John B. Hood Website

[huntdaw]

I came across this and found it to be interesting - especially the section on myths and realities about Hood. http://www.johnbellhood.org/

He certainly is a controversial figure and brings up some strong emotions among many when he is discussed. I don't think this site will make me a fan of his but it does make one think about some of the assertions that have been made about him over the years.

[EVOC]

"It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly...who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly."

---TEDDY ROOSEVELT

Having never faced combat, I recall what my father told me once. He was a WWII veteran and I told him the NARA military records showed one of my mother's g-grandfathers to be a Confederate veteran and "deserter". Dad warned me not to judge him. I found out years later my ancestor was not a deserter and that it was a loaded term in those days anyway.

I can never fully understand the experience of the men that Roosevelt talks about...including John Bell Hood.

After the War, the veterans of Hood's Texas Brigade named their association the same way and had 63 reunions between 1872 and 1933. They fought under Hood in the ANV. They knew about his controversy in the AoT. That is good enough for me.

[Emmanuel Dabney]

However, the website in and of itself does not tell us the WHOLE truth (granted we could argue that we'll never know the whole truth of the war, but that's not the debate we're having).

I was curious about Beauregard's statement (being a pro-Beauregard person) that is quoted in part on the website. I consulted the Official Records and found Beauregard report isn't quite as glowing as these folks make it out to be. Instead the report issued April 15, 1865 from Greensboro, N.C. finds Beauregard to be very agitated. Beauregard noted "several errors and inaccuracies in the report which I cannot leave unnoticed, while reserving for some more suitable occasion a more extended report of operations in the Military Division of the West while under my command." (starts on page 646, O.R., Series 1 - Volume 45 [Part I])

The general reports further on the Battles of Franklin and Nashville which I copy here in full:

"And now, in conclusion I deem it in place to give expression to my conviction that the campaign, instead of the unhappy day at Franklin and the disastrous culmination at Nashville, would have led to the signal defeat of Thomas, and such troops as might have been hurriedly brought up to his assistance, had the original plan been executed without undue delay and modifications and with vigor and skill; Sherman most probably would have been compelled to return to Middle Tennessee to repair and protect his line of communications before lie could have collected sufficient supplies for the march from Atlanta to the sea-coast, or, in the event that he had been able to reach the coast of Georgia, he must have been forced to abandon it and hasten to the rescue of Kentucky or perchance, the defense of Ohio, and thus have been prevented from attempting any operations looking to a junction on his part with Grant in Virginia, or any substantial diversion in favor of that commander;
meantime, too, he would have been enabled to glean and send supplies from Middle and East Tennessee to Virginia, and re-establish our railway communications between our capital and those well-stored sections of the country. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Gunter’s Landing, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he suddenly changed his line of march, as mentioned hereinbefore, and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads and prevailing rains, delayed his advance for nearly three weeks, whereby Sherman was given time to repair the damage done to the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. It is clear, also, to my mind that after the great loss and waste of life at Franklin, the army was in no condition to make a successful attack on Nashville—a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being
re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin, General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which surely would have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he might have returned, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated, detaching then a force for the protection of South Carolina.
Untoward and calamitous as were the issues of this campaign, never
in the course of this war have the best qualities of our soldiery been more conspicuously shown; never more enthusiasm evinced than when our troops once more crossed the Tennessee River; never greater gallantry than that which was so general at Franklin; and never higher fortitude and uncomplaining devotion to duty than were displayed on the retreat from Nashville to Tupelo.
The heroic dead of that campaign will ever be recollected with honor
by their countrymen, amid the survivors have the proud consolation that no share of the disaster can be laid to them, who have so worthily served their country, and have stood by their colors even to the last dark hours of the republic.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G.T. BEAUREGARD"

The problem it seems Beauregard has with Hood's Tennessee Campaign is "undue delay and modifications" and Hood's decision to march on Nashville; not so much that the campaign itself was a dumb idea.