. I am satisfied all the field officers did well. I especially commend the good conduct of Capt. W. T. Fry, my assistant adjutant-general, and Mr. A. Camp Beckham, who acted as my volunteer aide-de-camp.

JAMES L. KEMPER, Brig. Gen., Comdg. First Brigade, Longstreet's Division

#304

…on the morning of June 29 (Sunday) my brigade, in common with the other brigades of the division, recrossing the Chickahominy near the Gaines house, marched across the Nine-mile road, the York River Railroad, the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, and encamped for the night on the Darbytown, or Central, road, near the farm of Mr. Atlee, having made some 10 or 12 miles.

The march was resumed early the next morning and continued until about 2 p.m., it being now evident that the enemy was in front of us and not far distant. My own, Generals Pryor's, and Featherston's brigades were ordered to take positions in line of battle on the left of the road. Before, however, getting into position a second order was given to return to the road, and after advancing about 1 mile farther we were formed in line of battle in the edge of the woods, with a field in front of us, on the left of the road, and to the left of General Pickett's brigade. We remained in this position for two or three hours. Skirmishers were thrown out to the front, and some firing ensued between them and those of the opposing forces.

It was now near 5 p.m., and the enemy's artillery began to fire. Shot and shell passed over and fell beyond us, some exploding near us. One of our batteries was placed in position on the road in front, and, replying to the fire of the enemy, continued for nearly an hour, but as a heavy forest intervened little effect was produced on either side.
At length, near 6 p.m. (5.40 o'clock), I saw the brigade (Pickett's) on my right advance across the open field in front, and I was ordered to form line in the same field, the line being at right angles to the road upon which we had been marching. The brigade was soon formed in line as directed, and I was then informed that General Featherston's brigade had been ordered to extend to the left, with the view of communicating with General Huger, and that I must also close in to the left; but a minute afterward I was ordered by General R. H. Anderson to advance with my brigade to the support of other brigades, then engaging or moving forward to engage the enemy. Twice was the order given to close to the left and twice to move forward, my brigade being in the mean time in line and under a brisk artillery fire of shot and shell. Finally I was directed to obey General Anderson's order and to move to the front.

The order was now given to forward, and the brigade was marched in line across the field to the woods. Finding this so thick with undergrowth that a forward movement in line of battle was impracticable, the order was given for the regiments to move by the right of companies to the front. Marching in this manner they made their way slowly for 100 or 200 yards until the woods became more open. At this place I met General Anderson, and was ordered by him to press on directly to the front. I was aware that the enemy was in my front, but as to the distance, his strength, the position of his batteries and their supports I knew nothing. I had no knowledge as to the character or topography of the ground over which I had to march in the execution of my orders. Marching directly to the front as ordered, and being guided alone by the artillery fire of the enemy, the shot and shell from which passed over and often very near, without, however, causing any casualties, I had not advanced more than 200 yards when I found that two of my regiments were on the right and two on the left of the road (Long Bridge road) which ran in the direction of my line of march. The woods on either side were so thick as to prevent my seeing well the extreme right and left regiments. The road, now descending slightly for some distance, at length crossed a small stream, in the bed of which rails had been thrown to fill it up, so as to allow wagons and artillery to pass. This stream on the right of the road was boggy, and with a dense growth of trees in it, rendering it difficult for the regiments on this side to make their way through it. We were now under a close fire of artillery, the grape shot coming thick and fast through the trees.

Having crossed the little stream above referred to (on the left the woods were less dense, being small and scattered pine), and ascending slightly for some distance, we came to a field on the left of the road, and the enemy's infantry, in the woods on the left of this field, opened a brisk and close fire upon the left regiment of my line. This regiment (the Eighth Alabama) halted and engaged the enemy at this point. In this field, about 300 yards to the front and 100 yards to the left of the road, was a house, and beyond the house about 200 yards more was a six-gun battery of the enemy. This battery had an open field of fire, the ground in front being perfectly level.

The Eighth Alabama being engaged with the enemy, the Eleventh Alabama, the next regiment to it, continued to advance, and entering upon the open field, came within full view of the six-gun battery on this side (the left) of the road. This battery began at once a rapid discharge of grape and canister upon this regiment. It did not halt an instant, but continued to advance steadily and rapidly and without firing until it approached within 200 yards of the battery, when it gave loud cheers and made a rush for the guns. Halting for an instant in front of it, they fire upon the battery and infantry immediately in rear of it and then make a successful charge upon and take the battery. The enemy's infantry are in the woods in heavy force beyond and 200 yards distant and in the woods skirting the field to the left of the battery and not so far, and here in like manner in strong force. The enemy have a direct and flank fire upon this regiment, now at the battery.

The two regiments on the right of the road continued steadily to advance through the woods which extended along the road-side to within 100 yards of a second six-gun battery, this battery being nearly opposite to the one on the left of the road and some 200 yards distant from it. Halting for a few minutes in the woods fronting this battery to deliver their fire, these regiments— the Ninth and Tenth Alabama— charge upon and take this also, the enemy's infantry supports being driven back.

Both these batteries were now in our possession, having been carried in the most gallant manner, the men and officers behaving with the most determined courage and irresistible impetuosity. The taking of the battery on the right of the road was not attended by such a bloody strife as followed the assault and capture of the one on the left, for here the enemy had not the heavy pine forests so close in rear and on one flank in which he could retire, reform, and then renew the conflict with increased numbers. To the contrary, the pine was in our possession, and our men, under cover of it, were within 100 yards of and in front of the battery, the field extending far off to our right and the timber in rear of the battery being more distant. Other brigades, too, were on our right engaging the enemy, but none on our left and near the batteries. The battery on the left of the road was the first taken. The Eleventh Alabama had experienced severe loss in crossing the open field while advancing against this battery. Here the enemy, at first repulsed and driven from the battery, retire to the woods both on our left and in rear of the battery, and from there, under shelter of the woods and with superior numbers, deliver a terrible and destructive fire upon this regiment. With its ranks sadly thinned it heroically stands its ground and returns the enemy's fire with telling effect. The latter, under cover of trees on oar left flank and directly in our front, confident and bold from their superior strength, and seeing this regiment isolated and unsupported, now advance from their cover against it. Our men do not flee from their prize so bravely and dearly won overwhelmed by superior numbers, but, with a determination and courage unsurpassed, they stubbornly hold their ground, men and officers alike engaging in the most desperate personal conflicts with the enemy. The sword and bayonet are freely used. Capt. W. G. Y. Parker had two successive encounters with Federal officers, both of whom he felled with his sword and beset by others of the enemy he was severely wounded, having received two bayonet wounds in the breast and one in his side and a musket wound breaking his left thigh. Lieutenant Michie had a hand-to-hand collision with an officer, and having just dealt a severe blow upon his adversary he fell, cut over the head with a saber-bayonet from behind, and had afterward three bayonet wounds in the face and two in the breast, all severe wounds, which he survived, however, for three days. Many of the men received and gave in return bayonet wounds.

Having assaulted and carried this battery and driven the infantry into the woods to the left and beyond they hold it until the enemy reform and return in superior force, and now they resist in a hand to-hand conflict with the utmost pertinacity. There are no supports for them— no re-enforcements come, and they are at length forced to yield and retire to the pine woods on the right of the road and in rear some 150 or 200 yards, the enemy not pursuing, having left dead upon this field, in the battery and its vicinity, in front and rear beyond it. Capts. J. H. McMath, S. E. Bell, T. H. Halcombe, W.M. Bratton, and Lieut. A. B. Cohen, commanding company; Lieut. A. N. Steele and Lieutenant Michie, commanding company, were both mortally wounded and since dead; Capts. J. C. C. Sanders and W. C. Y. Parker severely wounded, and also Lieut. J. H. Prince, commanding company, slightly, and Lieut. R. H. Gordon dangerously; Forty-nine privates killed and Lieutenant Higginbotham and 11 privates taken prisoners.

The Eleventh Alabama retired, as above stated, to the right of the road into the pine woods, and there, together with the Ninth and Tenth Alabama, remained. From this position the battery on the right of the road was in full view and not more than 100 yards distant. The enemy made no effort to retake this battery, though their infantry continued to fire at long range upon our men then in the pine woods.

The Eighth Alabama, as explained previously, became engaged with the enemy's infantry before reaching the batteries, and contending against superior forces maintained its ground until regiments from General Pryor's brigade, and afterward Featherston's, arrived on this part of the field. The severity of the fight at this point of the field is evident from the loss sustained by this regiment.

It was now sunset, and, other troops arriving upon the field, my brigade, with ammunition now quite exhausted, was withdrawn for some 150 or 200 yards and there remained until 9 p.m., when it was withdrawn from the field, other and fresh troops in sufficient force having arrived, and the enemy having been driven back from the field far to the rear.

I cannot close this report without assuring the major-general commanding that on this occasion both officers and men of my brigade behaved with remarkable coolness and gallantry, and I beg to call his attention to the fact that two of the enemy's batteries of six guns each were taken, and if one of them was retaken, it was only owing to the fact that overwhelming numbers were brought to bear against a solitary regiment unsupported, and which entered this engagement with 357 men, of which number 181 were killed and wounded, among whom was the commander of the regiment (Captain Field), who received two wounds, one through the leg and the other through the arm; and of the 10 officers commanding companies 5 were killed on the field near the battery, I has since died of his wounds, and 2 others were severely wounded and 1 slightly, there being but one company commander that escaped unhurt. Although this battery was retaken, I have no personal knowledge that the enemy ever again used it against us. The other battery remained in our possession and the enemy made no effort to retake it.

Of my four regimental commanders all were wounded. It gives me pleasure to bring to your particular notice the conduct of them all as deserving high praise. Lieutenant-Colonel Royston, commanding Eighth Alabama, received a severe wound from a fragment of a shell. Major Caldwell, commanding the Tenth Alabama, was also wounded by a piece of shell striking him over the eye. Captain [J. H.] King, commanding the Ninth Alabama, is deserving of especial praise for his coolness and bravery, and he also received a severe wound in the leg. Other officers and men of the different regiments gave evidence of marked courage in this sanguinary engagement.

C. M. WILCOX, Brigadier-General, Commanding, &c.

#305

At Frazier's farm the position of my brigade was indicated by yourself. About 4 o'clock I received an order from Major-General Longstreet to go into the fight. At once I moved in line toward the field, but the wood and other obstructions forced me to form column and to send my regiments in successively. Arriving on the field, I discovered that the brigade on my right had been repulsed and that my command was exposed to a destructive fire on the flank as well as in front. Nevertheless they stood their ground and sustained the unequal combat until re-enforced by the brigade of General Gregg. We did not return to our original position until the enemy had abandoned the field and surrendered his artillery into our possession.

In this engagement my loss was uncommonly heavy in officers as well as men. The Fourteenth Alabama, bearing the brunt of the struggle, was nearly annihilated. I crossed the Chickahominy on the 26th with 1,400 men. In the fights that followed I suffered a loss of 849 killed and wounded and 11 missing.

In a report which I had the honor to submit some days ago I distinguished the officers whom I thought worthy of promotion. I will only add now that Capt. V. Maurin, of the Donaldsonville Artillery, attached to my brigade, exhibited himself a most courageous and capable officer.

ROGER A. PRYOR, Brigadier-General, Commanding

Even more to come, and keep in mind the federals won't be left out of this barrage of OR snippets.

Charles Heath
01-17-2008, 12:59 PM
Consider the sacrifice of millons of Oak nut galls that made the primary source material for the ORs possible back in the day.

#307

My headquarters Monday night was at Mrs. Fisher's. Wright reported the camps on White Oak Swamp abandoned. He went on to White Oak Bridge, where he met General Jackson, who informed me he was stopped at that point by the destruction of the bridge. General Wright, having only infantry, crossed the swamp and joined me at Mrs. Fisher's Monday evening, June 30.

Tuesday, July 1, at 3 a.m., I saw Armistead with his brigade ready to move, but passing through the woods the progress was slow; as soon as he cleared the road Wright followed. I now received notice from General Longstreet that the Charles City road was clear, and was much disappointed that General Mahone had not discovered the retreat during the night. He informed me he saw the pickets this morning, which was true, for, on advancing, the pickets gave themselves up as prisoners and said the army had retired without ordering them in.

I now pushed on as rapidly as could with Ransom's and Mahone's brigades; we were delayed by meeting our troops (first Cobb's brigade and afterward Jackson's troops), and I had no one to show us what road to take. Major Taylor, aide-de-camp to General Lee, came up and conducted us to the front, where I reported to General Lee. I found Armistead's and Wright's brigades on front line, exactly opposite the enemy, who were posted in large force, with powerful batteries of artillery, on a commanding plateau near Crew's house.

On riding to the ravine where these brigades were posted the action commenced between the pickets. I had previously, by direction of General Lee, sent Mahone's brigade to support Cobb's, and as the action progressed, at the request of General Magruder, I ordered Ransom's brigade to report to him. All the brigades of my division were thus sent into the battle and were engaged in the attack on the enemy's batteries. They were during the action under the immediate command of General Magruder.

As the different brigades of my division were sent forward into the battle at Malvern Hill, and I was directed to report them to another commander, though present myself, I was not in command during this battle. As! was treated in the same manner at Seven Pines, I can only hope this course was accidental and required by the necessities of the service. I therefore make no report, and I have to refer you to the subordinate reports, herewith transmitted, and to the reports of other commanders, for details of the action of Malvern Hill. After this battle, as required, the division was occupied, under my orders, in removing the wounded and burying the dead.

BENJ. HUGER, Major-General, Commanding Division

#310

On Sunday, June 29, orders were received to proceed down the Charles City road for the purpose of co-operating with other forces of our army now pursuing the retreating enemy along the line of the Chickahominy, but mainly in reference to the forces which had been stationed on the north side of the White Oak Swamp, immediately confronting our position on the Charles City and Williamsburg roads.

This brigade, which was followed by those of Brigadier-Generals Armisted and Ransom, pursued their march without the occurrence of any incident worthy to be noted until they arrived at the place known as Brightwell's house, where a small party of the enemy's cavalry were met.

At this point a cross-road leading from the Darbytown road was known to pass down to the White Oak Swamp, crossing the swamp at a passable ford in rear of Chapman's, leading thence into the main White Oak Swamp road, which had been heretofore held by the enemy and upon which his camps and fortifications had been established. It was anticipated that by this White Oak Swamp road Kearny's division, which had been more immediately confronting our lines, would attempt its retreat, crossing the swamp either at this point or at Fisher's Crossing, where another division of the enemy was known to have been fortified, or at White Oak Bridge, where he was also known to have been in large force formidably fortified.

Upon meeting this cavalry scout it was deemed essential to our safety, before leaving this pass to the Charles City and Darbytown roads in our rear, to ascertain if the enemy had left his camp on the opposite side of the swamp at Chapman's. With this view a reconnoitering party was immediately dispatched which soon returned, and reported the enemy's column then in the act of crossing the swamp about half a mile distant from our troops. The brigade was promptly placed in position to meet the approach of this force, whose advance guard and our skirmishers in a few minutes afterward came into collision. This guard was dispersed, and two regiments of the brigade pushed forward upon the crossing at the swamp. Meantime a cavalry scout of the enemy again made its appearance, advancing up the road, and were routed with a loss of 3 men and 3 horses killed.

It was now night, and our forces, holding this position, slept upon their arms. At this point we captured 15 prisoners.

Early the next morning it was ascertained that Kearny's division, upon coming up with our skirmishers, had recrossed the swamp. Satisfied that the enemy had changed his route of retreat across the swamp, the next point which seemed to require the like precautions as at Brightwell's was Fisher's, near by, where there was a still better crossing of the swamp, and which was known to lead directly to a large camp of the enemy. The brigade was now advanced to a position covering the crossing at Fisher's, when it was ascertained that a considerable body of the enemy had passed from across the swamp into the Charles City road the evening before. Again moving forward we at once cam