Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

[WV_Reb]

Hello all,

I was thinking about the Battle of Antietam the other day, and it's outcome. Now, we all know the details and outcome of the battle, but something has always bothered me about the way it is classified by most. The battle seems to be generally considered a tactical stalemate, but a Union strategic victory due to Lee's Maryland campaign being turned back. But I have a different take on it- I actually consider Antietam to be a strategic victory for the Confederates, not the Union.

To explain, the very fact that McClellan had the detailed Confederate battle plans basically dropped in his lap should have allowed him to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia and possibly end the war in the Eastern Theater right there in Maryland. The fact that McClellan was so cautious was bad enough, but the fact that he used the Army of the Potomac in piecemeal, costly attacks was mind-boggling to say the least. McClellan had the numerical advantage and Lee was vulnerable and without A.P Hill's forces at the time, which should have allowed the Union forces the opportunity for a resounding victory. Instead, the battle was a draw with huge losses for both sides and Lee escaped back into Virginia, his army damaged but not destroyed.

So, in conclusion, it is my opinion that the battle should be classified as a strategic Confederate victory because the Army of Northern Virginia survived to fight another day, and McClellan was responsible for yet another blunder. So kind readers, what do you think?

[john duffer]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

So, in conclusion, it is my opinion that the battle should be classified as a strategic Confederate victory because the Army of Northern Virginia survived to fight another day, and McClellan was responsible for yet another blunder. So kind readers, what do you think?

I have to respectfully disagree. True the battle for the Feds was horribly mismanaged and an enormous loss of an opportunity but nonetheless they managed to turn back Lee's advance. Compared to the Seven Days and Second Manassas it had to look like up and you'll note how quickly Lincoln jumped on it.

For the other part, until near the end where he had no choice, Lee fought to smash his enemy - not to survive to fight another day.

[Pvt Schnapps]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

At the end of August, 1862, the Confederate dollar was still worth two-thirds its value in gold (67 cents). By November it had dropped to half that and by the spring of 1863, after the twin blows of Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation, it had dropped to about 18 cents. ("Hard Times in the Confederacy," The Century, Sept. 1888)

That's pretty much what international capital thought about the outcome of Antietam.

Karl Marx, another observer, called it sooner, writing in Die Presse on October 7 1862, that "The short campaign in Maryland has decided the fate of the American Civil War, however much the fortune of war may still vacillate between the opposing parties for a shorter or longer time. As we have already stated in this newspaper, the fight for the possession of the border slave states is a fight for the domination over the Union, and the Confederacy has been defeated in this fight which it started under extremely favourable circumstances that are not likely ever to occur again." (Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 248)

Any time you see Marx and international capital agree on something you should probably take it seriously. Antietam was not just a strategic victory for the United States, but perhaps the most strategic victory of the war and, in this rare instance, the smart money and the ideological left agreed.

[WV_Reb]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

Good points everyone, Even though it was a Union victory, I still feel that it was not the total victory that it could have and should have been.

[thomas aagaard]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

Before judging it, I think it is important to study how strong/weak the federal army actually was...

They had just as many problems with strangling as Lee did.
They had units so green that they didn't know how to fire their weapons or change from column into line.
Most US units had seen combat 1 time. (And some not at all)
Most CSA units had seen combat 2-3 times or even more.
Most US officers was new in their commands, and the army was actually made up units from 3 different armies.
And one of them had just been routed in their last battle against Lee.

And finally strength. CSA numbers was counted as men in the line. not even officers was counted.
(and the many slaves doing support jobs was not counted)
US strength included the officers. And men detailed as teamsters, and other support jobs.

The numbers from 3 unit corp tell us that they only had about 2/3 of their men actually with the colors ready to fight. when compared to the represent for duty, numbers.
Some where of driving wagons, helping at hospitals and similar... and large numbers was strangling.

So the US army was not 2½-3 times larger then the CSA army...

[DougCooper]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

Obviously a Union strategic victory because of the political capital it gave Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. The war was suddenly a dual purpose, England and France interference nullified, Lee's invasion turned back, etc. The fact that McClellan could never win because he never dared to lose was moot in the great scheme of things. I have often thought about what might have happen had "won" the battle and crushed Lee against the Potomac. That would be an interesting thread.

[woodsda]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

Good points everyone, Even though it was a Union victory, I still feel that it was not the total victory that it could have and should have been.

It is impossible to judge a total victory from today's standards, especially when we have the whole war laid out in front of us. It is like judging the success of a football team on Monday morning when you have seen the results, we as humans tend to say why didn't they do this and that to make success even better or a reality. Antietam had to have been a terrible day in itself with the amount of casualties on both sides. This is coupled with the previous weeks fighting at South Mountain and Harpers Ferry, both sides were exhausted at the end. While McClellan did have the opportunity to renew the attack on the 18th, his men may not have had the desire to do so after the fighting on the 17th that really gained no ground. Here is what I do know about Antietam and the results: Lee's invasion of the north failed, his strategic goal of taking the fighting into Pennsylvania was stopped. This would force him to make the trip again the next summer with similar results. The fighting that raged in Maryland gave the AoP experience and confidence that can be seen even the losses at Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville in the coming months. Lincolns resolve to change the aim of the war by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation was a direct result of the Maryland campaign, and thus changed how the war would be fought from that time on. Confederate losses from the summer fighting and the Maryland campaign could not be replaced (however the army that went to Gettysburg was much larger then in the Maryland campaign), especially experienced officers and NCO's. I think the most important thing to understand about strategic arm chairing is that they did what they could with the information they had at hand at that time, whether it was accurate or not. At the end of the day, McClellan acted on his information and the strength of his army as he saw it. Lincoln did not see it the same way and we know what he did.

[WV_Reb]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

More good points, and after thinking about it some more, I'm starting to see the battle as more of a Union strategic victory. Mostly for the simple fact that Lincoln was able to issue the Emancipation Proclamation as a political master stroke that nullified the possibility of foreign intervention for the Confederacy. That in itself was a serious gut punch to the Southern hopes of victory.

[jake.koch]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

Don't forget that the Emancipation Proclamation also allowed the recruitment of African Americans into the Union Army 180,000-200,000 by war's end. One stroke of a pen because of this one battle essentially landed the Union the equivalent of two field armies, even if they didn't all see combat they were deployed in a way to allow others that chance. That is besides the previously mentioned international importance of the battle. The psychological standpoint had to be just as important in the Union as well, Lee had been unbeatable since he took command in the Spring. Suddenly he showed he was perhaps human.

[Sheafferhistorian]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

I tend to agree with McPherson on this issue- a rather decisive Union victory. Lee failed in all of his strategic goals and his army was battered in the process.

[4vaadjutant]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

The Battle of Sharpsburg was a Union strategic victory because it caused Lee to delay any plans to move into Pennsylvania and gave Lincoln the opportunity he wanted to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. An argument can be made that the battle might be considered a Confederate tactical victory because they were able to fight the Federals to a battlefield draw. Given that the Confederates had about 35,500 men on the field on September 17 while McClellan had about 110,000 available to service (but he failed to commit two corps that were on the field), the fact the Confederates were not driven from the field shows their tenacity and the ineptitude of McClellan. The Confederate losses (about 11,000 k/w/m) were proportionately greater than the Federals, but it is interesting to note that Lee was reinforced on the night after the battle concluded on the 17th by about 6500 stragglers. Another tough loss were the 49% of the army's commissioned officers in the fighting of the 17th. One objective of Lee's was to draw the Federal Army around Washington City away from the city and perhaps successfully engage it before all of McClellan's divisions were shifted to DC from the Virginia Peninsula. The size of the Union Army could have been much larger at Sharpsburg if the units of McClellan's and Pope's forces were allowed to combine. Another objective of Lee's was to get the Federals out of the Shenandoah Valley and Northern Virginia so the farmers could harvest their crops for consumption by the civilians and armies of the Confederacy in Virginia. That objective was largely met as well as that of the army surviving to continue the fight. Within a month after the Battle of Sharpsburg Lee's Army was back to about 60,000 men due to the return of stragglers, convalescents and the infusion of new conscripts.

[thomas aagaard]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

You numbers are basically using the lowest possible number for the csa and the highest possible for the union.

The basic problem is that the CSA number is only counting infantry in the ranks with a musket.
(not the officers, not the men in the artillery, not the men, often slaves, driving wagons and so on...)

The union PFD include them all. and about 1/6 of the union strength was doing none combat jobs
This would make two similar size armies out to have two very different strengths.

Until hooker the union used PFD when reporting numbers.
A union army that reported 100.000 men, would be men PFD, and it actually only had about 65-70.000 infantry ready to fight.
(numbers for AoP during june 63 give rates of 64-71% of the PFD strength being infantry ready to fight)

In comparison the AoV would just report 70.000 men, when the total size of the army would be about 100.000.

Hooker changed this and added a count of "Present for Duty, Equipped" this make his army look smaller.
Since Johnston and later Lee only counted "combat effectives" from the start this give us a better idea about the two army sizes from Hooker and for the rest of the war.

So the two armies where much more even than the numbers you give.


If you are interested in getting past the problematic numbers, I can suggest you look at :
this topic on civil war talk.

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/sharpsburg-was-a-confederate-victory-possible.137903/page-3

About the counting issue:

http://67thtigers.blogspot.com/2017/07/livermore-and-how-he-got-his-numbers.html

Oh, and only about 1 division was not committed by McClellan... the rest was used. When a corp attack and fail, many of the units are worn out, disordered and out of ammo and they need someone else to hold the line afterwards. Most of the two corps you think was in reserve, was used piecemeal for holding the line. And even if they did not see much actual combat, they where no longer a useful reserve.

[Sheafferhistorian]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

McClellan kept the Fifth and Sixth corps on the East bank of the Antietam September 17. A division from either could have decisively swung the battle.

[thomas aagaard]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

5th corp was not a reserve useful for any sort of attack.
First of all, one division (humphrey's) was not on the field.

So it is only two division at the start of the day. (making many of the numbers you can find for the corps to high)

If you read porters report he first loose his some of his artillery to Pleasonton. fighting west of the "center bridge"
Then four infantry battalions are used supporting Pleasonton (they loose about a 100 men during the day)
(Sykes regulars)

Later a brigade is sent in support of Burnside.
By late afternoon the 5th corp is less than 4.000 men that are not in reserve but in the front lines holding the center of the union lines.
(two of the brigades are ordered north, but later return)


The 6th Corps was put into line in the north covering the union fores that had been used up in the attacks in that area.
(including II and XII corps)

Similar making them useless as a reserve.

[john duffer]

Re: Antietam- Victory for the North, or salvation for the South?

"The 6th Corps was put into line in the north covering the union fores that had been used up in the attacks in that area.
(including II and XII corps)

Similar making them useless as a reserve. "

Lee fought every unit of his army and had no reserves. His entire force was used up and a fresh Corps should have been able to push anything in front of it.