The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

[Plug Hat]

Greetings,

I authored this article, Winfield Scott's Vision for the Regular Army, while I was on active duty in the USAF and a research fellow at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at Fort McNair in 2004-2005. This article explores Union mobilization during the Civil War from a manpower perspective. My intent was to get inside the mind of Winfield Scott, whose 1861 decision to keep the regular army intact impacted mobilization more than any other policy. The article chronicles how the Regulars were used as the Union organized, trained and equipped to fight the civil war. Through the course of my research, I learned a great deal about the American fighting man in the Civil War. While many mistakes were made during the organization, training and equipment portion of Union mobilization, it was the courage and perseverance of the common soldier that won the battles.

I have attached a link to the article, enjoy the read!

http://usfb.org/documents/WinfieldScottsVisionfortheRegularArmyv2.pdf

[Mojo1842]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Mark,
Thanks for putting that info out there and for all of your research. I'm sharing the link on the 19th US' Facebook page so our other members can take a look at it too.

[Plug Hat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Scott,

Glad the link worked and I was able to share my work. FYI, I was in Sykes Regulars for a good 11 years while stationed in the Eastern Theater. I retired from the USAF and now live in New Braunfels TX; I do Western Federal Infantry. Cheers,

Mark

[Sgt Scotti]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Mark, thanks for posting your article. The Regular Army is one of my favorite topics. You may already have; but a great read is "That Body of Brave Men" by Mark W. Johnson; covering the Regular army during Antebellum years and then the organization and battle accounts of the new regiments in the western theatre.

[Plug Hat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Scott, Thanks, I have the book...it's in the Q to read; I'm working on Grant's Memoirs now. Best read on the Eastern Regulars is Sykes Regular Infanstry Division, 1861-1864 by Timothy Reese, published in 1990.

Cheers from Texas.

[hireddutchcutthroat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Mark, Thank you for putting that on here, it is a really good read. I am from the land or the 4th, 6th, 9th, and 3rd Arty so I have always had a soft spot of the Regulars.

Funny I am reading Grant's memoirs too.

[Plug Hat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Robert,

Thanks for the note and glad you enjoyed the read. I live in Central Texas, 37 Companies of Regulars were here in 1861. The Exodus of Regular Forces from Texas is a great story in itself when hostilities broke out.

I believe there is a book out there somewhere entitled Regulars in the Redwoods, about the 4th US in the Pacific Northwest; I don't own the book but remember hearing about it awhile back.

I do have another book on my shelf you will want to read: The Sixth United States Infantry Regiment, 1855 to Reconstruction by Clifford L. Swanson, 2001. Another unknown book on the Regulars is The Civil War Letters and Diaries of Sergeant charles T. Bowen, 12th United States Infantry, 1861-1864 by Edward K. Cassedy, 2001. Finally, one of the most prized possesions on my shelf is The History of the Second United States Infantry, 1930.

Cheers,

[hireddutchcutthroat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Mark

I picked both of those books up thank you very much.

I imagine you already know Cody Mobley does prewar regulars in West Texas.

[rake]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Thanks for posting your article - I'd like to offer a few comments.

Winfield Scott had a model of what expanding the regular army would do to combat effectiveness of the army as a whole - the War of 1812, in which Congress kept expanding the number of regular regiments in an attempt to make up for the poor performance of militia units. The regulars were expanded from 8 to 44 regiments, and Scott himself commanded a brigade made up from some of the higher number regiments which were basically RINOs ( Regulars in Name Only) as men had to be recruited to fill the ranks, and commissions were given to men as lieutenants and captains who had no real experience. Scott was able to train those regiments and lead them into battle in 90 days. The lesson from the War of 1812 was that unit performance depended on the ability of the commander, and neither the regulars or the militia had enough good commanders.

The war with Mexico is an interesting study, as a number of the volunteer units were led by men with prior military experience, which made them effective. Had more regiments been needed, the same quality of personnel problem was bound to occur, as it did 15 years later.

As you pointed out in your conclusions, the size of the regulars compared to the expansion required, would have completely dissipated the influence of the regulars at the company level, where soldier training takes place. The 10 infantry regiments had 30 field grade,officers, which with the 18 from the cavalry regiments, add artillery and subtract southerners who resign, and you have some 50 officers to command the notional 25 brigades, 8 divisions, 3 Corps, and at least 2 armies with their staffs, which you then have to draw from the 200 captains, taking the rest of the captain to as regimental commanders.

Of the notional 100 regiments, they will need one of the 400 lieutenants as adjutant, leaving the rest as regimental officers, and not a single company commanded by a regular, unless sgts, are commissioned to be the company commander, and that would be a stretch for the numbers to work.

In reality, Scott did the only thing that could be done - use the regulars as a "stiffener" when dire circumstances required it.

Of even more interest is the situation repeats itself in the War with Spain, WWI and WWII, as it takes the US over one year to mobilize and engage in offensive operations in any strength.

[Plug Hat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

Tommy,

Great comments indeed; thanks for posting. Your analysis is spot on, yes, NCOs would have had to be made into officers to fill the shear number of billets. Even the enlisted men, well not educated, had lived the soldiers life and understood what it took to survive from sanitory conditions to discipline and drill. Total Mobilization is indeed a daunting task to undertake; it seems we always forget the lessons learned by generations before us. The ratio of trained men to untrained men will always be important...how much risk can we take? and what is the return on investment? Cheers,

[Plug Hat]

Re: The U.S. Regulars and Mobilization in the Civil War

While reading Grant's Memoirs, I came across a reference I wish I had known about when I authored the original article. In Vol I, Chapter XXI, pages 282-283 Grant makes the following observation (note the time frame is Jan 1862 just prior to the movement to capture Fort Henry; Grant is in Cairo and had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the Columbus garrison):

"There were serveral officers among them whom I had known before, both at school and in actual war, which is far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the South possessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion. They had from thirty to forty percent, of the educated soldiers of the Nation. They had no standing army, and consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own States. In this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. The whole loaf was leavened."

"The North had a greater number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. In the Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession...This state of affairs gave me an idea which I expressed while at Cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers."

I found this interesting, again, if I had read Grant's Memoirs sooner, I would have added this in my paper! At the time Grant expressed this, McClellan was back east planning the Peninsular Campaign. One note, there were some volunteer regiments in Sykes Regular division for the Peninsular Campaign; the 3rd Brigade contained the famed 5th New York and 10th New York.

[noonanda]

I apologize for the Necropost, but the link provided no longer works. Does anyone have the article mentioned?