The Federal point of view

[Charles Heath]

Hooker's comments about McCall are particularly interesting. As with the CS snippets, the number references the reports in the "Great Battles" section of the ORs on CD (Guild Press Version) and these are edited for brevity.

#1
July 15, 1862

During the night of the 28th and 29th the divisions of Slocum and McCall were ordered across the White Oak Swamp, and were placed in position to cover the passage of the remaining divisions and trains. In the course of the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman and the division of Smith were ordered to fall back from their original position to an interior line resting upon Keyes' old intrenchments on the left and so arranged as to cover Savage Station. They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by the different divisions concerned; nevertheless the result was that two attacks of the enemy---one a very determined onset--were signally repulsed by Sumner's corps, assisted in the last by Smith's division, of the Sixth Corps. These are the two actions known as the affair of Allen's Field and the battle of Savage Station. The Third Corps crossed the swamp before dark, having left its position before the hour assigned and was not in action during that day (the 29th). The Second Corps and Smith's division safely crossed the swamp during the night with all their guns and materiel, and brought up the rear of the wagon train. In the night of the 29th and 30th the Fourth and Fifth Corps were ordered to move to James River, to rest on that river at or near Turkey Bend and occupy a position perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gunboats, and covering the wagon train, which was pushed as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's and Harrison's plantations.

The remaining corps were moved in the same direction and posted so as to cover the main roads leading from Richmond as well as the crossings by which the army had passed the White Oak Swamp and to guard the passage of our large trains to the James River. When the troops were in position in the afternoon before the enemy attacked they were posted about as follows: Porter with two divisions (Morell's and Sykes') and the mass of the reserve artillery on Malvern Hill (the left of the position); next Couch, with one brigade of Peck's division in reserve; next Sedgwick; then McCall, Hooker, Kearny, Slocum, Naglee's brigade, Richardson, and Smith.

During the actions which ensued at Turkey Bridge, on the New Market road (Glendale),and at White Oak Swamp, changes were made in this disposition. The result of the various actions of the 30th, during which our whole line was attacked, was that the enemy was everywhere repulsed except in his attack upon McCall's division, which, hard pressed by greatly superior numbers, and having lost three of its general officers, broke and lost most of its artillery. The gallant conduct of their comrades near by, especially Hooker's division, retrieved that mishap, and rendered it impossible for the enemy to reap any advantages from it.

By this time the last of the trains had reached Haxall's Landing, and during the night the troops fell back to the vicinity of that place, all arriving in safety and unmolested at an early hour of the morning. They were promptly placed in position to offer battle to the enemy should he again attack, the left of the line resting on the admirable position of Malvern Hill, with a brigade in the low ground to the left watching the road to Richmond; the line then following a line of heights nearly parallel to the river and bending back through the woods nearly to the James River on our right. On the left we relied upon the natural advantages of the position. On the right, where the natural strength was less, some little cutting of timber was done and the roads blocked.

Although our force was small for so extensive a position it was necessary to hold it at any cost. When the battle commenced in the afternoon I saw that in the faces and bearing of the men which satisfied me that we were sure of victory.
The attack was made upon our left and left center, and the brunt of it was borne by Porter's corps (including Hunt's reserve artillery and Tyler's heavy guns) and Couch's division, re-enforced by the brigades of Sickles and Meagher. It was desperate, brave, and determined, but so destructive was the fire of our numerous artillery, so heroic the conduct of our infantry, and so admirable the dispositions of Porter, that no troops could have carried the position. Late in the evening the enemy fell back, thoroughly beaten, with dreadful slaughter. So completely was he crushed and so great were his losses,that he has not since ventured to attack us.

Previously to the battle of Malvern I had fully consulted with Commodore Rodgers, and with him made a hasty reconnaissance of the positions on the river. The difficulty of passing our transports above City Point was so great that I determined to fall back upon the position now occupied by the army; a position, too, much less extensive than that of Malvern, and therefore permitting me to give the men the rest they so much needed. Accordingly the army fell back during the night of the 1st and 2d of July, reaching this place at an early hour on the 2d. On the 3d the troops were placed essentially in their present positions.

To the calm judgment of history and the future I leave the task of pronouncing upon this movement, confident that its verdict will be that no such difficult movement was ever more successfully executed; that no army ever fought more repeatedly, heroically, and successfully against such great odds; that no men of any race ever displayed greater discipline, endurance, patience, and cheerfulness under such hardships.

My mind cannot coin expressions of thanks and admiration warm enough or intense enough to do justice to my feelings toward the army I am so proud to command. To my countrymen I confidently commit them, convinced they will ever honor every brave man who served during those seven historic days with the Army of the Potomac Upon whatever field it may hereafter be called upon to act I ask that it may never lose its name, but may ever be known as "The Army of the Potomac," a name which it never has nor ever will disgrace.

I cannot conclude this report without expressing my thanks to the gallant and accomplished Commodore John Rodgers for the valuable assistance rendered this army in various ways, but especially by the fire of a portion of the flotilla upon the flank of the enemy attacking Malvern Hill on the 30th of June and 1st of July. Their fire was excellent and produced very beneficial results.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

#9

July 4, 1862
I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 30th ultimo I received an order from the commanding general to advance with my command to Glendale and halt there till further orders. At 12 o'clock m. I received a pressing application from General Franklin for re-enforcements at the bridge at White Oak Swamp. I sent off at once two brigades, leaving but one of my own brigades and two batteries on the field. General Hooker was in the woods on my left with his division and Kirby's battery was placed near my left. About 3 o'clock p.m. the action commenced by a determined assault of the enemy on McCall's division, which was some distance on my right and in front. The battle drew near. Many of McCall's division came flying into my lines, closely followed by the enemy. Just at this time I got back the two brigades which I had previously detached and they went into the battle splendidly, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field, and thus ended the battle of Glendale.

During the contest the enemy would change his point of attack. Sometimes he would be in front of General Hooker and then again in front of General Sedgwick's division. Lieutenant Kirby again distinguished himself by the able manner in which he handled his battery. To Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, Burns, Dana, and Meagher, and Lieutenant Kirby the country is indebted for very important services in this action. General Richardson's division was engaged at the bridge, and will, of course, be embraced in General Franklin's report.

The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks, and it gives me great pleasure to state that the troops engaged in it, with the exception of McCall's division, behaved most nobly. I cannot too strongly confirm every word the subordinate officers have said in praise of their officers and men.

At 9 o'clock p.m. I received intelligence that General Franklin had retreated and that General Heintzelman was going to do it. This, of course, compelled me to retire at once, which I certainly should not have done without orders from the commanding general if these generals had not fallen back and entirely uncovered my right flank. My command reached the lines near James River about daylight.

E. V. SUMNER, Brigadier-General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

#14
July 6, 1862.

On the afternoon of Monday, the 30th, the brigade was exposed to a severe artillery fire at White Oak Swamp while supporting the batteries of Captains Hazzard and Pettit, and lost several in killed and wounded.

Between 5 and 6 o'clock the same afternoon I was ordered forward to support General Kearny, who was engaged in a severe battle at Nelson's Farm. We moved forward at double-quick, and arrived on the ground in the hottest of the fight. I formed three regiments on the right of the road and the Fifth New Hampshire Volunteers on the left. The Fifth New Hampshire and the Seventh New York, beyond a first volley, were not engaged. The enemy's fire had nearly ceased in their immediate front and darkness soon came on. The Seventh New York was soon withdrawn. The Fifth New Hampshire was advanced to within a few paces of the enemy, and there remained until withdrawn, about I o'clock a.m. of Tuesday, the 1st.

The Sixty-first New York, Colonel Barlow, formed behind a fence on the border of an open field at the right of the wood. Other regiments were firing into the open field from behind this fence.

After stopping the fire of the other regiments the Sixty-first, without firing a shot, charged over the fence and through the open field, driving the enemy in such haste and confusion before them that they abandoned their colors which were picked up by Colonel Barlow. On approaching the woods on the farther side of the open field the Sixty-first opened fire upon the enemy in the woods, which was vigorously returned. After the firing had continued for some time I ordered the Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers to relieve the Sixty-first New York. Both regiments continued firing until their ammunition was nearly exhausted, when they took position on the right of the field near the fence, where they remained until withdrawn, about 1 a.m. of Tuesday.

On the morning of Tuesday, July 1, the brigade was formed in line of battle at Malverton, being assigned its position by Captain Irwin, of General McClellan's staff. Here we were exposed to a severe artillery fire of the enemy, which killed and wounded several of my men. About the middle of the afternoon I moved my whole brigade to the support of General Couch's division, and while lying in reserve was again exposed to a violent artillery fire.

Between 5 and 6 o'clock p.m. the brigade came into action, the Fifth New Hampshire supporting a battery on the right and the three other regiments engaging the enemy's infantry. The Fifth New Hampshire remained supporting a battery until withdrawn on the morning of the 2d. The Sixty-first New York and Eighty-first Pennsylvania I consolidated, and placed under Colonel Barlow. They engaged the enemy on the extreme right of General Couch's line, being drawn up in an open field, while the enemy were posted in the edge of a wood. These regiments, under the able command of Colonel Barlow, fought most splendidly. I do not think their steadiness and gallantry were ever surpassed. The Seventh New York Volunteers were on the left of the Sixty-first and Eighty-first, and fought gallantly. All these regiments fought till every round of ammunition was exhausted, and then stood without flinching the fire of the enemy when unable to return it. The brigade was withdrawn about midnight, and marched with the rest of the army to this place.

JOHN C. CALDWELL, Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

#15

July 3, 1862.

Monday, June 30, the regiment was formed as support to battery, and was under a very heavy artillery fire nearly all day, during which time we had 5 killed and 9 wounded. At about 7 p.m. went with the brigade to support General Kearny, then engaged about 2 miles to our left. On our arrival we formed line of battle on the left of the Seventh New York Volunteers in the road. We remained in this position subject to a musketry fire, but were unable to return it on account of a regiment of our men being in our front. Some time after the firing had ceased the regiment was ordered forward about 100 yards as picket. At about 2 a.m. I was ordered by General Caldwell to retire and join the brigade. In retiring I lost one first lieutenant and several men, who must have remained on the ground asleep and been taken prisoners.

Tuesday, July 1, after forming the regiment in column, I was unwell and retired, and did not join it until Wednesday, at this camp. Herewith I forward a report of Captain Sturtevant, who was in command during my absence. A large number of the sick and wounded were left behind, and have probably fallen into the hands of the enemy. A day or two more and we can tell nearer how we stand.

Respectfully,
S. G. LANGLEY, Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Fifth New Hampshire Vols.

#24
July 5, 1862.

About 11 p.m. the march was resumed across Waite Oak Swamp, the crossing being successfully accomplished by about daybreak. After a brief rest the march was continued to the point known as Nelson's Farm, or Glendale. About 11 a.m. June 30, the enemy having made a strong attack with artillery upon Franklin's command, which had remained to defend the bridge across White Oak Swamp, Dana's and Gorman's brigades (the latter under command of Colonel Sully, First Minnesota) were sent, under Brigadier-General Dana, to Franklin's support, moving a part of the way at double-quick.

About 3 p.m. a very fierce and strong attack was made upon McCall's division in the first line, which after a short resistance retired, thus bringing in direct contact with the enemy that portion of my command remaining with me. Burns went immediately to meet the enemy, and Dana's and Sully's brigades were recalled, again marching a part of the way at double-quick. The Nineteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Hinks, was the first to arrive, and scarcely pausing to draw breath, gallantly dashed at the enemy. The others followed and went to the front as they came up as rapidly as their wearied condition rendered possible. Some temporary confusion arose among the regiments of Dana's brigade owing to their failure to advance equally with each other, and all these regiments suffered severely. The entire division was now hotly engaged, the greater part of it until night, and not only did these troops meet and repulse the assaults of the enemy, but were forced to withstand the demoralizing influence of the panic among those of the first line, who in many instances broke through our ranks in their haste to move out of reach of the enemy's fire.

About 10 p.m. the regiments, which were lying upon- their arms in the positions occupied at the close of the fight, which lasted, as at Savage Station, until some time after dark, were called in, and preparations made to continue the march to Malverton, which we reached about daybreak.

At 9 a.m. July 1 the enemy again attacked. My division took up a position under the orders of General Sumner, which was changed once or twice during the day, and was held in readiness to meet the enemy should he appear in our immediate front, or to give any assistance required on other parts of the line. It was exposed during a portion of the morning to a heavy fire of artillery, from which, however, surprisingly few casualties resulted, among them, unhappily, the death of Major Brown, Thirty-fourth New York Volunteers.

Between 12 and 2 a.m. of the 2d instant my command was withdrawn from the hill, and took up the march down the River road to this point, arriving about 10 a.m.

We have to deplore the loss of several valuable officers. Colonel Hinks, Nineteenth Massachusetts, fell, dangerously wounded, during the action at Glendale while gallantly leading his regiment. Major How, of the same regiment, fell at the same time. Colonel Charles, Forty-second New York, also fell, mortally wounded, at the head of his regiment.

I cannot refrain from speaking with pride and satisfaction of the great resolution, cheerfulness, and good conduct of the men during the entire march. All were ready at all times, in spite of the severe and almost unparalleled fatigues they were compelled to undergo, to meet the enemy at a moment's notice. I would especially call the attention of the general commanding the corps to the gallantry of Brigadier-General Burns in the severe engagements both of Savage Station and of Glendale, in the former of which he was severely wounded, and in both of which he exhibited great daring and excellent judgment in the disposition of his troops.

The conduct of Brigadier-General Dana and of Colonel Sully, though they were less conspicuously engaged, was in every way what was to be expected from their well-established reputation. I would also especially commend the firm and steady behavior of the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, which covered the movement from Fair Oaks to Allen's farm, repelling several attacks made by superior numbers most handsomely. Kirby's battery was of great service in the engagement at Glendale, and it is needless to say that officers and men fully sustained their well-earned reputation. Captain Tompkins' Rhode Island battery was also engaged upon the same occasion, and was worked with great spirit.

I refrain from multiplying mention of good conduct, but refer for additional details to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders which I herewith submit. My personal staff, Capt. William D. Sedgwick, assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. Church Howe, aide-de-camp, as well as Col. C. H. Tompkins, chief of artillery, were untiring in their exertions, and rendered me, as usual, constant and most valuable assistance. Maj. R. F. Halsted, volunteer aide, also behaved most handsomely, and rendered me important services. To Capt. R. N. Batchelder, assistant quartermaster, for his skill and indefatigable energy in the difficult undertaking of moving our transportation, the service is under great obligations.

JOHN SEDGWICK, Brigadier-General, Volunteers, Commanding Division.

#28
July 6, 1862

About 9 p.m. the regiments were withdrawn, and we took up our line of march through the White Oak Swamp; continued the march during the night and next day until we reached Nelson's farm. At the time some skirmishing was going on in front by troops of other divisions. Heavy artillery firing taking place in our rear, the brigade was ordered back to support Richardson's division. Being very unwell I remained behind, sending my staff with orders to send for me in case we got engaged.

Soon after this the battle opened on the field where I was, the enemy driving large bodies of our troops (McCall's division, I believe), who ran to the rear panic-stricken. I did all I could to rally them, but without success. General Sumner told me he had sent for my brigade and wished me to lead it into action, keeping the First Minnesota as a reserve. The brigade soon after arrived, very much exhausted, having marched most of the way at double-quick. It was soon formed and marched to the front, the First Minnesota being placed in advance of our batteries. I rode to the right of our line and found that General Burns had ordered the Fifteenth Massachusetts and Thirty-fourth New York into the woods, to support some regiments hotly pressed by the enemy. The Eighty-second New York was placed in position on their right.

Finding that the right of the line was very much exposed, owing to the fact that some regiments before stationed there had fallen back and the enemy were collecting a large force in our front, I sent back word to General Sumner and then went myself, in hopes of bringing up the First Minnesota Regiment, but I found that General Dana had ordered it into the thickest of the fight, to sustain some regiments of his brigade. This, I understand, they did most gallantly. The Fifteenth Massachusetts were ordered farther to the left by General Burns, to support part of his brigade. During the rest of the day they held the ground they were ordered to. The Thirty-fourth and Eighty-second New York also, maintained their position on the right till 12 at night, when all the regiments were withdrawn and we again took up our line of march. By sunrise we reached Malvern Hill, and the rest of the army, almost entirely broken down by fatigue, but not to rest. We were soon again under arms, and marching to the right formed line of battle, to support some batteries and be ready for an attack. After waiting there some time, exposed to a heavy fire of artillery, we moved by the right flank and joined Smith's left, where we remained in position until night, when we were again ordered to march, reaching this place about noon July 2.

Where so many behaved well it is hard to mention names. Colonel Sutter, Thirty-fourth New York; Colonel Hudson, Eighty-second New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, First Minnesota; Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, Fifteenth Massachusetts, commanded their regiments with great coolness and bravery. Colonel Sutter, Thirty-fourth New York, recommends his adjutant, Lieut. George W. Thompson, for his efficiency. I cheerfully concur in this recommendation. My thanks are due to my staff, Captain Hebard, Lieutenants Raquet and Gorman, and Mr. E. L. Sproat, volunteer aide, acting on the staff, for the services rendered me in time of action. I beg leave to state to the general commanding that I can say with pride that in all these fights not a regiment of the First Brigade yielded one inch of ground to the enemy.

ALF. SULLY, Colonel First Minnesota, Commanding Brigade

#29
July 5,1862

On Monday, 30th ultimo, at 2.30 o'clock p.m., was ordered to form my regiment in the open field in front of headquarters at Nelson's Farm, heavy firing of artillery having opened on the right. After remaining about half an hour in this position was ordered to move to the right and report to General Dana. After proceeding half a mile in this direction was ordered to form my regiment in the field near the road. At this time Colonel Suiter took command of the brigade. At about 4 o'clock p.m. was ordered to the left of General Richardson's line of battle, forming a right angle with his line, in order to protect his left flank. At about 5 o'clock p.m. was ordered to return to my original position, a severe engagement having opened at that point. On the road I received orders direct from General Sedgwick, through Lieut. Church Howe, to use the utmost speed in reaching the field, as more troops were greatly needed at this critical moment. Almost exhausted by fatigue and heat, my men, unable to move rapidly, still came in in good order, and forming in the field advanced, by order of General Sumner, to the front.

After advancing some 300 yards was ordered by General Burns to move by the right flank to the rear and support of Colonel Baxter. The firing becoming very heavy on the extreme left, was ordered by General Burns to proceed to the left of the First Minnesota Volunteers and then move forward to that point where the fire was the hottest. On reaching the front I relieved the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose ammunition had become exhausted. Before my arrival the fire had slackened and soon ceasing altogether was not renewed at that point. I remained in this position until 12 o'clock, when being ordered to withdraw quietly, did so, taking in my pickets. The loss to my regiment during this engagement was 6 wounded, which will be shown in the recapitulation of casualties.

On Thursday, July 1, at 11 o'clock, the enemy having appeared in force, I was ordered to form in line of battle on the hill at Malverton as a reserve to the First Minnesota and Eighty-second New York Volunteers. When in this position received a severe fire from the enemy's artillery, and was soon ordered out of range and under cover of the woods.

JOHN W. KIMBALL, Lieut. Col. Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry.

#30

July 5, 1862

On Monday, about 8 o'clock, we were again put in march for Malverton. When arriving at Glendale we were halted to allow the train to pass us. About 11 o'clock the enemy attacked the troops of General Franklin at the bridge. General Sumner sent two of General Sedgwick's brigades back to his support, leaving but mine at Glendale. About 3.30 o'clock an attack was made on General McCall’s division in front of Nelson's house. Soon his left gave way and broke toward us in confusion. General Sumner made the disposition of my brigade, placing Colonel Baxter on the right, Colonel Owen in center, and Colonel Morehead left, the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Jones, in rear of Kirby's battery, in support. At the request of General Hooker, General Sumner forwarded Colonel Owen to the right of Hooker's first line and sent Colonel Morehead in reserve of General Hooker's right. I was then directed to lead Baxter to the wood on the right of the field, through which McCall's left retreated, as the enemy seemed to be moving that way to rid themselves of the terrible fire of Kirby's battery, which swept this field. Soon after General Dana's brigade came back from the bridge and went forward, filling the space between Colonel Owen's right and Colonel Baxter's left.

Another heavy attack broke McCall's center and sent the fugitives shamefully through our ranks. Our line was advanced, and Colonel Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, unsupported, pursued the victorious rebels back over the ground through which they were passing and crowned the crest of the hill where McCall had lost his artillery. Gallant Sixty-ninth! The line followed this noble example, and McCall's position was held and the enemy discomfited. By direction of General Sedgwick I placed the Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers and Nineteenth Massachusetts in support of the first line, in connection with Baxter's Seventy-second, Colonel Hudson's Eighty-second New York, Colonel Suiter's Thirty-fourth New York. While perfecting this line another attack was made on the left center, and I found that the Seventh Michigan and Forty-second New York had broken from the front line, the enemy rapidly advancing through the gap. I threw the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, Colonel Jones, and Nineteenth Massachusetts, Colonel Hinks, into the breach, and nobly did they redeem the faults of their comrades. These two noble regiments met the enemy face to face, and for nearly one hour poured into them such tremendous volleys that no further attack was had at that vital point.

On going to the right I received a message from General McCall that he was wounded and hard pressed on his right. By authority of General Sumner I immediately forwarded the Thirty-fourth New York, Colonel Suiter, to the left of General Berry, at his request, and advanced our right, then in reserve, to relieve McCall, but before reaching him three staff officers came back, and informed me that the enemy had been taken in flank on the right and was in a fair way of being captured. I halted, our line, as it was growing late and I was fearful of firing upon friends coming from the right flank. Again Sedgwick's division was victorious. About 11 o'clock orders were given to fall back on Malverton, which was quietly done.

At Malverton my brigade was exposed to a heavy enfilading fire of shells, in which 2 were killed. I refer to the reports of regimental commanders for individual good conduct. Colonel Baxter, Colonel Owen, Colonel Morehead, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones fulfilled my utmost expectations. I repeat my assertion at Fair Oaks--I am satisfied with the conduct of my brigade.

WM. W. BURNS, Brigadier-General, Commanding

#31
July 5, 1862

I was just leading my remaining regiment (the Nineteenth Massachusetts Volunteers) to the support of my two regiments on the right, when at about 9 p.m. I received an order to recommence the retreat, and immediately recalled my four regiments. The brigade marched about 10 p.m. across White Oak Swamp, and crossed the bridge at the swamp at about dawn of day of the 30th instant, slept on their arms about two hours, and then resumed the retreat, halting at Nelson's farm.

About noon of this day a very heavy artillery fire was heard on our right at the White Oak Swamp, where General Franklin was posted with three divisions to hold the place. Soon after this an artillery fire commenced in our front. About 2 p.m. I was ordered to go with my brigade and with the First Brigade, under Colonel Suiter, to re-enforce General Franklin. Assuming command of these two brigades, I directed Colonel Lee, the senior officer, to assume command of my own brigade.

On arriving at White Oak Swamp I was ordered to place one of my brigades on the left of French's brigade and hold the other in reserve. After remaining in this position about two hours a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry was heard in the position we had left two hours ago. Messengers came to me almost every moment from General Sumner to hurry up my command by regiments in double-quick time and to make all possible haste. Very many men broke down on the road, and those who arrived at Nelson's farm, although in excellent spirits, showed the marks of great fatigue. The regiments were formed and marched into the woods as rapidly as they arrived. The first three which arrived were under command of Colonel Lee. The last one which arrived was the First Minnesota, which I formed myself and marched forward to the woods. The first line, under Colonel Lee, advanced beyond support and was subjected to a tremendous fire. One of the regiments broke, but was afterward rallied, which compelled the Twentieth Massachusetts, which had advanced farther than any, to fall back, which they did in order.

Soon after dark orders were given to withdraw the regiments and continue the retreat. The retreat was continued all night, and at dawn of day of the 1st instant we arrived at Malverton, where my brigade was formed in line of battle immediately in rear of Richardson's division. The enemy soon after commenced an attack, and we were exposed to a galling fire of artillery, but about 9 o'clock we moved to the right to occupy a road in the woods in the direction of Smith's division. Soon after this the One hundred and sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers was sent to report to me, which connected my line with Smith's division. About 11 o'clock at night I received an order to again withdraw my regiments and continue the retreat, and arrived here about the middle of the forenoon.

N.J. T., Brigadier-General, Commanding.

#32

In the morning June 30 I sent and destroyed the bridge at Brackett's Ford, and gave orders to fell trees across that road, as well as to obstruct the Charles City road in the same manner.

After the commanding general passed on his way to James River he sent back an aide to inform me that General Sedgwick's division was close in rear of my corps, with instructions to furnish me with re-en-forcements, if needed.

The left of General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road, at a point a short distance in front of the débouché of the Brackett's Ford road; General Kearny's right to connect with General Slocum's left, and to extend across to the Long Bridge road, which branches some 2 miles in advance into the Central and New Market roads. Beyond this was to be General Hooker's division. The object was to cover the Quaker road, upon which our wagons and artillery were crossing to James River.

General Kearny's division took up a strong position very favorable for an advance upon Richmond, but much too far forward for the object we had in view. After much difficulty I got this division into its proper position. In the mean time General McCall's division took post to the left of the Long Bridge road, in communication with General Kearny's left. General Hooker was then forced to move still farther to the left and connect with the left of General McCall. This is the reason why General Hooker's division was not in its proper position. These delays brought it to the afternoon before General Kearny's division was in position.

At I p.m. the enemy commenced a heavy artillery fire to the right, I afterward learned, at the White Oak Swamp Bridge. There was also an attempt made to cross at Brackett's Ford, but it was repulsed by the troops I sent to destroy the bridge and obstruct the road.

At 2 p.m. General Berry reported the enemy advancing in force on the Charles City road. At 3.30 p.m. the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left. His artillery kept the enemy in check.

About 5 p.m.--perhaps a little earlier--General McCall's division was attacked by the enemy in large force, evidently the principal attack. In less than an hour General McCall's division gave way. General Hooker, being on his left, by moving to the right repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner and with great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided, with his artillery and infantry, in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss. The attack continued until some time after night. This attack commenced at 4 p.m., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great skill, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy. Each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers.

When General McCall's division gave way, as I felt satisfied that the attack on the Charles City road was not the serious one, I rode over to the open field in front of the house at Nelson's farm where General Sumner had his headquarters, to see for myself the situation of affairs, having previously ordered over Captain De Russy's battery to aid in checking the enemy. General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and commenced firing into the woods over the heads of the fugitives in front. I placed Captain De Russy's battery on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. General Burns' brigade was then advancing to meet the enemy and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from White Oak Swamp Bridge, where they had been sent earlier in the day to sustain our defense of that point. Here, whilst looking on, I received a severe contusion on my left wrist, disabling my arm for several weeks.

Seeing that the enemy were giving way I returned to the forks of the road, where I received a call from General Kearny for aid. Knowing that all General Sedgwick's troops were unavailable, I was glad to avail myself of the kind offer of General Slocum to send the New Jersey brigade of his division to General Kearny's aid. I rode out far enough on the Charles City road to see that we had nothing to fear from that direction, and returned to see theNew Jersey brigade enter the woods to General Kearny's relief. A battery accompanied this brigade. They soon drove back the enemy.

It was now growing dark. I sent by three different aides of the commanding general a detailed verbal statement of the events of the day and of our situation. From the exhaustion of the men, want of ammunition and provisions, uncertainty as to the force and position of the enemy, I also gave my opinion that the troops had better be withdrawn. I had no fears of the force we had just defeated so signally, but of the fresh troops they could bring up against our worn-out men.

Shortly after dark I heard that General Franklin was retiring. The right of my troops being so far in advance, and my being without orders, I could not believe it. Soon after General Seymour came and assured me that it was so. I sent Lieutenant Hunt, of my staff, to entreat him to hold on until I could hear from the commanding general, as I expected to do so every moment. Lieutenant Hunt returned, and reported that when he got there General Franklin's troops had already left; that three regiments of General Naglee's brigade were drawn up a short distance from the White Oak Swamp Bridge, waiting for the return of the general. It was now 12 o'clock, and I could not wait any longer. General Slocum was at my headquarters, waiting for me to decide what to do, he having also heard that General Franklin was leaving. We arranged for his division to leave immediately, to be followed by General Kearny's and then by General Sumner's. It was necessary for us to move promptly, as the enemy were busily engaged repairing the bridges, and would soon be enabled to cross in force on our rear. I hastened to General Sumner's headquarters, and informed him of what had been done. He concurred with me, and sent a note to the commanding general with the information. I then took the road and reached Malvern Hill at 1.30 a.m., and reported to the commanding general. Soon after daylight both of my divisions were on Malvern Hill.

I cannot speak too warmly of the gallantry displayed by General Hooker and his division. Special mention is made of General Grover, the First Massachusetts, Sixteenth Massachusetts, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania, Second New Hampshire, and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments. The colors captured by Captain Park, Company F, Second New York Volunteers, had "Williamsburg" and "Seven Pines" on them, and belonged to the Seventeenth Virginia Volunteers. They were sent to General Sumner's headquarters. This same company captured 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and 30 to 40 privates.

General Kearny showed his usual gallantry and activity. The portion of his division engaged behaved most gallantly.

The first of the attack fell on General Robinson's brigade, and continued five hours. General Robinson was particularly distinguished. Captain Thompson's battery was conspicuous from the admirable manner in which it was served. It was most admirably supported by Colonel Hays, with the Sixty-third Pennsylvania and half the Thirty-seventh New York. Attention is called to General Kearny's report of this part of the action. I gladly add my commendation.

General Caldwell's brigade, sent by General Sumner, rendered valuable aid; also General Taylor's New Jersey brigade, volunteered by General Slocum. My thanks are due to both these officers for the promptness with which they gave this assistance.

General Berry and his brigade behaved with their usual gallantry. Special attention is called to Major Fairbanks, who commanded the Fifth Michigan, and was dangerously wounded. The Twenty-fourth New York Volunteers, only 200 men, led by Lieutenant Greenhalgh, one of General Berry's aides, captured a stand of colors.

I neglected to mention in the proper place that Captain Randolph, who commanded a battery, is highly commended.

My staff, as usual, performed their duties to my satisfaction. Captain McKeever, chief of staff, was active in communicating orders to the left at a critical moment, and Lieutenant Hunt especially, in going to White Oak Swamp Bridge <ar13_102>just before midnight to learn whether our troops had retired.

All the reports received accompany this, and will give the names of those worthy of mention.

I annex a statement of the losses in General Hooker's division this day, but cannot of General Kearny's, as the casualties of this day and the next are blended. The aggregate is 951 for the two days, of which I believe the greater part occurred on the 30th of June.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
.

July 24, 1862

On my arrival at Malvern Hill, at 1.30 a.m. of the 1st of July, I met the commanding general on horseback and reported to him what had been done. He directed me to see General Barnard, chief engineer, and General Porter, commanding the Fifth Corps, and consult with them as to the position for the troops to occupy. I found them, but they were of the opinion that nothing could be done before daylight. As soon as it was light I saw General Barnard, and he rode out to make another examination of the ground. On his return he pointed to the direction where I was to post my troops. I gave the necessary orders, but before they could be carried out the commanding general returned, and I rode with him the whole circuit of the lines, leaving staff officers to place my two divisions in position--General Kearny's on the left, to connect with General Couch's right on the right of Kearny; General Hooker's division with General Sumner's corps on his right. It was near 10 a.m. when I returned via Haxall's to Malvern Hill. We now occupied a very strong position, but lacked some 20,000 men to be certain of holding it against the superior force I feared would be brought against us.

Before my troops were all in position the rebels commenced an artillery fire, which we returned. Some of their shells exploded beyond the buck house on the hill and in the bottom beyond. This lasted about two hours. At 3.30 p.m. the attack was renewed with artillery and accompanied by infantry on the left of General Kearny, but principally on General Couch's division. By 5 p.m. this was repulsed. Later the attack was renewed on General Porter's front, extending to the right as far as General Kearny's, by artillery and infantry in large force. The firing continued until 9 p.m. The rebels were defeated with great slaughter.

During the afternoon large bodies of troops were seen passing along our front toward the right in the edge of the woods. They were several hours passing. They disappeared, however, without any further demonstration. They passed beyond the range of our field artillery.

Toward dusk General Porter sent to General Sumner for a brigade and battery of artillery. This was sent. I added another brigade and battery, to enable him to make the defeat more complete. I sent them, as it was now so late I did not anticipate any attempt on my right.

All the troops under my command were exposed to this artillery fire. In General Kearny's division only the artillery and skirmishers were immediately engaged. "Captain Thompson managed his battery with the full genius of that arm, whilst Captain Randolph with his Parrott guns persecuted all that attacked him, silencing several times batteries that were sweeping our front or covering their columns of attack on General Couch to our left." The Fourth Maine was particularly distinguished for its coolness in holding a ravine and repulsing the enemy's skirmishers.

In General Hooker's division the men behaved with their usual coolness. The batteries were so placed that they were enabled several times to enfilade the enemy's artillery and infantry advance. We have to deplore the loss of Captain Beam, a most gallant officer, commanding one of the batteries. He was killed by a shell.

Captain De Russy, my chief of artillery, was quite distinguished. It was through his good management and personal attention that the batteries sent to the left later in the day were so effective.

Quite late in the afternoon a staff officer from the commanding general informed me that we might fall back to another position farther down the river in the course of the night. At 10.50 p.m. I received orders to move in rear of General Couch's division. Before the road was clear for the leading brigade of my corps it was 3.40 a.m., and the rear did not leave till daylight.

Soon after daylight a heavy rain set in, seriously injuring the road, but early in the day all the troops reached their camps.

My whole corps made the march with its artillery and baggage wagons from Savage Station to the camp at Harrison's Bar without the loss of a single wagon. Our reported loss in missing is but 745, and of this number a portion of killed and wounded were left on the battlefields, and some have since come in. To show the endurance and fortitude of the troops, the Seventh and Eighth New Jersey Regiments did not lose a man in the whole march. Of these regiments one had 8 stragglers, of whom 3 were wounded. They have all since come in. The Seventh New Jersey did not have a field officer present. Captain Bartlett, Company C, commanded, with 1 captain, Frederick Cooper, and 3 lieutenants, Hillyer and Mullery, of Company K, and ------, of Company C.

At Savage Station we received orders to reduce our baggage. We left our tents for the wounded and' the officers part of their personal baggage. This enabled me to place 500 pounds of ammunition in each wagon for the reserve artillery of the corps. Captain De Russy made good use of it at Malvern Hill.

All the troops were exposed for several hours to a continuous fire of shells, which they bore with unflinching courage. Those exposed to the infantry fire behaved with their usual gallantry.

General Sickles' brigade was sent late in the day to aid General Porter's command. How well it was done is well set forth in the general's report. The conduct of Colonel Taylor's regiment, the Seventy-second New York Volunteers, was brilliant.

The officers of my staff performed their duties with their usual promptitude and energy. Dr. Milhau did all it was possible to do under our peculiar circumstances. Captain Weeks, assistant quartermaster, Captain McKelvy, chief commissary, and Lieutenant Dresser, ordnance officer, attended faithfully to the duties of their respective departments. To them I am indebted for the safety of every wagon, for ample supplies of provisions, and that the reserve ammunition was on the field at the proper moment. Captain McKeever's duties since the first day of the battle of Fair Oaks have been exceedingly arduous, and have been performed with great judgment and untiring energy, assisted by Captain Moses, assistant adjutant-general. Lieutenant Hunt I have mentioned in my previous report. Lieut. Henry Norton, one of my aides, particularly distinguished himself at Malvern Hill by communicating with General Couch at the extreme front during the hottest part of the engagement and previously, showing much personal gallantry.

I beg leave especially to call the attention of the commanding general to the loss in battle of General Hooker's division since the 1st of June, 847 men, and since the opening of the campaign 2,589. As they have uniformly slept on the field of battle, no other evidence can be required of their gallantry and that of their distinguished commander.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

#36

July 15, 1862.

About daylight the following morning, 30th ultimo, the major-general commanding the corps communicated to me in person that it was his desire that my division should cover what is called the Quaker road, over which our troops, artillery, and trains were to pass in their retrograde march to James River. As Kearny's division was assigned the same duty, and as it was yet early in the morning, we mounted our horses, rode over the road we were required to defend, and examined the country and the approaches over which the enemy would be most likely to advance. The direction of Quaker road is nearly perpendicular to the general course of James River and crosses at nearly right angles the principal highways leading out of Richmond between the river and the Williamsburg road. Numerous by-roads connect these most traveled highways with the Quaker road, and it was determined that I should establish my division on the one which falls into the last-named road near Saint Paul's Church, the right resting on this cross-road, and the line nearly parallel with and half a mile or more in advance of the Quaker road. A forest covered the area between my position and this road. On my right was Sumner's corps in a cleared field, occupying the position which I had supposed was assigned to Kearny, and Kearny remained near where I had left him early in the morning.

About 9 o'clock my line of battle was established, Grover on the right, Carr in the center, and Sickles' brigade on the left. In the mean time directions were given for all of my batteries to continue on their march to our proposed camp on James River, in order that they might be put in position there.

About 11 a.m. some of our army wagons were observed in our front, which on inquiry were found to belong to McCall's division, which was the first intimation I had received of his being in my neighborhood, and on examination I found his division drawn up in line of battle, his left resting 500 or 600 yards from my right, and stretching off in an obtuse angle with the direction of my own. The woods in which this division was found extended to the immediate front of my right wing, narrowing in width as it approached my position.

About 3 o'clock the enemy commenced a vigorous attack on McCall, and in such force that General Sumner voluntarily tendered me the services of a regiment, which was posted in an open field on my extreme right and under shelter from the enemy's artillery. This was the Sixty-ninth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Colonel Owen.

Meanwhile the enemy's attack had grown in force and violence, and after an ineffectual effort to resist it, the whole of McCall's division was completely routed, and many of the fugitives rushed down the road on which my right was resting, while others took to the cleared fields and broke through my lines from one end of them to the other, and actually fired on and killed some of my men as they passed. At first I was apprehensive that the effect would be disastrous on my command and was no little relieved when they had passed my lines. Following closely upon the footsteps of these demoralized people were the broken masses of the enemy, furiously pressing them on to me under cover of the woods until they were checked by a front fire of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers and afterward by a diagonal fire on their right and left flanks from the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers and the left of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers; also, whenever the enemy ventured to uncover himself from the forest, a destructive fire was poured into him along my right wing.

After great loss the enemy gave way, and were instantly followed with great gallantry by Grover, at the head of the First Massachusetts Regiment, while the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania Regiment, heroically led by Owen, advanced in the open field on their flank with almost reckless daring.

Grover was re-enforced by the Second New Hampshire and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments, but not until after he had suffered severely from the enemy's reserves. The enemy were rolled back through a part of McCall's camp, and passing Sumner's front, were by him hurriedly thrown over onto Kearny, where the fire was kept up to a late hour in the night.

During all this time several of Sumner's batteries had been doing splendid execution in the rebel ranks and greatly contributed to our success. The troops under Grover were withdrawn from the pursuit at dark and restored to their places in our line of battle.
Soon after this attack was made word was received from General Sickles that the enemy in his immediate front was preparing to turn our left, when all of our reserves were dispatched to strengthen him. No attack, however, in force was made, and Sickles' and Carr's brigades remained in position. The former reports the capture of 150 prisoners, in which are included 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and 40 enlisted men, taken by Captain Park, Company F, Second Regiment New York Volunteers, Carr's brigade. To these should be added one stand of colors, all of which were forwarded to the headquarters of General Sumner.

The loss of the rebels in this battle was very severe. The field on which it was fought was one of unusual extent for the numbers engaged, and was almost covered with their dead and dying.

From their torches we could see that the enemy was busy all night long in searching for his wounded, but up to daylight the following morning there had been no apparent diminution in the heart-rending cries and groans of his wounded. The unbroken, mournful wail of human suffering was all that we heard from Glendale during that long, dismal night.

I was instructed to hold my position until Sumner and Kearny had retired over the Quaker road, and soon after daylight my command was withdrawn and followed them.

Among others I have to deplore the loss of Colonel Wyman, of the Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, and, there is too much reason to believe, of Major Chandler, of the First Massachusetts Volunteers, both officers of singular merit and promise. Diligent search was made for the latter during the night without success, and no tidings of his fate have since been received by his regiment.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division
-----

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. INSANE ASYLUM,
Near Washington, D.C., November 8, 1862.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE A. McCALL, Commanding, &c.:

Your letter of the 30th ultimo(*) reached me day before yesterday, since which time my engagements have prevented reply, and even now I have not time to give it the consideration it requires.

I regret extremely that you should have discovered any exceptionable statements in my report of the battle of Glendale, and if injustice has been done you or your command I shall be rejoiced to remove it, but before doing so I must be satisfied that I am in error.

In rendering the report of Glendale my single object was to be just to my own division, and if I had felt that my desire admitted of execution without reference to your command I assure you no mention would have been made of it by me.

You will excuse me, general, if I give you some of my reasons for supposing that your command had met with discomfiture at Glendale, and I believe I nowhere leave it to be inferred that it was not without abundant cause, for of that I had no opportunity of knowing. Sumner was on my right in an open field, where at one time not less than six or eight regimental colors were seen flying to the rear, while between my position and his the horses of the artillery, without their batteries, and the dragoons rushed down the road. Crowds of men were even running panic-stricken to the rear along the road, and far to the right and left of it I myself arrested an officer in his flight with a small body of men, who represented himself to be in command of the provost guard of your division, and ordered him to halt, form his guard: and check the flight of the runaways in his immediate vicinity, which he attempted, but was soon hurried to the rear by overwhelming numbers. He declared openly that this division had been all cut to pieces, that all the artillery was lost, and that several regiments had lost their standards. From my personal observation I must confess I was prepared to believe it all, and without knowing the impression of any great number of the officers of Sumner's and your own command, I never felt a doubt but that they confirmed my own. If it should become necessary their evidence can readily be procured, as well as that of officers of Kearny's command, on your right. In fact, I am more indebted to that officer for knowledge of the operations on the right than to any one with whom I have conversed. Of what related to the extreme right I know nothing from personal observation.

You will remember where I met yourself and General Meade, in the vicinity of your batteries, early in the afternoon, and it was only from that visit that I had an opportunity to form an idea of your position. With regard to Sumner's views of our relative positions, as communicated through your letter, I can only say that his knowledge of them seems to be extremely limited. I hope that an opportunity will soon present itself, if it is a matter of doubt now, whether his opinions or mine are the correct ones.

In calling it the Quaker road, I adopted the name by which it was called on every map furnished me from headquarters; and in referring to your position as a camp, it only referred to the place where I had seen your troops passing the day in like manner with my own. I had pitched no tents during my transit from Casey's camp to Harrison's Landing. Until I received your letter I was not aware that any troops except your own occupied the ground in advance of my position.

But these are matters of but little or no consequence in the issue. I reported that your command was routed at Glendale, and if it was not I shall be rejoiced to be convinced to the contrary, that I may do your division "justice." I should be sorry to learn that I had ever done them injustice. I simply announced what I believed, and still believe, to be a fact, without reflecting upon the conduct of your men while engaged with the enemy or expressing an opinion of his force which required your command to give way before him.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General,
-----

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. INSANE ASYLUM,
Near Washington City, D.C., October 15, 1862.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General:

If you have no objection I request that you will substitute the inclosed report of the battle of Glendale for the one forwarded at the proper time. I desire it for the reason that the latter contained a reflection on the conduct of McCall's command which they nobly redeemed at South Mountain and Antietam. The language of my report was just and called for when made, but I do not think that it was so much the fault of the men as of other causes. I am now of opinion that the men were all right. In other regards the reports are identical.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General

More to come....

[Charles Heath]

The correspondence between McCall, a 35-year regular army veteran pressed into service for the Penna. Res. Division and Joe Hooker foreshadows some 1863 events. I'd love to find the records of the court of inquiry buried somewhere, and with as many copies as were made, surely they exist somewhere. The rejoinder on behalf of the Penna. Reserves is not in the ORs, but published elsewhere, and makes for interesting reading.


#36 Continued -----

HEADQUARTERS CENTER GRAND DIVISION,
Camp near Potomac Creek, Va., December 7, 1862.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE A. MCCALL,

Washington, D.C.:

Your letters of the 11th, 13th, and 19th of November, with inclosures, were duly received, as also that of the 2d instant, and if I have delayed making my acknowledgment I assure you it has been from no want of respect to yourself, or desire on my part to remove from your mind as early as possible any unfavorable impression you may have entertained respecting the accuracy of my official report of the battle of Glendale.

From the perusal of your letter of the 13th ultimo, the impression left on my mind was that you did not look for answer until the "opportunity to ascertain from General Meade, and others of your division, the particulars of this hard-fought field" had been presented me, since which time my official engagements have more than ever before absorbed my attention. I only regret that I could not relieve your mind earlier, and that you have not furnished me with more evidence that I had been unkind or unjust in that part of my report which relates to your command at Glendale, for I had already assured you that it was my conviction that you had been "completely routed" on that field--not so much from the reports which were made me by the officers of your command, as you seem to convey in your letter of the 13th, as from my own personal observation. These only helped to confirm me in the opinion I had previously formed, from the falling back not of "stragglers" or the parts or whole of "one or two" regiments, but, I should judge, of the bulk of your command, in a flying, demoralized condition.

The objectionable part of my report appears to be that which alleges that your division was completely routed, and yet I will venture to assert that neither General Reynolds, Meade, or Seymour will ever say that such was not the fact. Reynolds, since the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo, has assured me that such was the case. I have had no opportunity to converse with Meade and Seymour on the subject, but do not doubt that if that specific question is put to either of them they will reply in the affirmative.

In the extract from Meade's letter furnished me he seems to dwell on the fact "that if the whole division had run through my lines our army would have been destroyed." I certainly nowhere in my report declared that they did, for of these that fled to the rear but an inconsiderable portion crossed my line; a much greater proportion made their escape through the field occupied by Sumner. Generals Sumner and Sedgwick are good authority on that subject, for they had as good an opportunity to witness it as myself.

The letter of Captain Clark is no less irrelevant to the point at issue, which is not that your men did not behave well, but that they were "completely routed." In announcing that fact I did not impeach their conduct, for of that I had not the same opportunity to know. Troops can be whipped, I take it, and still preserve their honor. The same remark is applicable to extracts from letters of other officers of your division. They all seem to mistake the point at issue. To arrive at the fact it would be much more conclusive and satisfactory to inquire of each whether or not your division was "completely routed" on that field. Generals Kearny, Berry, and Robinson informed me that such was the fact, on the extreme right. The two latter are now living and can testify for themselves. If any further doubt is felt on this point it would be well to refer to the record of the court of inquiry on young Randol, commanding battery.

But of this--the testimony of my whole division--that of Sedgwick's and Kearny's---no matter. I assure you, general, that it is no agreeable task for me to accumulate proof to the prejudice of any companion in arms, and I have only written the above to satisfy you that I have not been unjust or untrue in my report of this battle. The crossing of my lines by your men filled me with apprehension--the approach of the rebels none. Justice and duty required that it should be placed on record at my hands, and from that consideration only I made mention of your command. This record must stand as it is, because it is true of yours and it is just of mine. I shall never refer to it again except in vindication of what I have stated.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General, Commanding.
-----

July 18, 1862

After withdrawing from Glendale our march was continued to the Malvern Hills without interruption, and about 10 o'clock a.m. my division was established in line of battle for the defense of our new position. Under a heavy fire of the enemy's artillery Grover's brigade was strongly posted on the right, Carr's on his left, and well sheltered. Subsequently Sickles' brigade, held in reserve, was posted in rear of my right, protected from the enemy's shots, and well in hand to re-enforce any part of my lines. Osborn's and Beam's batteries occupied higher ground, where they could reply to the enemy's artillery, or open upon his columns of infantry should he attempt to advance. Webber's and Bramhall's batteries were located in rear of these, and held in reserve.

During the remaining part of the forenoon a brisk fire was kept up between the artillery, principally on the part of the enemy, without any decided effect, as far as could be discovered, on either side, the distance being about 1,500 yards. I regret, however, to state that it was in this artillery skirmishing that the gallant chief of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment [Second New Jersey Battery], Captain Beam, fell from a shell which pierced his body. About 3 o'clock this firing was resumed with more activity in the direction of Kearny's left. This exposed the rebel batteries to an enfilading fire from my position, a direct one from Kearny, and a diagonal one from several other batteries, which soon resulted in driving the rebel gunners from their pieces. Prior to this a heavy column of infantry had been seen passing to my right, which disappeared behind the forests in my front, and were not heard from again that afternoon. On the left an attack was made in great force, and the battle lasted until long after dark.

About half an hour before sunset orders were sent me by General Sumner to dispatch a brigade of my command to the assistance of General Porter, and immediately General Sickles' brigade moved to that point.

For a full account of the important services it rendered on the left I respectfully call the attention of the major-general commanding the corps to the report of its chief, herewith inclosed. I will especially invite his attention to that part of the report which relates to the brilliant conduct of Colonel Taylor's regiment, the Seventy-second New York Volunteers. The loss sustained by that regiment is the truest index of its services.

The First and Third Brigades were not engaged during the day, and remained in their position until near morning, when orders were received to march in the direction of Harrison's Landing.

I transmit herewith the reports of brigade, regimental, and battery commanders.

I desire to make honorable mention of Capt. John S. Godfrey, the assistant quartermaster of the division, for his zealous, faithful, and meritorious services in the performance of all of his duties from the commencement of the campaign.

As no official list has been furnished the major-general commanding the corps of the losses sustained by the division I have the honor to command since the 1st day of June last, I herewith forward it. The number, as will be seen, is 847, making the aggregate of my loss in battle since the opening of the campaign in the Peninsula 2,589.

And in this connection I may be permitted to add, in justice and fidelity to the living and the dead, that the brave officers and men whose honor and welfare were confided to my care have uniformly slept on the field on which they have fought; that in all their encounters with the enemy, whether involving the whole force of the division or down to an affair between the pickets, they have inflicted heavier blows than they have received, and under all their toils, hardships, and privations have evinced a cheerfulness, obedience, fortitude, and heroism which will never fail to command the gratitude, reverence, and admiration of their chief.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

#39

About 3 o'clock p.m. the enemy moved upon General McCall's lines in our front, and having broken them, came down in great force upon our position. The Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, being in position across and on the immediate left of the road along which the advance was made, received and repulsed the heaviest and most persistent attempts of the enemy to break the lines. The Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, on the left of the Sixteenth, were not hard pressed, and had not an opportunity to deliver its whole fire upon the enemy. The Eleventh Massachusetts was thrown upon the extreme left of our division lines, in anticipation of an attempt to turn our flank. As no such attempt, however, was made in force, this regiment did not become engaged during the day. The First Massachusetts and Second New Hampshire occupied a line in rear of the Sixteenth Massachusetts and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania

Volunteers, but the steadiness and determination with which the first line met the enemy, not only checking his advance, but causing him to withdraw from this portion of the field, rendered any assistance at this time unnecessary from the second line.

It had now become nearly sunset; the fury of the battle had shifted to the right of our position, and the strength of the enemy was evidently broken in our front. I was ordered with the First Massachusetts to drive what there remained of the enemy from our immediate front. That gallant regiment, with the greatest enthusiasm and rapidity, advanced to the front, driving before it whatever enemy still remained upon the ground, and advanced to the crest of a hill something like a quarter of a mile from our lines. Upon this high ground the smoke of the battle had settled heavily and obscured our view; still, upon advancing in line, the left of a body of our troops in line of battle on the right could be seen. On the left, somewhat nearer to our position, a column of infantry was moving by the flank to the right. Their colors were furled, and they wore the uniform of our troops, and were believed to be a regiment from the left of the Excelsior Brigade, moving to re-enforce the right of our position. Upon approaching nearer, however, this column halted, faced to its right, and fired a volley upon us. Fully assured still that it was one of our own regiments, I ordered the regiment to fall back under cover of the crest of the hill without returning the fire. Having withdrawn my men, I returned to assure myself of the facts of the case, and rode within about 100 yards of their colors, which had become partially loosened from the staff. It was a rebel regiment, and gave me a volley as soon as I was observed.

At dark a portion of my brigade, the Second New Hampshire and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, re-enforced the line on our right of the road, where the fighting did not cease until about 9.30 p.m. These regiments did not, however, come into action. At about 10.30 p.m. the latter regiments were withdrawn to their first positions. At about 4 a.m. on the 1st of July we carefully withdrew our pickets and continued our march, making an early camp at Malvern Hill. On the morning of the 2d the march was continued to James River during a heavy rain and almost impassable roads. Since reaching this vicinity no incident worthy of notice has occurred.

The conduct of the Sixteenth Massachusetts on the 30th was highly distinguished. Its gallant colonel lost his life and its lieutenant-colonel and adjutant were wounded.

The First Massachusetts sustained the character it had previously won. It lost among many others its major.

C. GROVER, Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

#40

July 11, 1862.

I make to you the following report of the part taken in the battle of Nelson's Farm, near White Oak Swamp, by the First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, under my command, on Monday, June 30:

The enemy in overwhelming numbers attacked a portion of our lines held by General McCall's division for the purpose of breaking our lines and completely destroying the rear of our army. This, it seems, was nearly accomplished, when General Hooker's division was ordered up and placed in such a position as to check their farther advance, and they were finally repulsed and put to flight with great slaughter. During this action I was ordered to charge on the enemy in front at considerable distance, which I did, passing over a fence across a field and through the woods, the rebels falling back before us; we still advanced through an open field. Here we advanced in line of battle, when a brigade of troops, dressed in our uniform and supposed by us to be our own, opened a terrific fire on our front and left flank, from which fire I lost many of my bravest and best men.

ROBERT COWDIN, Colonel, Commanding First Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.

#46

July 4, 1862

June 30 were drawn up in line of battle on the left of the Quaker road. McCall, who was in front, became engaged about 3 o'clock. The engagement was progressing with considerable vigor, and McCall seemed to be holding his own, when suddenly he gave way, and the attack fell upon our own lines. Owing to the nature of the ground I could bring the fire of but one company to bear upon the enemy, who struck our lines some rods to the right of my position. This company delivered a rapid and telling fire, which was returned, but the return fire all went over. The enemy was soon beaten back from that point, and the battle raged farther along the right.

I was then ordered by General Hooker to take my regiment out of line and clear the open space between the wood held by the enemy and that held by us. I did so, charging through for about a quarter of a mile, and covering and holding the entire open space, clearing it of the enemy so far as I could see. The men charged with great cheering and shouting and the enemy fled, leaving us from 20 to 30 prisoners, who were extracted from ditches and other places of concealment. The smoke of battle and the coming night making it very dark, and my left flank extending toward and nearly reaching the enemy's wood, I filed my men into the front edge of our wood in such position as to cover the entire open space on our front. From this point I was withdrawn and posted to support a portion of Sumner's corps. The next morning we went to Malvern Hill, and were posted on the right directly before one of our batteries, which was firing over us most of the day. The next day reached Harrison's Landing.

GEO. D. WELLS, Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Vols.

#47

On the morning of the 30th I was directed by the brigadier-general commanding the division to reconnoiter the country in front of the Quaker road toward James River, and especially with reference to intersecting roads leading from the front. Accompanied by Colonel Carr, commanding Third Brigade, and Captain Chester, of my staff, I made a careful examination of the line as far as Malvern Hill. While returning heavy cannonading on the right admonished me that an engagement had begun in the vicinity of the Charles City road. Hastening to my command, I found it moving under Colonel Taylor to a position covering the Quaker road, along which our train was passing. General McCall was in front and to the right. The brigadier-general commanding the division assigned me the left of the line of battle, embracing my own and the Third Brigade, which was formed on the outskirts of a belt of woods covering the Quaker road and commanding an opening extending to a small stream in front. On the left the woods encircled the opening, and through this timber, as well as in front to another belt of timber, flankers and skirmishers were thrown out. My left requiring support, I directed the Second New York to form on Colonel Taylor's left, and later in the day the Eleventh Massachusetts reported to me with orders to cover the left flank. It was not long after these dispositions were made before General McCall became engaged. A considerable body of his troops falling back on my line, and mistaking us for the enemy, poured several volleys into us Our colors were promptly displayed along the line, and through the exertions of Major Holt (First Regiment) and Major Stevens (Third), with a company of Berdan's Sharpshooters, which were in front, these fugitives were driven back to their line. From a lookout which I established in a tall tree, in charge of Corporal Bowen, Company D, and Private Patrick Connor, Company E, Third Regiment, and also from the reports of my skirmishers, confirmed by my own observations, I ascertained that the enemy's reserves were moving against our right in a line of battle almost perpendicular with my front. This I caused to be reported to the brigadier-general commanding the division, with the suggestion that a battery of artillery, supported by my left, might be advantageously thrown forward, so as to assail the enemy in the rear and on his right flank.

At this moment my second regiment was ordered to report to General Sumner, and learning that the First and Sixteenth Massachusetts, of this division, were also sent to support our position on the right, I reluctantly relinquished the design of moving my left forward, even without artillery. Each regiment as it was successively posted on my left flank (Third Excelsior, Second New York, and Eleventh Massachusetts), by throwing forward skirmishers and flankers, captured numbers of prisoners--at least 150 in all--and among these the field and some of the line officers, together with the colors of --------- Regiment.

These prisoners were sent to the rear in charge of Captain Chester, of my staff, with directions to report with them to the division or corps commander, and in their absence to turn them over to the nearest provost-marshal. My loss during the day was limited to a small number wounded, which is embraced in the list of casualties heretofore reported. I regret exceedingly that Private Patrick Connor, Company E,Third Regiment, was seriously injured by falling from the tree in which he was rendering important service as a look-out. Corporal Bowen, Company D, Third Regiment, was exceedingly active and useful in discharging the same duties.

During the night we rested on our arms. The enemy was in motion all night. Rations for two days were issued to his men. Parties were constantly sent out for wounded. All commands given were distinctly heard along my line, and especially by my pickets. These commands embraced at least forty regiments, from various States. Just before dawn--indeed, twice during the night--the enemy formed a line of battle in front and extending far beyond my left. These movements were promptly reported to the brigadier-general commanding the division. At daybreak, in pursuance of orders, I called in my pickets and flankers and withdrew my command, moving by the right flank through the woods to the Quaker road, where I joined the division column and marched with it to Malvern Hill, whither the main body of the army had preceded us.

After remaining in column of battalions for several hours, exposed to the enemy's artillery, fortunately without loss, I was ordered about 2 p.m. to support the First Brigade in front. Covering my men in a ravine on the right, I threw out Captain Bliss' company, Third Regiment, as scouts, and the First and Fourth Regiments (forming one battalion), under Major Holt, as pickets along the interval between the right of the Third Corps and Sumner's left.

Two prisoners taken by Captain Bliss, who were sent to division headquarters, reported a movement of the enemy in force toward our front. This was corroborated by other information and some demonstrations of the enemy, who was then attacking General Porter on our extreme left, so that it appeared- evident that a general engagement along the whole line was imminent. Soon afterward, say about 5 p.m., I was ordered to move at once to support General Porter, which order was welcomed and obeyed with admirable spirit by my command. For my operations in that part of the field I have the honor to refer you to the special report made to the assistant adjutant-general of the Fifth Provisional Corps, a duplicate of which is herewith transmitted.

This is an imperfect and barren narrative of the movements of my command during two eventful days and nights. Desiring to confine my report within the appropriate limits sanctioned by usage, yet I cannot close this communication without putting on record my heartfelt testimony to the fortitude and constancy--traits rarer than courage--. which signalized alike my officers and men in all the critical positions, the anxious vigils, the arduous marches, and the severe privations which they shared in common with this army in its successful movement to a new and distant base of operations.

D. E. SICKLES, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

July 9, 1862.

I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from the brigadier-general commanding the division, on the afternoon of the 1st instant I left my position on the right and moved rapidly with my command to report to General Fitz John Porter, who was then engaged with the enemy at Malvern Hill, on the extreme left of the position occupied by the army on that day.

On arriving at General Porter's headquarters, the general being in front, I reported to General Kearny, who was present. General Kearny told me the enemy were then moving in force toward the center and right, and advised me to return and resume my position. The action on the left appearing still to be very animated, I requested the signal officer at General Porter's headquarters to inform me of the state of affairs in General Porter's front. In a few moments it was reported to me that General Porter's right was weak, several regiments being out of ammunition. General Kearny then said, "I have no further advice to give; decide for yourself." I immediately led my column at a brisk pace to that part of the field where the firing was most vigorous and sustained. Not meeting an officer from whom I could receive orders I halted my men in a ravine partially under cover, and, accompanied by Major Stevens, Third Regiment, rode over the field from right to left, which was nearly a mile in extent, to find General Porter. Meeting an officer of his staff, I reported to him, and informing him of the position of the head of my column, returned to my command and awaited orders.

In a few moments General Porter arrived in person and directed me to support two batteries near a large farm-house on the right of the main road, and for this purpose to form my line en échelon, left in front. At the same time General Porter directed me not to pursue in case the enemy retired, but to hold my position at all hazards. The column was promptly deployed, every regiment springing into line with enthusiastic cheers--indeed, the same dashing spirit animated all their movements throughout the day.

I directed my left-flank regiment (Colonel Taylor, Third Excelsior) to be formed in line to the left and rear of the left battery. The Fifth, Col. Charles K. Graham, the First and Fourth (forming one battalion), under Maj. Thomas Holt, and the Second, Col. George B. Hall, were formed in line en échelon at 20 paces, so that the right-flank regiment (Colonel Hall's Second) was within supporting distance of the battery on the right.

A few moments after this formation was completed I was directed by an officer of General Porter's staff to report to General Couch, to relieve such of his regiments in front as would be indicated. I endeavored to find General Couch, but could not. However, it was not long before several staff officers came to me with messages from Generals Couch, Howe, and Abercrombie, requesting me to relieve a number of regiments in front which were out of ammunition. As soon as precise orders could be obtained from General Couch Colonel Taylor's Third was sent forward, moving by the right flank, to relieve the Thirty-first Pennsylvania, which was in position in an open field in front of a belt of woods, behind which the right battery was posted. The Sixty-first New York was on the left, and both these regiments were engaging the enemy. Colonel Taylor promptly relieved the Thirty-first Pennsylvania and was soon warmly engaged, the enemy being in force on the other aide of the edge of the woods in front and on his right. Giving his line an oblique direction on the right, Colonel Taylor delivered a sustained and most effective fire for an hour. Twice the enemy, suffering from the rapidity and precision of our fire, attempted to advance across the open field, but each time was gallantly driven back with great loss, when he withdrew, leaving some parties to carry off his wounded.

In the mean time Colonel Graham's Fifth Excelsior was posted on the left of the road to the rear and left of Colonel Taylor, about 100 yards in advance of one of our batteries, and far enough to the left to unmask its fire. Colonel Graham was immediately engaged with the enemy, who was covered by some woods on the left. Opening with great spirit an oblique fire to the left, which being promptly followed by grape and canister from the battery, the enemy was driven from his ground with fearful loss. Colonel Graham was then withdrawn from the front to the support of the battery on his right. Later, when the firing of the enemy had ceased on the right, he was again advanced and pickets thrown out to the woods in front.

Leaving Major Holt within supporting distance of a battery farther on the right, I moved Colonel Hall's Second Excelsior to the front, where he relieved the First U.S. Chasseurs, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler commanding. The fire from the battery effectually cleared the woods in his front. After lying on his arms about two hours Colonel Hall moved forward in line with the Third Excelsior, and remained in that position until my regiments were withdrawn. The battery on the right having retired, I sent for Major Holt's battalion, First and Fourth Excelsior, as a reserve support for my line in front, but it seems that an aide-de-camp of Brigadier-General Howe had in my name ordered the regiment to the front, to relieve, as he understood, the Eighty-first Pennsylvania. Some time afterward I found Major Holt in position on the left, he having relieved one of the regiments of General Howe's brigade.

Observing that there was no reserve supply of ammunition on the right in General Couch's division, I brought up from the rear 20,000 rounds, caliber .58, having previously supplied Colonel Taylor with 15 rounds a man from Major Holt's boxes while he was in reserve. As soon as the ammunition arrived Colonel Taylor and Major Holt obtained 60 rounds a man, and the remainder was placed at the disposal of the regiments of other commands.

Colonel Taylor lost several men from the fire of one of our batteries in the rear. There was no hospital and no surgeon in my part of the field. There were many of our wounded who languished and died from the lack of medical attendance.

Early in the morning I was informed by General Couch that he was ordered to withdraw all his troops and move to the rear. No orders were communicated to me, but General Couch intimated to me that I should follow the movement of his command.

About 2 a.m. I withdrew my regiments, commencing with the Third (Colonel Taylor), and having formed in line of battle about 600 yards in the rear, covered the movement of several isolated regiments, called in my pickets, and with a section of a battery moved off in column, following a portion of Kearny's division, which I overtook on the route toward Harrison's Landing. Colonel Hall remained on the large field in the rear of General Couch's headquarters, when he reported to Colonel Averell, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry, who was in command of the rear guard, and continued under his orders until about 9 a.m., when he was relieved and proceeded to join this brigade.

I have to regret the severe loss sustained by Colonel Taylor. Besides Capt. Stephen M. Doyle, an officer conspicuous for courage and zeal, who was killed early in the action, this regiment lost 14 killed and 47 wounded out of a force of about 300 engaged.

Colonel Graham (Fifth) lost 8 wounded. Commendation is pre-eminently due to Colonel Taylor, Major Stevens, and the officers and men of the Third Regiment for gallantry and distinguished conduct in this action. Colonel Graham (Fifth), during the brief period his regiment was under fire, handled his men with judgment and tact, displaying his characteristic intrepidity in action.

The loss inflicted upon the enemy in my immediate front was very great. Without estimating the destructive fire of the Third and Fifth Regiments, which was at short range and delivered with coolness and precision, the artillery swept the woods with grape and canister, followed by shell as the enemy fled through the undergrowth. During the night the air was laden with the cries of their wounded, which were audible all along my lines, and as I advanced my pickets it was difficult for them to avoid the enemy's dead and wounded lying in their paths. Many of my own wounded were left behind. They were brought to the rear and placed beside others of our men in some farm buildings near General Couch's headquarters. Every possible attention was given to them. I sent Lieutenant Tremain, aide-de-camp, as well for ambulances as for ammunition, but with all his efforts he was only able to procure three, and these could not be brought to the depot for the wounded until morning, when we had commenced our flank movement. A few only were brought away, with the body of Captain Doyle. It was painful beyond expression to abandon so many brave men. If a surgeon could have been left with them my solicitude for their fate would have found some alleviation. All the medical officers of my command were on duty at the general hospital, nearly a mile in the rear.

D. E. SICKLES, Brigadier-General, Commanding

#53

At 5 o'clock a.m., June 29, I was relieved by the First Brigade, in order that I might prepare my brigade to move, which was done in a very brief space of time. At 6 o'clock I commenced the movement, and formed line of battle on the left of the Williamsburg road about a mile to the rear of the rifle pits. I was then ordered by General Hooker to move and form my brigade on the right of the road in the rear of the second line of defenses. There we remained until 4 o'clock p.m. when I was ordered to move and take the rear of the division, which covered the whole column. This position we retained without molestation from the enemy until we arrived at White Oak Swamp, where we bivouacked for the night.

At 12 m. on the following morning (30th) I was ordered to form line of battle in the edge of the woods in the rear of the Quaker Meeting-House, to support Generals McCall and Kearny, who anticipated an attack from the enemy. I posted four regiments on the left of the First Brigade and one on the left of the Second Brigade (the Second New York), directing them to throw out one company as flankers. While the enemy was hotly engaged with the first line they advanced on to our left and engaged the flankers from the Second New York, under command of Capt. Sidney W. Park, who stood their ground nobly, and captured one battle flag (bearing the inscriptions "Williamsburg" and "Seven Pines") 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, and from 30 to 40 enlisted men---all belonging to the Seventeenth Virginia. As the enemy did not advance by the first line the remainder of the brigade did not become engaged. I retained the position until 3 o'clock the next morning, July 1, when ordered to move to the rear of the First Brigade, which order I endeavored to carry out, but was prevented by the Second Brigade, which broke through my line and passed me, as I believe, contrary to orders. At about 6 o'clock I arrived at Kemp's farm, on the James River. After remaining here for two hours was ordered to form line of battle on the left of the road, which was done under a heavy fire from the enemy's battery, but the position was chosen by General Hooker, and it was a splendid one, for we could resist an attack against three times our number, as every man was under cover.

I remained here until 3 o'clock the following morning, July 2, when I received orders from General Heintzelman's aide to move my brigade immediately, and also notify General Grover to do the same. I sent word to General Grover, and at the same time moved my own brigade. It commenced raining, and rained incessantly until after my arrival at Harrison's Landing, which rendered the march excessively severe, especially on the convalescents. After reaching Harrison's Landing we immediately went into camp and remained until the following morning, July 3, when we were ordered to march, without camp equipage or knapsacks. After marching about 2 miles and halting as many hours we were ordered to another camp, where we remained until the following morning, when General Patterson took command of the brigade.

In closing, it affords me no ordinary pleasure to compliment nearly all the officers of the brigade, especially Colonel Mott, of the Sixth New Jersey, for his coolness and excellent judgment, and Capt. Sidney W Park of the Second Infantry, New York Volunteers, who commanded his company while acting as flankers during the engagement of the 30th ultimo, and captured so many officers and men, as well as a battle flag, without losing a man; also Lieut. C. K. Hall for his very efficient and able services as aide during the whole movements and engagements which the brigade took part in.

JOS. B. CARR, Colonel, Commanding Brigade

#64

July 11, 1862.

On the morning of the 30th I moved my battery from the vicinity of the bridge up to General Kearny's headquarters and reported. The caissons of my battery came by another road, and having been sent forward at a rapid gait by General Kearny's orders, one complete caisson and one body were upset and lost.

The battery was then ordered into position near the New Market road on the right. The fences in front were leveled, the brush cut down, and the field cleared. Soon after General Meade came with General Seymour and desired me to change my battery from front to right, so that instead of bearing on the New Market road it should bear toward the débouché from the Charles City, &c., roads. I pointed out to them the position of General Kearny's division, and said I was on his left flank, and, as I believed, in proper position as regarded his division. They retired, and soon after an apparent change of line of battle in General McCall's division was observed, and the battery they proposed to deploy perpendicularly was deployed nearly in prolongation of it, slightly advanced. General Kearny soon rode up and I commenced to tell him of this. He ordered me to change my position so as to fire to the right, which placed me nearly perpendicularly behind Randol's battery, and soon after General Kearny left I deployed forward in echelon of pieces, and came into action left, so as to cover the ground I did at first, and in this position the battery fought over three hours. Had I remained in the other position my battery would have been swept away with Randol's, without doubt, before I could have changed front forward.

The enemy appeared by the New Market road, and as soon as they began to show themselves in front the battery opened on them with spherical case-shot just in the edge of the woods about 400 yards. They advanced in line, stooping down and firing, and we continued firing spherical case-shot until they reached the torn-down fence, brush, &c., about 150 yards in front, where they appeared to falter. They soon, however, rallied for a charge, and canister was poured upon them, and as they advanced double canister was used and served without sponging, which with the terrible infantry volley poured into them by Colonel Hays' Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, gallantly supporting the battery, drove them back. They retired to about 150 yards at the fence, when spherical case was again used with half-second fuses. Three successive charges were made by overwhelmingly large forces, but they were each time hurled back with terrible slaughter. The battle continued in this manner when, at about 7.30 o'clock p.m., the canister and spherical case-shot having become exhausted, and after firing round shot, it became apparent that the battery was being risked without doing the enemy injury, and it was therefore retire.

Lieut. J. H. Butler is deserving of great credit for bravery and efficiency. I am under great obligations to him for the condition of my battery.

The battery went into action with six pieces, four caissons, and one caisson limber; came out with five guns, one caisson, and two limbers. The horses of one piece were shot, and the piece lost after getting partly off the field.

One man killed, 13 wounded, 2 missing. Medical-Cadet Frank Le Moyne was on the field of battle or near the battery during the entire day, and worked until late at night dressing wounded until all were attended to. His conduct deserves great commendation.

JAMES THOMPSON, Captain, Second Artillery, U.S. Army.
.


* This statement as to Twentieth Indiana is not correct.

P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

No excuse for this. I remained on the field as long as the enemy continued to advance--at least half an hour after retiring of battery. It was never reported to me, nor General Robinson, nor Colonel Hays.

P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General.

July 7, 1862

I have the honor to report the operations of my battery (G, Second U.S. Artillery) on Monday, the 30th June:

In compliance with instructions from the general commanding the division the battery was posted on the right of the New Market road, supported by Berry's and Robinson's brigades, in order to be in position to open fire on the enemy advancing either upon the New Market road or upon the Central road. I deployed my battery facing the open field on the right of New Market road, the left piece near and a little in rear of the right piece of Randol's battery, First U.S. Artillery, McCall's division, the right retired in echelon.

About 400 yards in front was a dense wood, which approached within 100 yards on our right behind a small house. About 4 o'clock the enemy came upon us in line from this wood. I opened fire upon them with spherical case-shot, but they advanced to the débris of two fences I had caused to be thrown down in the earlier part of the day and about 100 yards in front. Canister was now used, and our supports opened fire on them with musketry, and they were stopped. The wood on the right was densely crowded with them in large force, and three successive charges to capture the battery were repulsed by the prompt and gallant supports deployed between the guns and by the murderous double canister from our guns, loaded without sponging.

The battery was enabled to hold this position until about 8 p.m., after the capture of the battery on our left, and until our supply of canister was exhausted, some guns having fired double spherical case-shot, cut to explode on leaving the gun.
By great exertion we were enabled to bring all our guns from the field except one. When leaving with this a trace broke, and in replacing it (although there was one under the limber) the horses were shot, and we were compelled to spike the gun and have it. Efforts were made during the night to bring it away, but without success. The battery was saved, first, by its double canister, served without sponging, and the admirable support rendered by Generals Berry and Robinson; secondly, by its retired echelon position.

Our loss was small--1 man killed, 13 wounded, and 2 missing. As the infantry deployed through the battery they mingled with the cannoneers, and in some instances served the guns with great zeal and efficiency.

After Randol's battery was taken one of his lieutenants worked one of my guns for some time with 3 men only. The conduct of the officers and men of the battery was excellent. Lieut. J. H. Butler, Second Artillery, was very cool, brave, and active, and I am greatly indebted to him for the efficient condition of the battery before the battle. Lieut. J. S. Dudley, Second Artillery, and Lieut. J. C. Schuetz, Second Michigan, had charge of sections, and behaved admirably.

JAMES THOMPSON, Captain, U.S. Army.

[Indorsements.]

* I should rather say that the time was 7.30 p.m.

P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

I have to complain that Captain Thompson made no report to me of this accident to his piece at the time, though immediately in front of where the pieces had been firing. A small detail of men---even his own artillerists--should have taken it off. I was ignorant of his loss for twenty-four hours and only learned it by rumor.

P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division

Respectfully forwarded.

The court of inquiry asked for at my suggestion should examine this loss of piece, never reported and most easy to be saved. Our line never once broke, but held their ground. I was with Colonel Hays for more than half an hour after retiring of Thompson's pieces. Captain Thompson was brave in action, negligent afterward.

P. KEARNY, Brigadier-General

#65

July 4, 1862

On the morning of the 30th ultimo my brigade left the edge of White Oak Swamp and took the position assigned it at Nelson's farm, on the right of the New Market road, McCall's division being on the left. About 2.30 o'clock p.m. the enemy commenced a furious attack upon McCall's position. While he was there engaged I employed a portion of my brigade in constructing a slight barricade of rails on the right of my line. Before this was completed the enemy relinquished his attack on McCall, and at 4 o'clock turned his whole force against my front. I had two companies of the Twentieth Indiana deployed as skirmishers in the woods in front of the clearing, who held their position as long as possible and fought their way back to the brigade. The remainder of the Indiana regiment was in line behind the barricade. In the center was the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania, and on the left the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, while the One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania was formed in column and held in reserve. Against this line the enemy brought his whole force, constantly sending in fresh regiments to relieve those already engaged.

For five hours my brigade sustained these assaults under a terrific fire, and frequently repulsed the enemy and drove him to seek shelter in the woods. I was supported during the afternoon and evening by regiments from Birney's, Berry's, and Caldwell's brigades, but many of the regimental commanders having failed to report to me, I leave it for those brigade commanders to report their operations. The enemy was twice driven back by our troops charging upon him.

The Sixty-third Pennsylvania, in addition to guarding the left of our line, was charged with protecting Thompson's battery, which duty was most gallantly performed. The regiment, although few in numbers, made a brilliant charge upon the enemy, contended with him hand to hand, and drove him from the field.

I beg to call your special attention to the report of Colonel Hays, who mentions First Lieutenants Gray and Fulton and Adjutant Corts as particularly distinguished in this action.

Considering the disparity of the forces engaged, the enemy outnumbering us at least 4 to 1, the result of the battle was all that could be desired and more than we had reason to expect. The Eighty-seventh New York, one of the regiments of my brigade, was that morning detached and sent to destroy Brackett's Ford, across White Oak Swamp, which duty was well performed in face of the enemy.

JNO. C. ROBINSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

#68

July 4, 1862

I have the honor to report the operations of the Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers during the battle of the 30th of June, near Richmond, Va.

Early in the day the regiment, of 300, men was detailed to protect the battery commanded by Captain Thompson, Second U.S. Artillery

About 3 o'clock p.m. the enemy opened fire upon one advanced section, in command of Lieutenant Butler, which was soon withdrawn, and with the regiment retired to the rear to join the battery. The battery was placed in position to sweep an extended field, over which it was necessary that the enemy should advance to the attack.

In about an hour's time the enemy opened upon us with shot, shell, and other missiles, to which Captain Thompson replied most gallantly. For the space of an hour the firing was unremitting. In the obscurity of the smoke it was communicated to me that the battery was endangered. I at once gave the order to charge, which was responded to by my men leaping the fence and moving forward at double-quick in better order than at an ordinary drill. The alarm was false, and I withdrew to my original position.

Very soon afterward General Kearny, as also Captain Thompson, announced danger to the battery. Again the order was given to charge, and again the regiment moved forward, passing the battery, and were halted 50 feet in front, the enemy retiring to the woods and houses beyond. The order was given to lie down and open spaces for the artillery. Within good range of our "Austrians" and the continued fire of the artillery we hurled into the enemy a perfect storm of shot. The enemy, however, replied vigorously and presented an obstinate resistance. The contest was thus carried on for an hour, when Captain Thompson announced to me that his ammunition was exhausted and the necessity of withdrawing his battery. To cover his withdrawal, as the enemy had been made emboldened by heavy reenforcements, I ordered again a charge. At once the men sprang to their feet, and with leveled bayonets dashed upon the enemy. The conflict was short, but most desperate, especially around the buildings. It was muzzle to muzzle, and the powder actually burned the faces of the opposing men as they contended through the paling fences. The enemy fled, and I withdrew my force back to the position occupied by the battery--one piece of which still remained upon the field. I was here informed that another force was relieving us, and retired to our original position at the fence. Night was coming on. We had been under fire for five hours, in action half the time, and our loss very heavy.

We are indebted to a detachment from the Thirty-seventh New York Volunteers for assistance during our last charge, and I would be pleased if I could name the officers in command. At the same time I regret to state that our charge was much impeded by a fire on us from our friends.

ALEX. HAYS, Colonel Sixty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.

#78

July 20, 1862

On the morning of June 29 a large portion of a regiment of rebel cavalry, approaching on the New Market road, charged upon a part of the line of Couch's division with extraordinary audacity. Averell's cavalry sentinels in front gave way judiciously, leading the enemy forward to within 50 yards of our line, when a section of Captain McCarthy's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Munk, First Pennsylvania Artillery, opened with canister and case-shot, which being followed up by Averell's cavalry and assisted by Lieutenant Dougherty, of Flood's battery, First Pennsylvania Artillery, who commanded a section on the right, damaged the assailants to the amount of about 80 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our side lost not a man. This little affair produced an excellent effect in clearing the roads, as the contrabands informed me that all the cavalry we did not kill had run away to Richmond. I desire to call particular attention to the fact that Lieutenants Munk and Dougherty were ready with their guns to fire when the enemy appeared. Lieutenant Munk had measured the ground in front of his guns, and was thus able to cut his fuses to the proper length.

On the afternoon of June 29 I was ordered by General McClellan to move my whole force to the James River, where I was to communicate with the gunboats, guard Turkey Bridge, the mill-pond, and stream leading to the river. Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter's corps was ordered to support me in case of attack.

By the assistance of scouting parties from the Eighth Illinois and Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry and persons belonging to the country I had learned all the roads and paths to the James River. I directed Colonel Farnsworth, with his (Eighth)Regiment of Illinois Cavalry, with all the baggage and mule trains, to march after dark by a road to the left. The whole of the infantry, artillery, and Colonel Gregg's Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry I directed along an obscure road through the woods which had been brought to my knowledge by Captain Keenan, of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, an excellent officer, and as skillful as an Indian in woodcraft. A portion of that road had not been used for wheels in many years, and old trees were lying across it. The cavalry and artillery were divided through the column, the infantry of Couch's division in advance and that of Peck's division in the rear. In this way the Fourth Corps moved all night silently 6 miles through the woods, and early in the morning of June 30 it encamped, with all its artillery and baggage in good order, on the banks of James River, below Turkey Bridge, which was strongly guarded, without delay.

After the arrival of the commanding general and other portions of the army the line of defense on the down river side of the new position was assigned to the Fourth Corps. The enemy having attacked above Turkey Bridge, I was ordered successively to detach the brigades of infantry of Couch's division to strengthen our forces in that direction. By a reference to the reports of Brigadier-General Couch and his subordinates, and of Major West, chief of artillery, and other artillery commanders, it will be found that at Seven Pines, Malvern Hill, Bet-tom's Bridge, Jones' Bridge, and elsewhere the troops of the Fourth Corps fought with the same gallantry with which they have uniformly met the enemy in this campaign. That corps has won many advantages over the enemy and has never given an inch of ground to equal numbers.

With the balance of my command, embracing Peek's division of infantry, thirty-five pieces of artillery, and two regiments of cavalry, I was charged on the night of July 1 to form the rear guard of the army in its movement down the river to Harrison's Bar, 7 miles below Turkey Bridge.

The road along which the army was to move, running at an average distance of 2½ miles from the river, was bordered throughout on the left with forest and on the right by open fields, here and there checkered with woods. From the left the enemy might approach by many roads and paths through the woods, and might follow on the main road over Turkey Bridge unless we could succeed in destroying it.

To insure the destruction of the bridge I requested Colonel Farnsworth, Eighth Illinois Cavalry, to send me an officer and a detachment of men from his regiment, on whom I could rely, for that purpose. He sent Captain Clark, with a party of 25 axmen, who proceeded to make, in advance, the examinations and preparations necessary to secure the prompt demolition of the bridge the moment the last of our troops should have crossed. To provide against a hot pursuit, I directed Major West to select an able officer of artillery to blow up the bridge if it should become absolutely necessary to destroy it in that way. Lieut. M. Reichenbacher, First Pennsylvania Artillery, was the artillery officer selected. Lieutenants Gibson and Jackson, of my staff (the former an officer of General McClellan's staff and a volunteer with me for the night), were directed to go with the parties to the bridge and to make sure of its destruction, and bring me information. While our troops were passing, many large trees were chopped nearly through, and in fifteen minutes after the taft of the column had crossed the bridge had disappeared without the use of powder, and the road through the jungle was blocked against the possible passage of wheels or cavalry for twenty-four hours and made hazardous for infantry.

Beside the main road, upon which the army was to retire to Harrison's Bar, a road for the accommodation of neighbors starts from Haxall's immense field, below Turkey Bridge, on which vast numbers of our wagons were parked, and joins the main road about 4 miles below the bridge. Near my headquarters on the lower edge of the field this road crosses a stream, wooded on both sides, which extends from the main road to the river. To prevent the enemy passing that way to attack our right flank I had given permission to General Naglee, who came to ask it, to fell trees across the road after he had passed over with his brigade and several batteries of the rear guard.

As the day began to dawn it became evident that all the artillery and wagons could not pass along one road. Immense trains were standing still, and others were turning off the main road, which had become blocked, and were moving down toward my headquarters. At this time the rain began to fall briskly, and though I was not yet certain of the destruction of Turkey Bridge, I knew the roads would be seriously injured by the rain; so, weighing all the chances and dangers, I concluded to save the trains if possible. Accordingly I ordered as many axmen as could work to clear away the felled trees and open the road which Naglee had obstructed. Over the road thus cleared not less than 1,000 vehicles, nearly all drawn by six cattle, passed, and were saved from the enemy, who might otherwise have seized them all.
The troops composing the rear guard were arranged as follows: Wessells' brigade, with Miller's and one section of McCarthy's batteries, all under immediate command of Brigadier-General Peck, commanding division, were formed in line of battle, faced to the rear, on the hill overlooking Haxall's vast farm and in the woods across the roads coming in from the direction of White Oak Swamp. Upon all these roads cavalry scouts were kept in constant motion. Half a mile below Peck's position Colonel Farnsworth's regiment, the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, was drawn up in line of battle, faced also to the rear, and still a mile farther on Naglee's brigade and several batteries under Major West were formed in line of battle on the brow of a ridge. All these arrangements were made before daylight, and the extremities of the lines of battle concealed in the woods or by the inequalities of the ground, so as to confuse the enemy in regard to our numbers. The Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Gregg, was ordered to accompany me, to act as circumstances might dictate. The columns of infantry moved in the fields parallel to the double line of wagons in the main road. The men were kept in the ranks and the ranks and teams closed up, so that the army never presented a more formidable appearance nor had it before been so much massed and in so good a situation to repel an attack, which was threatened, but not made, during the march of our columns.

As the last of our wagons passed the rear guard withdrew to new positions. Every straggler who could be seen was sent forward, and nothing was left behind except a small number of wagons which broke down. No doubt some stragglers concealed in the woods fell into the hands of the enemy.

As the day advanced the continuous deluging rains rendered it next to impossible to get forward the trains over Kimminger's Creek, which is the boundary of our present camp. It was found necessary to park some 1,200 as they came up on the other side of the creek, and it was not till after dark of the 3d instant that by extraordinary exertions the last of the wagons was brought over.

Brigadier-General Wessells, with his brigade, assisted by Miller's battery and a party of Gregg's cavalry, remained to guard the wagons and to defend them against the enemy, approaching with cavalry and artillery. After firing a few shells the enemy left upon being saluted with a few 100-pounders from the gunboats.

I do not think more vehicles or more public property was abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left in the same state of the roads if the army had been moving toward the enemy instead of away from him; and when it is understood that all the carriages and teams belonging to the army stretched out in one line would extend not far from 40 miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be appreciated.

Accompanying this report are reports of Brigadier-Generals Couch and Peck, commanding divisions, and of Major West, chief of the Reserve Artillery of the Fourth Corps, and of their subordinates. To these officers, especially to my staff, and to many others I owe my acknowledgments for their efficient co-operation with me in the late movements. In other communications many gallant officers have been recommended for advancement.

In the battles, labors, and exposures to which this army has been subject the Fourth Corps has had its full share. Many in that corps have fallen while nobly and bravely fighting for our cause. Their names will be held in honorable remembrance. A few, I regret to say, have sought to evade the stern duties which this crisis imposes upon every man who loves his country.

E. D. KEYES, Brigadier-General, Commanding Fourth Corps.

#93


July 8, 1862.

On the 29th of June, the major-general commanding having decided to move on the following day the whole of the material of the army to a position on the James River near Turkey Island, I was directed, with Morell's and Sykes' divisions and a portion of the reserve artillery, to proceed to the vicinity of Turkey Bridge, and there select and hold a position behind which the army could be withdrawn in safety. I moved the command at sundown that evening on New Market road from White Oak Swamp, but, ignorant of the country, having but one guide, we were misled that night and did not succeed in reaching our destination until the following morning at 9 o'clock, where I had two hours earlier selected a position on Malvern Hill west of Turkey Bridge. This hill commanded all the roads leading from Richmond and Chickahominy Swamp to James River which converge at Turkey Bridge. Here as soon as possible were posted the two divisions, thoroughly covering the River road and the débouchés from the New Market, Charles City, and Williamsburg roads. Warren's brigade, of Sykes' division, was posted in the valley of the creek, across the River road, to prevent the left flank from being turned by an advance from Richmond along the road. Through the command thus posted passed in safety the supply trains of many of the divisions and the reserve artillery of the army, the current only ceasing to flow at about 4 o'clock p.m. 30th of June.

At about this hour the enemy began to appear and to feel our front, and about 5 o'clock showed themselves in large force, advancing upon our left flank. Under the cover of the woods skirting the River road the enemy planted his artillery to engage our main force on Malvern Hill, while his infantry, with some artillery, moved direct upon Colonel Warren, with whom he was soon engaged.

The enemy's demonstration soon brought upon him the concentrated fire of some thirty guns, together with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's troops. Under these influences the force which had advanced against that part of our line incontinently retreated, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren and numerous evidences of the destructiveness of the artillery which crowned the crest of Malvern Hill.

In this connection should be mentioned with due acknowledgment the help of the gunboats, whose well-directed fire of heavy shells gave the very greatest support, moral and physical, to the efforts by which this determined onslaught was repulsed. The assaulting column is understood to have consisted of 15,000 men, under General Henry A. Wise, being part or the whole of the division commanded by General Holmes. This is known as the battle of Turkey Bridge.

While the battle was taking place, McCall's division, posted on the New Market road to cover the withdrawal of our trains, was attacked by the enemy in immense force. He maintained his place till night-fall, when the surviving portion of his command rejoined the corps, coming in under the command of Brigadier-General Seymour, the only remaining general officer on duty. I have here to regret the loss of Brigadier-General McCall, commanding division, taken prisoner, and of the services of Brigadier-General Meade, severely wounded, and of many other valuable field and line officers, as well as many brave men.

This action (the battle of New Market road) lasted from about 4 p.m. till after dark, during which period the remainder of the trains of the whole army had successfully passed the contested point and reached a place of safety within the interior lines of the army. To Generals McCall's, Meade's, and Seymour's reports, to be made and forwarded hereafter, I must refer for the details of the battle of New Market road, and to Generals Couch and Warren for those of Turkey Bridge.

F. J. PORTER, Brigadier-General, Commanding

The fate of McCall's Penna. Reserves Division on 30 June 1862 reminds me of another, far more modern, Penna. Division that was sent to a "quiet spot" in the lines after a severe beating during the [I]Schlacht im Hürtgenwald in 1944.

More to come.

[Charles Heath]

And a little more.....

July 8, 1862

While the battle of Turkey Bridge was taking place the necessary arrangements were being made to resist the enemy coming from the direction of New Market and Charles City, who, as a natural consequence of previous operations, might be expected to launch on the following day his whole power against this force, with the hope of annihilating it and destroying the Army of the Potomac. The corps felt the responsibility and accepted it.

The position in which we were thrown had certain elements of great strength, and was the best adapted for a battle-field of any with which we have so far been favored. All elevated plateau covered the converging roads and was fronted to a certain extent with defensible ravines and low grounds, over which our artillery had excellent play. On the night of the battle of Turkey Bridge the division of General Morell was placed on the right of the line, with a portion of his division artillery and of Hunt's reserve artillery; the division of General Sykes on the left, with the same support, and the reserve artillery, under Colonel Hunt, advantageously posted for general efficiency, crowning the crest of Malvern Hill. In this position the corps lay on its arms during the night and waited the attack, which took place at about 4 in the afternoon of the 1st of July.

Couch's division, which had been sent on the night of the 30th of June to General Sumner, remained in support of our immediate right, and, like our own force, lay on its arms through the intermediate time.

On the following morning, July 1, the lines were visited and rectified by the major-general commanding, and Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, who had retired from White Oak Swamp within our lines during the night, took position on the right of Couch, prepared to resist attack or give support to the left and center, as circumstances should require. Our position was strengthened by the arrival of heav